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All lands comprising the United States were previously owned by Indian tribes or
foreign nations. Over the nation's history, over 2 billion acres of land have been acquired
through treaty, purchase, or conquest. Ownership ofmost lands has since been transferred
to states—which maintain their own public land systems—and private corporations (e.g.,
railroads) and individuals. Federal policies in favor of land disposition began to give way in
the late 1800s to policies designed at land retention. Lands reserved in federal ownership
through congressional or presidential action are found in several national land-use systems,
including National Forests managed by the U.S. Forest Service, National Parks and
Monuments managed by the National Park Service, Wildlife Refuges managed by the U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service, and a host of"leftover" lands, generally arid grasslands, managed
by the U.S. Bureau ofLand Management [hereinafter BLM]. Significant landholdings also
are under the jurisdiction of the military and the two primary federal water agencies, the
Bureau ofReclamation and U.S. Army Corps ofEngineers. Today, approximately one-
third of the original public domain—about three-quarters of a billion acres!—is retained in
federal ownership. The overwhelming majority of these public lands lie in the western
United States, including Alaska.
The value of the federal public lands is both vast and incalculable. While it is
frequently possible to quantify public and private revenues associated with specific public
land resources, activities, and programs, this information rarely paints a complete picture of
resource valuation. Of particular concern is the observation that many qualities of the
public lands are valued in ways that are not explicitly economic, thus impeding efforts to
quantify all resource values using a singular, monetary valuation criterion. Additionally,
many types of values with an economic component defy easy measurement. This can be
particularly troublesome for resource goods and services that are not directly associated
with human consumption or use, and for those which are not amenable to market
transactions due to their public good orientation, their intergenerational nature, or to related
qualities promoting market failures. The proliferation of natural resource subsidies can
further hinder the use of economic statistics which, despite these shortcomings, still provide
an essential empirical measure ofvalue that is impossible to escape or ignore. For these
reasons, the authors of this report have chosen to nest the review of economic statistics
within discussions of the history, ideology, politics, and law of resource management,
leading to a highly socioeconomic construct ofvalue. This provides an appropriate
perspective from which to value public land resources.
Although it is impossible to empirically describe the full value of the public lands,
some relevant statistical data can be presented for most of the major uses and values,
especially those of an explicitly economic nature. Two broad categories of statistical data
are presented: (1) resource inventory, use, and prognosis; and (2) market values and
revenue streams. This information is assembled for seven types of resource uses and values,
organized into two categories:
A. Primarily Consumptive Uses and Values
• (1) Minerals and Energy Resources. This category include hardrock minerals,
leasables (including most oil and gas resources), and salables. Both hardrock
minerals and leasables generate huge financial outputs, although only the latter
results in significant public revenues—approximately $6.2 billion in 1997.
• (2) Rangeland and Grazing. The BLM manages approximately 165 million acres
open to grazing, supporting about 4.4 million cattle, sheep, and horses; while the
Forest Service manages approximately 105 million acres of public rangeland in the
United States, almost exclusively located in the West, grazed by 2 million cattle,
sheep, and horses. These activities typically generate over $20 million in public
revenues from grazing fees.
• (3) Timber and Forest Products. In 1996, approximately 3.7 billion board feet
[hereinafter BBF] oftimber was harvested from the National Forest system,
generating about $544 million in public receipts. Timber harvesting on BLM lands
is not a major activity outside ofthe O&C (former Oregon and California Railroad)
lands in Oregon, which generated $75 million in public revenues in 1996.
• (4) Water Resources. Federal lands are the source of most surface water supplies
nationally. Additionally, much of the nation's available water storage—especially in
the arid and semi-arid West—is provided by federal water impoundments. Water
withdrawals nationally totaled approximately 390 million acre feet [hereinafter
MAF] in 1990, with the largest users being western agriculturists at 140 MAF. In
addition to storing water, many ofthese facilities generate huge sums of
hydroelectricity. Over 130 billion kilowatt hours were generated in 1996 from
facilities managed by the Bureau ofReclamation and Army Corps ofEngineers.
B. Primarily Non-Consumptive Uses and Values
• (5) Recreation. Most components of the public lands receive heavy recreational
use. In 1995, the Forest Service and National Park Service recorded 345 million
and 110 million visitor days, respectively. Recreational visits on BLM lands totaled
almost 73 million visitor days in 1996. Recreation at federal water facilities is also
extremely significant. Outdoor recreation in the United States is a $350 billion
industry (in terms of gross domestic product), with approximately $140 billion
attributable to public lands and $40 billion to public waterways.
• (6) Research and Knowledge. The public lands contain a wealth of information in
a variety of substantive areas, including biology, geology, archeology, and history.
This knowledge is valued both by scholars and the general public, as evidenced by
the approximately 60 million visits per year to historical, commemorative, and
archeological sites managed by the National Park Service. These resources are
primarily valued for social, rather than economic, reasons.
• (7) Biodiversity Preservation. Over 3,000 plant and animal species are dependent
upon the federal public lands for at least part of their habitat. Over 900 of these
species are listed as either threatened or endangered. The value of these species,
according to the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Endangered Species Act, is
"incalculable." Congressional appropriations for recovery programs implemented by
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service totaled $29 million in 1994; the total national
investment in species protection is considerably higher.
Potential reforms for improving public lands management come from all ends of the
political and ideological spectrums. Proposals range from the "tweaking" of existing
statutory regulations and administrative responsibilities to wholesale privatization of the
public lands. This report does not attempt to survey the entire spectrum of potential
innovations, but instead focuses on three major categories of reform proposals generally
focusing on the location of decision-making authority and the nature in which market
incentives and process are utilized to efficiently pursue objectives: marketization,
privatization, and localization. The broad category of marketization includes those
proposals calling for the application of market incentives and pricing structures to public
land management, allowing free markets, rather than political processes, for example, to
establish grazing, recreation, and royalty fees. A closely related—but more politically
ambitious and controversial—concept is privatization, which involves formally transferring
ownership or control of public land resources into private hands. Privatization is frequently
discussed in the context offederal divestiture, which in the language ofthis report, also
includes those reform proposals described as localization. Localization refers to the formal
transfer of public land resources into the hands of state and local governments.
In many cases, these reform efforts are fueled by a growing national concern over
natural resource subsidies, as many uses ofthe public lands are not financially self-
supporting or do not generate revenues commensurate with similar activities on private or
state lands. Public land subsidies often suggest an outdated or otherwise inappropriate
allocation offederal funds and priorities. However, in other cases, these policies reflect a
desire to protect ecological or social values and land uses that defy a simple monetary
accounting. Determining which policies are inappropriate and which reforms are justified,
therefore, is a difficult undertaking, requiring a careful balancing of resource values ofboth
an economic and non-economic nature. This is usually best accomplished through a non-
quantitative approach that utilizes the available economic data, but also considers factors
such as environmental objectives, social mores, and community responsibilities. This is an
extremely difficult mandate, but is central to the challenge of public lands valuation.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Issue of Perspective
The public lands of the United States are a great national treasure. These vast tracts
of land, largely located in the western U.S., encompass a staggering array of natural
diversity, and correspondingly, a tremendous diversity of attendant human uses and values.
Determining appropriate uses, and non-uses, ofthese lands is a complex and evolving policy
challenge. To do this correctly—and we must do this correctly—requires, at a minimum,
some common understanding ofthe value of these lands. At first glance, this appears to be
a conceptually simple, albeit practically arduous, matter of compiling statistics on resource
availability and use. While information ofthis nature is certainly relevant and useful, and is
a featured component of this report, these statistics can provide only an approximation of
public value, as value is not a fixed or easily defined parameter. In most human endeavors,
value is determined through a comparison of costs of similar goods or services, or if no
comparable substitutes exist, through some estimate of willingness to pay.1 While tools
such as these can be of some use, ultimately they can provide only crude approximations of
many types ofvalues.
One particularly troubling challenge in estimating public land values is the simple
observation that what is valuable is shaped by a variety of forces over time, as cultural,
economic, political, technological, ideological, legal, and social trends, among others, work
to modify the perspective through which we view our public lands. There is an awkward,
historically-based dichotomy in the public lands. Whereas many public lands are regions of
such beauty and significance that they have been retained in federal ownership as national
treasures, many others are quite literally lands the government could not give away during
the homesteading era. Long thought to be valueless, many ofthese semi-arid and arid lands
are now highly coveted, as changing social mores, economic conditions, and technological
opportunities have revealed many new values in these lands, including oil and mineral
resources, recreation opportunities, and a variety of other commodity and amenity values.
If this consideration were not sufficiently complex, consider the further situation of lands
now utilized to satisfy specific management purposes, for example, the preservation of
endangered species. For those that value endangered species, including those that feel a
moral responsibility to protect species from human-induced extinction, what is the value of
these lands? For those that depend economically upon the production oftimber or other
commodities from those same lands, activities now restricted in favor of endangered species
protection, what is the value of these lands? How, if at all, were these values truly different
before the endangered species was recognized and accorded legal protection? These are
not economic questions, nor are they questions for which any credible economic valuation
statistic can be provided.
1 Detailed discussions of valuation techniques are provided by Freeman (1993), Hausman (1993), Smith
(1996), and Pethig (1994), among others. Section III provides a very brief overview of some of the major
concepts covered in these texts.
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Accurately cataloging and measuring the full range of public land values,
consequently, is an inherently imprecise undertaking. The aforementioned methodological
constraints, however, do not invalidate the need to provide policy-makers with accurate
information about public land values. As is true for all policy areas, the quality of decisions
made is, at least in part, dependent upon the quality of information available to the decision-
makers. How, then, can a meaningful and practically useful estimate of public land values
be compiled? The approach taken in this report is to recognize that several types of
statistics, if placed within a relevant historical and ideological context, can help to develop
an appropriate perspective through which to evaluate public land values. An appropriate
perspective is one which recognizes that human beings ascribe value to external objects in a
multifaceted manner, attaching monetary, spiritual, aesthetic, or simply indefinable impulses
of significance to the public lands and to the array of natural qualities and human
communities which, in some way, are associated with these lands. If this perspective is
cultivated, then traditional economic statistics—such as revenues generated from timber
sales—can be utilized responsibly in public policy debates, and not used as a political tool to
subjugate parties concerned with the less economically tangible and quantifiable values of
the same lands, such as environmental activists promoting the preservation of old growth
forests to serve ecological and aesthetic objectives. This is the approach taken in this
report.
Organization and Content of the Report
This report presents a variety of statistics and supporting material dealing with the
public lands. Public lands are defined broadly to encompass all lands retained and managed
by the federal government due to their natural resource properties. This definition includes
familiar public land components such as National Forests, National Wildlife Refuges, federal
rangelands, and National Parks and Monuments, as well as less familiar elements like sub
surface mineral resources—including offshore deposits—wildlife habitat, and environmental
amenities. A few other resources, such as wildlife and water, are discussed briefly due to
their close association and interrelationship with public lands management. Indian lands are
not covered in this report due to their quasi-independent status. Similarly, federal lands
retained for military purposes are also excluded in this report, in part because the
management decisions for these lands are not driven by traditional natural resource
management considerations, and in part because relevant natural resource statistical
information for these lands is often not publicly available.2 The availability—and more
importantly, the unavailability—of statistical information unavoidably shapes the type of
data provided in the report. Most ofthe quantitative information presented focuses upon
the two major public lands management agencies, the BLM and the U.S. Forest Service, as
these agencies keep solid records oftheir activities. Most nongovernmental sources of
information derive their statistics from the data and records ofthese two agencies, thus
2 Rubenson et al. (1996) provide one of the few useful overviews of the 25 million acres of land managed by
the Department of Defense.
privately compiled records are typically not appreciably different or more credible than the
official statistics.
The report begins in Section II with a description of the historical genesis of the
public lands and the gradual shift in federal land policy from a focus on aggressive
disposition ofthe "public domain" to increasingly strict land retention and management by
the federal government.3 This discussion is needed to describe the major categories of
federal public lands, and to introduce the primary agencies and statutes responsible for the
management of these resources. Section III features a review of philosophical and
methodological issues associated with public lands valuation. This discussion is part of the
effort to nurture an appropriate perspective from which to consider valuation statistics.
Section IV features a partial summary of use and valuation statistics for many types of
public land resources, including the primarily consumptive use values associated with
energy and mineral resources, rangeland, forests, and water resources, as well as the
primarily non-consumptive values associated with outdoor recreation, research and
knowledge, and biodiversity preservation. Section V examines emerging trends and
proposed policy reforms that are reshaping public lands policy. Specifically, this section
investigates innovations expanding the role of market processes and local entities, both
public and private, in the management of the federal public lands. Finally, in Section VI, a
few concluding observations are offered, focusing in part on the modern concern over
natural resource subsidies. Additional statistics and literature citations are provided in
Sections VII and VIII, respectively.
3 Although the phrase "public domain" today is used synonymously with the term "public lands,"
traditionally the term "public domain" referred to lands open to homestcading which had not yet been
"reserved" to federal ownership. There are no public domain lands today in the sense of public lands which
are not explicitly reserved.
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Acquisition of the Public Lands
All lands comprising the United States were previously owned by Indian tribes or
foreign nations. Over the nation's history, over 2 billion acres of land have been acquired
through treaty, purchase, or conquest. Ownership ofmost lands has since been transferred
to states—which maintain their own public land systems—and private corporations and
individuals. However, approximately one-third of the original public domain remains in
federal ownership. The majority of these public lands lie in the western United States,
including Alaska.
The nation's formal acquisition of territory began with the American Revolution and
the ratification ofthe Constitution, which effectively gave the original thirteen states
underlying fee title to the lands of the former English colonies located along the Atlantic
coast.4 These original states, as well as Vermont, Maine, Tennessee, Kentucky, Texas, and
Hawaii, are generally not considered "public land states," because the federal government
never retained appreciable ownership of lands within their borders, instead ceding most of
these lands directly to the states. In addition to land acquisitions from the English Empire,
significant landholdings were also acquired from France, Spain, Mexico, and Russia. Of
particular historical significance was the Louisiana Purchase of 1803, when 523 million
acres ofthe Mississippi River Basin were acquired from France. This acquisition was soon
followed by Spain's surrender ofFlorida in 1817, and by an agreement with the British in
1818 to extend the 49th parallel—the northern border ofthe continental United States—
westward into the Red River Valley. Remaining English territories in Maine and Oregon
were acquired in 1842 and 1846, respectively. Most of the remaining western territories,
excluding Alaska and Hawaii, were acquired through conflicts with Mexico in the 1840's.
Of particular note was the statehood granted to Texas in 1846 after achieving independence
from Mexico, and acquisition ofmany additional territories originally claimed by Mexico—
including California and much of the Southwest— in the 1848 Treaty ofGuadeloupe
Hidalgo. Extreme southern Arizona and New Mexico were later acquired from Mexico in
the Gadsden Purchase of 1853. Alaska and Hawaii did not join the Union until 1959, the
Alaska territories having been acquired earlier through purchase from Russia in 1867, while
Hawaii joined the United States as an independent nation.5
Caught in the middle of the colonial conflict for land between the emerging new
nation of the United States and European nations struggling to retain significant footholds
A A fascinating narrative of this history is provided by DcVoto (1952).
5 Although it is difficult to measure the cost of territories acquired by war, those acquired by purchase arc
easy to evaluate. The total price tag of the Louisiana Purchase, after required interest payments and other
terms, totaled over $27 million dollars. The 1853 Gadsden Purchase, involving much smaller and
dramatically less fertile lands, cost $10 million. The purchase of the Alaskan territories in 1867 cost $7.2
million. Of these transactions, the Alaska purchase was the most controversial, even though the per acre
cost of about two cents per acre was nearly identical to the cost of the highly acclaimed Louisiana Purchase
Available in Encyclopedia Britannica Online,<http://www.cb.com>.
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in North America were the Native Americans, thought to have occupied the continent for at
least 20,000 years. The legal basis for federal acquisition and control of Indian lands was
first articulated by the Supreme Court in 1823 in the landmark case ofJohnson v.
Mclntosh.6 Although many elements of the decision authored by ChiefJustice Marshall
positively influenced federal Indian law by recognizing some tribal rights of occupancy and
sovereignty on aboriginal lands, the decision's articulation of a "doctrine of discovery"
provided the legal justification for dispossessing the Indians oftheir lands.7 After several
decades of warfare, disease, and treaty-making, most surviving Indian Nations by the
1880's had been concentrated on reservations in the western United States, primarily in
what is now Oklahoma, South Dakota, Montana, and Arizona. These reservations, totaling
approximately 138 million acres of mostly desolate lands, represented only a small fraction
of original Indian territories. Moreover, within 50 years, well over sixty percent of these
lands were removed from Indian possession, as the new American nation completed its
torrid and frequently reprehensible accumulation of land and natural resource wealth. One
of the primary mechanisms by which Indians were dispossessed of reservation land was the
General Allotment Act (or Dawes Act) of 18878 which called for Indian reservations to be
allotted, or parceled out, to individual members of the tribe rather than remaining in
collective ownership. Once these lands were converted to private individual ownership,
transfer to non-Indian interests was greatly simplified (McDonnell, 1991).
Early Policy: Disposition of the Public Lands
Almost as quickly as the public domain was acquired did Congress turn its attention
to land disposition and settlement, recognizing that nations cannot easily retain lands that
are poorly populated. The Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides Congress
with broad authority over the use and disposal of the public lands: "Congress shall have
Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or
other Property belonging to the United States."9 Up until the turn ofthe 20th century,
Congress used this exclusive plenary power in a series of legislative initiatives designed to
dispose of the public lands. These initiatives included land grants to states, railroads, and
settlers, as well as mineral and timber grants.
Grants to States
In addition to large land grants made upon statehood to the "non-public lands
states" located primarily in the East, newly created states in the Midwest and West also
6 Johnson v. Mcintosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543 (1823).
' Essentially, the doctrine of discovery, borrowed from the international "law ofcivilized nations," asserts
the right of European nations to assume valid title to land either by conquest or purchase.
8 Act of February 8, 1887. ch 119, §1, 24 Stat. 388. now codified at 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1995).
9 Article IV, section 3, paragraph 2.
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often received sizable land grants upon gaining statehood.l0 These grants were allocated in
accordance with the Land Ordinance of 1785, which created a rectangular survey system in
which federal lands were divided into square townships of 36 identically-numbered sections
each containing 640 acres (Coggins et al., 1992)." Initially, states were allocated two
sections per township—numbers 16 and 36—typically to support state education
expenses.12 In some circumstances, "in lieu" selections were granted to the states when
necessary to compensate for the fact that the legislatively specified township sections were
sometimes already claimed by other private interests, usually homesteaders or miners. In
lieu selections entitled a state to another township section of land of comparable quality or
rough equivalency. Originally, states making in lieu land selections were prohibited from
systematically selecting valuable lands of known mineral character or value, however, this
policy was eventually revised to allow in lieu mineral selections provided that the
unavailable school trust lands were also mineral in character.13 Land grants to states either
gave full fee simple ownership to states, or were sometimes limited to a particular public
purpose like recreational activity.14
Overall, 77 million acres were given for state school trust lands and 21 million acres
were disposed of as sites for institutions of higher education (Coggins et al., 1992). The
vast majority of these educational land grants are located in the West, in accordance with
changing federal policies over time regarding the admission ofnew states. A few western
states—namely Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah—were particularly fortunate, receiving
four school sections, twice the normal allotment, in every township.15 Another special case
was that of Alaska, which under the Alaska Enabling Act was granted the right to select
104 million acres of federal land, the largest of all state land grants.16
Grants to Railroads
Another major strategy of land disposal was grants to railroads, which provided
powerful economic incentives to accomplish the twin goals of western infrastructure
10 In accordance with the Submerged Lands Act of 1953 (43 U.S.C.A. §§1301-1315), states have also been
granted the right to regulate lands located beneath navigable rivers within their borders—although
regulation of the river itself is frequently retained by the federal government through exercise of the
Commerce Clause.
11 A Township is a square plot of land 6 miles to a side, consisting of 36 sections of one square mile each.
Each section contains 640 acres.
12 See 43 U.S.C.A. §§851-73.
13 The Supreme Court upheld the Secretary of Interior's administrative policy of disallowing in lieu
selections when there was "grossly disparate value" between the original school trust lands and those
selected for substitution, in Andrus v. Utah, 448 U.S. 907 (1980).
14 See 43 U.S.C.A. § 869. . .
15 In fact, a significant controversy surrounding President Clinton's recent declaration of the 1.7 million
acre Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument in southern Utah is the fact that the State of Utah has
some school trust lands located within the monument which are believed to be of significant mineral value,
and is consequently demanding comparably valuable federal lands outside of the monument boundaries in
compensation.
16 72 Stat 339 (P L. 85-508), Act of July 7, 1958; 48 U.S.C. §§ 21, ch. 2-27.
11
development and settlement (Coggins et al., 1992). As early as 1835, Congress was
granting railroads rights-of-way across the public lands up to 100 feet wide, adopting a
general law to that effect in 1852, which also included the free use of earth, stone, and
timber from adjacent public lands.17 To create an additional incentive for rapid railroad
construction, Congress in 1850 began granting railroad companies "checkerboard" rights-
of-way through the public lands, giving railroad companies the alternate odd-numbered
township sections within six miles ofthe railroad line. Later, these checkerboard grants
increased to twenty odd-numbered sections within a forty-mile radius. This checkerboard
pattern of land disposal was designed to increase the value of the federal plots adjacent to
newly privatized railroad lands by making it more appealing for settlement due to its
proximity to a rail line and burgeoning commercial enterprises. The checkerboard policy
was also designed to prevent the already powerful railroad companies from monopolizing
the public lands—a goal only partially accomplished. Railroads were given immense parcels
of land, drying up a significant amount of the public lands still available for homesteading
and leading some modem observers to conclude that the "railroad enterprise effectively
ended the frontier" (Coggins et al., 1992:98). Approximately 90 million acres were
eventually given directly to the railroads by Congress, as well as 35 to 40 million acres
granted to the states for use by the railroads.
These generous land grants to railroads were often abused, occasionally leading to
forfeiture of lands back to the federal government for failure to comply with the conditions
of the original grants. The most notable example is provided by the timber-rich "O&C"
lands ofthe Pacific Northwest, so named due to their original conveyance to the Oregon
and California Railroad which had agreed to construct a line from Portland to Sacramento.
However, after numerous delays in construction, the land eventually reverted back to the
federal government and is today managed by the BLM (Coggins et al., 1992). The O&C
lands contain some of the finest old growth forests left in the United States, and have
consequently emerged as lands of high concern to many parties in the Pacific Northwest, as
well as national timber interests and the greater environmental community.18
Land Grants to Settlers
Several legislative initiatives were also designed to privatize or directly transfer
public lands into the hands of individual western settlers, particularly farmers. The
underlying federal philosophy during the homesteading era was derived from the idealistic
Jeffersonian vision of a vast society of independent, productive "yeoman" farmers.
Individuals of this nature were typically characterized as being more desirable Americans
than the capitalistic and industry-minded entrepreneurs that were becoming an increasingly
powerful economic force in 19th century America. Initial federal support for homesteaders
17 Act of August 4, 1852, ch. 200, §§ 1-2, 10 Stat. 28.
18 Most of these lands are now under the protective veil of President Clinton's Northwest Forest Plan, in
effect since 1993, which has severely restricted timber cut-levels in old growth forests of the Pacific
Northwest primarily to protect the dwindling population of endangered spotted owls (Record of Decision,
1994; Carroll, 1995).
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came in the General Preemption Act of 1841, which formally recognized the previously
unofficial practice of preemption: i.e., granting settler-squatters the preferential right to buy
their claims at modest prices without competitive bidding.19 Further assistance to western
homesteaders was provided by the 1862 Homestead Act,20 designed to achieve widely
dispersed individual ownership of land and provide a means of encouraging rapid westward
expansion into the Frontier. Under the Act, an individual U.S. citizen was permitted to
enter a parcel of public domain land in good faith and receive a federal patent—i.e., a deed
granting fee simple title—to 160 acres ofterritory for settling the land, residing on it for five
years, and putting it to beneficial agricultural use.
The Homestead Act and similar policies were frequently abused. For example,
many unscrupulous "settlers" would enter a parcel in alleged good faith, only to strip the
land of its timber or minerals, sell the commodities, and then move on to exploit other
parcels of the public domain. More sophisticated schemes involved hiring a straw purchaser
to pose as a farmer-settler and patent a tract, whereupon the phony homesteader would tum
around and sell the patent to timber speculators for a nominal fee (Wilkinson, 1992). Still
other recalcitrant individuals would claim lands they did not legitimately settle—in the sense
of cultivating the land agriculturally—or fence in more land than was allowed by the statute,
thereby excluding other settlers. Ultimately, the Homestead Act was partially revoked with
the passage of the 1934 Taylor Grazing Act,21 and was expressly repealed in 1976 with the
passage of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA).22
Corruption was not the only major deficiency in federal homesteading policy. Of
equal concern was the tremendous failure rate of homesteads, especially during prolonged
midwestem droughts beginning in the late 1880's (Stegner, 1953). To more effectively
pursue Jefferson's agrarian ideal, it was soon evident that landholdings of 160 acres were
insufficient to support a pioneer family in semi-arid and arid regions that were better suited
to ranching economies. One response to this realization was found in the Stock-Raising
Homestead Act of 1916, which increased the amount of land that could be homesteaded to
640 acres of land designated as chiefly valuable for grazing.23 A different approach to the
aridity problem was taken earlier in the 1877 Desert Lands Act,24 which awarded land to
settlers in arid regions for twenty-five cents per acre, with patents being conveyed upon
19 Act of September 4, 1841, ch. 16, § 11; 5 Slat. 433, 456 (repealed 1891). Up until the passage of this
Act, preemption was understood to be a preferential right of settlers to squat on a parcel of public lands and
later purchase the land from the federal government for a modest fee and without the competition of a
bidding system. In contrast to all prior preemption-based statutes which had only the effect of ratifying
prior squatting claims, the General Preemption Act sanctioned prospective squatting by granting the right
of eligible settler-squatters to receive up to 160 acres at $1.25 per acre (Coggins et al., 1992).
20 See 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 161-284, (repealed 1976).
2143U.S.C.A. §§315-315r.
"43 U.S.C.A §§1701-84.
23 See 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 291-302. The Stock-Raising Homestead Act followed largely in the footsteps of the
Kinkaid Act, passed in 1904, to successfully settle Nebraska. In response to the abuses of the Homestead
Act, patents issued under the Stock-Raising Homestead Act limited the use of the land to grazing and
foraging crops, explicitly reserving the coal and mineral rights to the government. As a result of this, lands
patented under the Stock-Raising Homestead Act comprise a split-estate: the surface ownership is private,
while the subsurface, mineral estate is federally owned.
24 See 43 U.S.C.A. §§321-329.
13
proof of successful irrigation. In many regions, however, relatively few individuals or
privately-funded cooperatives could successfully satisfy the financial and technical demands
of constructing irrigation projects, prompting congressional passage ofthe Reclamation Act
of 190225 and the subsequent establishment ofthe U.S. Reclamation Service, later to
become the Bureau of Reclamation (Pisani, 1992). Some $22 billion later, the Bureau of
Reclamation has provided well over 100 million acre-feet of water storage capacity in over
130 major projects, radically changing the western landscape forever (WWPRAC, 1997).
Sizable land grants were also offered as payment to individuals who served in the
armed forces during war, especially the Civil War. Not only did these "bounty warrants"
eliminate a burden on the federal treasury, they also satisfied the twin goals of"rewarding
the aggressive conquerors while removing them from the civilized vicinity" (Coggins et al.,
1992:85). Although a precise estimate of the total acreage awarded through this program is
difficult to accurately determine, over 60 million acres were disposed of in this manner
between 1847 and 1906.
Mineral and Timber Grants to Settlers
Land was not the only incentive provided by the federal government to settle the
West. The potential to "strike it rich" through mineral development provided one ofthe
most significant inducements to western settlement, beginning in earnest with the gold and
silver rushes ofthe 1840's and 1850's (Coggins et al., 1992). The 1872 General Mining
Law (also known as the "Hardrock Act") was designed to encourage additional western
mineral exploration, proclaiming "all valuable mineral deposits in lands belonging to the
United States . . . shall be free and open to exploration and purchase, and the lands in which
they are found to occupation and purchase."26 Still in effect today, the law gives individuals
the opportunity to "locate" or stake a mining claim on federally owned public lands,
entitling the individual to the exclusive rights to occupy and diligently explore the land for
"discovery" of a valuable mineral deposit.27 Upon proof of discovery of a commercially
valuable mineral deposit and payment of a nominal fee, the individual can patent the land
and thereby receive a full estate in property: i.e., fee title to both the land (surface estate)
and the mineral resources (subsurface estate). With such a liberal standard for mineral
exploration, it is not surprising to find a long and sordid history of exploitation under the
General Mining Law. These abuses have led over time to increasingly strict management of
minerals in the public interest and a gradual removal of commercially valuable minerals
initially covered by the Hardrock Act, with those resources placed instead under closely
managed leasing or competitive bidding systems.
25 See 43 U.S.C.A. §§371431.
26 30 U.S.C.A. § 22.
27 This right is known as "pedis possessio," under which the prospecting individual has an exclusive right to
work the located land, a right which is good against all third parties except the United States. Upon
discovery of a commercially valuable mineral deposit, however, the individual may "patent" the land and
thereby receive full fee title, good against all parties, including the United States.
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The incentive of federal timber resources in the Frontier—and their resulting
exploitation—also provided a strong stimulus for western expansion. Responding to the
nearly insatiable commercial demand for timber in the budding young nation, claims to
western timber resources were often based on fraudulent assertions of preemption by
settler-squatters with dishonest motives. In many other cases, less sophisticated criminal
operations entailed illegally entering the lands of absentee owners and clearcutting the
available timber (Coggins et al., 1992). Several legislative initiatives also promised
significant timber rewards, thereby further fueling timber speculation. For example, the
Timber Culture Act of 1872 supplemented the Homestead Act by granting settlers the right
to aggregate an additional 160 acres to a homesteading claim by simply agreeing to leave 40
acres of the additional land as uncut forest. Later, in 1878, the Timber and Stone Act
authorized some western citizens to purchase up to 160 acres ofpublic timberlands which
were identified as "chiefly valuable for timber or stone" for a modest fee of $2.50 an acre.
Although these timberlands were to be used only for personal, non-speculative use,
commercial interests again predominated. Additional congressional support for timber
exploitation in the West was provided later that year in passage of the Timber Cutting Act,
which gave residents of other states the right to cut on mining lands that had not been
entered (Coggins et al., 1992).
Modern Era of Retention and Preservation
Beginning late in the 19th century, Congress and the Executive started to
fundamentally redirect the focus ofthe nation's public lands policies, concluding that the
remainder ofthe public domain and its associated natural resources should be conserved
and managed for long-term public benefit. In large part, this change in focus was prompted
by the widespread abuse ofliberal federal land disposition policies by unscrupulous railroad
companies, homesteaders, prospectors, and other entrepreneurs over-zealously extracting
the wealth ofthe public domain. This change in focus is perhaps best illustrated by
revisiting the case of the O&C lands, which after being repossessed by the federal
government, were not returned to the public domain and to the policies of disposition.
Instead, the 1937 O&C Act asserts that these lands "shall be managed for permanent forest
production, and the timber thereon shall be sold, cut, and removed in conformity with the
principal [sic] of sustained yield for the purpose of providing a permanent source oftimber
supply, protecting watersheds, regulating stream flow, and contributing to the economic
stability of local communities and industries, and providing recreational facilities."28
Both Congress and the Executive have played prominent roles in reserving federal
lands for specific purposes, with early congressional reservations primarily focusing on
lands of scenic value, and initial presidential reservations focusing on the retention of timber
lands and lands of special ecological significance. Over time, land reservations have been
made for an extremely wide variety of public purposes, as directed by an evolving body of
federal law and policy. While Congress possesses plenary power over the public lands, the
:8 43 U.S.C.A. §U8l(a).
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presidential authority to reserve lands continues to be an area of some confusion and
controversy.29 The Executive does possess some independent authority to reserve public
lands, however, most presidential land reservations have been based on authority delegated
from Congress. One of the earliest ofthese delegations was found in the General Revision
Act of 1891, which authorized the President to "set apart and reserve ... any part of the
public lands wholly or in part covered with timber or undergrowth, whether of commercial
value or not, as public reservations."30 Also significant has been the Antiquities Act of
1906, which authorizes the President to set aside from the public domain national
monuments, defined as "historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other
objects of historic or scientific interest."31 Even more sweeping was the Pickett Act of
191032 which gave the President discretionary authority to "temporarily withdraw from
settlement, location, sale, or entry any of the public lands of the United States, including
Alaska ... and such reservations shall remain in force until revoked by him or by an Act of
Congress."33 The language in these and similar statutes not only provides a legal
mechanism for the preservation of federal public lands, but also serves to articulate some of
the values that Congress and the President, on behalf of the American people, ascribes to
these lands.
Forest Management: The Forest Service
The General Revision Act of 1891, prompted in large part by widespread abuses of
public forestlands under the General Preemption and Timber Culture Acts, created the
vehicle for the establishment ofthe modern system ofNational Forests. By 1894, almost 18
million acres of forestlands had been withdrawn from the public domain. Three years later,
with just ten days left in office, President Cleveland more than doubled these reservations by
withdrawing an additional 21 million acres of forest reserves (Clarke and McCool, 1985).
This rapid reduction of the public domain outraged many western leaders, in part because
existing law suggested these forest reserves were to be off-limits to all private use, perhaps
even illegal to enter (Pinchot, 1947). The intended use ofthese reserves began to take
shape with passage of the Organic Act of 1897 and the subsequent establishment in 1905 of
the Forest Service, within the Department of Agriculture,34 under a mandate "to regulate . .
. occupancy and use" of the forest reserves, including the managed sale of timber.35 This
already formidable management mandate grew significantly in the agency's first couple
29 "Plenary power" in this case refers to broad congressional exercises of authority, actions thai have the
effect of preempting state action.
30 16 U.S.C.A. §471 (repealed 1976).
31 16 U.S.C.A. §431.
32 See 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 141-142 (repealed 1976).
33 43 U.S.C.A. § 141.
34 Until 1905, the federal forest reserves were under the jurisdiction of the Department of Interior, while all
of the government's foresters—all two of them—were employed in the Department of Agriculture. The
1905 legislation finally connected the federal forests and professional foresters (Clarke and McCool, 1985;
Pinchot. 1947).
35 16U.S.C. §§476, 551.
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years, as the national forest system swelled to almost 150 million acres (Wilkinson, 1992;
Coggins et al., 1992). Today's system ofNational Forests contains approximately 191
million acres (Forest Service, 1996).
In language designed to retain but limit presidential authority to reserve national
forests, the Organic Act provided an initial determination of forest management objectives:
"No national forests shall be established, except to improve and protect the forest within the
boundaries, or for the purpose of securing favorable conditions of water flows, and to
furnish a continuous supply of timber for the use and necessities of citizens of the United
States."36 Providing this "continuous supply" oftimber to the rapidly growing nation,
especially in the post World War II housing boom, required dramatic increases in harvest
levels, which created escalating conflicts with parties seeking to utilize these lands for other
purposes, such as recreation.37 These growing sectoral conflicts were addressed in part in
the Multiple-Use, Sustained-Yield Act (MUSY) of 1960, which codified the heretofore
implicit Forest Service policy of multiple-use management by listing five uses of the national
forests to be pursued on a sustained-yield basis: "outdoor recreation, range, timber,
watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes."38
Although the management purposes specified in MUSY remain as the modern basis
ofNational Forest management, implementing multiple-use, sustained-yield management
has proven to be highly difficult, especially as concerns over clearcutting, the loss of old-
growth forests, endangered species, and related environmental issues have become more
featured elements ofthe public policy dialogue. These and other concerns regarding the
difficulty of managing forests to serve "multiple" values were addressed in part in the
National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA),39 which requires the Forest Service to
utilize public input in preparation of comprehensive multiple-use land management plans for
each administrative unit of the national forest system every 15 to 20 years—a procedural
requirement that has proven extremely difficult to implement.40 Also problematic in
36 16 U.S.C.A. § 475.
37 Annual timber harvests in the national forests first exceeded 1 BBF in 1923,2 BBF in 1940.4 BBF in
1951, and an amazing 12 BBF in 1966 (Coggins et al., 1992). Coincident with this post-war logging boom
was a parallel increase in recreation on the national forests. For example, from 1948 to 1976. visits to the
national forests increased twentyfold, from 10 million to 190 million annual visits (Wilkinson, 1992).
38 16 U.S.C. § 528. This legislation is discussed further in Section III.
"See 16 U.S.C.A. §§1600-1614.
40 The passage ofNFMA was largely fueled by the so-called Monongahela decision of 1975, in which the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Forest Service had exceeded its authority by selling
economically, but not biologically, mature trees, and by failing to practice selective cutting, as required by
the Organic Act, in favor of the more efficient harvest method of clearcutting. (See West Virginia Division
ofthe Izaak Walton League ofAmerica. Inc. v. Butz, 522 F.2d 945, 4th Cir. (1975).) NFMA supports the
court's decision that trees must be biologically mature prior to sale, as it prohibits the cutting of trees which
have not reached the "culmination of mean annual increment" (CMAI) of growth—that is, to be eligible for
sale, trees must have reached a point of maturity where annual growth rates have tapered significantly (16
U.S.C.A. § 1604 (m)). This has the effect of imposing a longer rotation age upon Forest Service timber
harvesting, requiring the Service to wait until trees are physically mature before turning over a stand. In
addition, NFMA imposes a number of stringent conditions which must be met before the Forest Service may
authorize a clearcut sale, and requires that the Forest Service engage in genuine multiple-use planning by
classifying lands physically and economically unsuitable for timber production to "provide for a diversity of
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practice is implementation of the act's reliance on "nondeclining even-flow" (NDEF)
management,41 essentially a conservative version of sustained-yield management which
discourages wholesale removal of old growth forests by requiring that the same level of
timber harvest be "maintained annually in perpetuity" (Coggins et al., 1992).
National Parks: Creation and Management
Running counter to the utilitarian motives of the Forest Service and its first leader,
Gifford Pinchot, was the preservationist school of thought articulated by men such as John
Muir, best remembered as the founding father of the Sierra Club.42 The preservationists
primarily fought for the reservation of federal lands of unique scenic and historical
significance. Early congressional land reservations at the Hot Springs region in Arkansas in
the 1830's43 and California's Yosemite Valley in 186444 paved the way for the eventual
designation of the nation's first National Park: Yellowstone, reserved as a national
"pleasuring ground" in 1872.45 There are now 50 such parks covering over 80 million acres
of land, with Congress approving 340 land additions to existing Parks to date (Coggins et
al., 1992; Miniclier, 1997).
Very similar to the situation seen for National Forests, the American system of
National Parks evolved well before an administrative body emerged to manage these lands.
The deficiencies of this approach were perhaps best illustrated at Yellowstone, where the
early days of the Park saw rampant squatting by hunters, loggers, and miners. It was only
after the eventual dispatch ofthe U.S. Cavalry to Yellowstone that these squatters were
ejected (Miniclier, 1997). These forces remained at Yellowstone until the U.S. National
Park Service was established and equipped to take over enforcement responsibilities. The
Park Service was established as part of the National Park Service Organic Act of 1916,
which provided the agency with a mandate to "to conserve the scenery and the natural and
historic objects and the wildlife therein, and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in
such manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired in future generations. "46 The
management of most National Monuments, National Battlefields, and many other areas of
physical or cultural significance are additional responsibilities ofthe Park Service.
plant and animal communities based on the suitability and capability of the specific land area in order to
meet overall multiple-use objectives" (16 U.S.C. §§ 1604(g)(3)(E), 1604(k), and 1604(g)(3)(B)).
41 "The Secretary of Agriculture shall limit the sale of timber from each national forest to a quantity equal
to or less than a quantity which can be removed from such forest annually in perpetuity on a sustained-yield
basis." 16 U.S.C.A. § 1611(a).
j: For a discussion of philosophical differences between the Pinchotian and Muirian approaches to public
lands preservation, sec Section HI.
4J The Hot Springs region was acquired as part of the Louisiana Purchase in 1803 and reserved from the
public domain on April 20, 1832 (4 Stat. 505). The site was not designated as a National Park until March
4, 1921 (41 Stat. 1407).
44 Yosemite Park Act, 13 Stat. 325.
45 Under the Yellowstone Park Act, public domain lands were "reserved and withdrawn from settlement,
occupancy, or sale under the laws of the United States, and dedicated and set apart as a public park or
plcasuring-ground for the benefit and enjoyment of the people" (30 U.S.C.A. §§21-22).
46 16 U.S.C.A. § 1.
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The dual mandate of the Park Service to preserve the natural quality of designated
sites while providing for tourism and recreation has been a constant source of conflict
within the agency. Traffic congestion and facility overcrowding are increasingly severe
problems in many components of the Park system, as agency officials and subcontractors
struggle to upgrade and maintain visitor services and concessions while protecting those
natural qualities that merited the original reservations of these lands. Managing negative
transboundary impacts among these lands and neighboring communities is also an
increasingly complex challenge for the Park Service. For example, while supporters of
Yellowstone worry about potential negative impacts on the Park from outside
developments, such as the proposed New World Mine, some neighboring ranching interests
fear the export of predators such as wolves and diseases such as brucellosis, which some
parties fear may be carried by bison.47
Rangeland and the Bureau ofLand Management
Rangelands constitute another major component of the federal public lands. Unlike
the highly valued lands reserved for National Forests and National Parks, the federal
rangelands are, in large part, comprised of lands the government could not give away during
the homesteading era. Much of these lands are highly arid and generally unsuitable for
agriculture, but are instead more appropriate for ranching economies. The initial
homesteaders who established private ranches in these arid and semi-arid regions typically
monopolized the water sources in valleys, leaving in the public domain higher altitude lands
upon which further settlement was not readily feasible. As these ranching operations grew,
the lands remaining in public ownership became increasingly utilized as summer grazing
lands. In a manner typical of common resources, these public grasslands soon began to
show the negative effects of overuse, as each rancher sought to maximize their own use of
the unregulated resource.48 Rampant overgrazing, in turn, led to widespread erosion,
flooding, and vegetative community changes on the public lands (Bates, 1992).
The Taylor Grazing Act of 193449 was designed, at least in part, to curb this overuse
problem occurring on the federal rangelands—a goal that essentially resulted in the closing
of the public domain. The Taylor Grazing Act created "grazing districts" within which
Interior Department land managers award grazing permits to participating ranchers, thereby
regulating the number of animals grazing on a given portion of the public lands.50 This
management scheme was initially more impressive on paper than in practice, however, as
47 Many of these issues are discussed in depth in the High Country News, September 15, 1997 (Volume 29,
Number 17).
48 Situations of this nature are frequently referred to as a "tragedy of the commons," a phrase made famous
by Garret Hardin (1968). Problems of this type are typically resolved by limiting access, either by
transferring the common resources to private control, or by instituting a governmental program of regulated
access. Elements of both strategies can be found in existing leasing programs.
49 See 43 U.S.C.A. §§315-315(r).
50 Grazing leases are based on the number of AUM's, animal unit months, that the federal land manager
believes the land can support.
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"district boards" with the power to set grazing levels and fees within the districts were
effectively controlled by ranching interests (Foss, 1960).
To address this and other administrative deficiencies in the new grazing program,
the BLM was established in 1946 in a merger of the Grazing Service and the General Land
Office. As of 1996, slightly more than half of the 264 million acres under BLM
management are located within grazing districts,51 firmly establishing the agency as the
nation's premier manager of grazing lands.52 The establishment of the BLM, however, has
proved to be only a partial remedy to the management problems on the federal rangelands,
as the new agency did not acquire an official mandate to implement rangeland conservation
or protect other public land values until the passage ofthe Multiple-Use-Sustained Yield
Act of I960,53 soon followed by the Federal Lands Policy and Management Act of 1976
(FLPMA).54 Clearly codifying what had been implicit since the Taylor Grazing Act,
FLPMA articulated the modern policy preference in favor of federal land retention, stating
that "the public lands be retained in Federal ownership, unless ... it is determined that
disposal of a particular parcel will serve the national interest... ."55
FLPMA is the primary land management statute governing the lands managed by the
BLM.56 Similar in many ways to NFMA, FLPMA is management and planning oriented,
requiring the Interior Secretary "to establish comprehensive rules and regulations after
considering the views of the general public," including the promulgation by BLM of long-
term resource management plans based on the multiple-use, sustained-yield philosophy.57
Implement of this philosophy is complicated by its inherent contradictions between resource
development and preservation. On the one hand, FLPMA specifies that the "public lands be
managed in a manner that will protect the quality of scientific, scenic, historical, ecological,
environmental, air and atmospheric, water resource, and archeological values; that, where
appropriate, will preserve and protect certain public lands in their natural condition; that will
provide food and habitat for fish and wildlife and domestic animals; and that will provide for
outdoor recreation and human occupancy and use."58 On the other hand, FLPMA specifies
that the rangeland be managed "in a manner which recognizes the Nation's need for
domestic sources of minerals, food, timber, and fiber from the public lands .. .".(footnote
for quote)
51 Statistics taken from Table 1-4 of Public Land Statistics 1996 (BLM, 1996a), available on the world wide
web at <http://www.blm.gov/nhp/landfacts/pls96.htm)>.
52 The Department of Agriculture, primarily acting through the Forest Service, also manages some federal
grazing areas within National Forests, and in areas designated as "National Grasslands" by the Secretary of
Agriculture. National Grasslands include lands purchased by the Federal Government from bankrupt dirt
fanners in drought-ridden depression years under the Submarginal Lands Retirement Program (Coggins et
al., 1992). Through the "land acquisition and utilization program," or LU program, a scries of reforms
were undertaken in 1933 to shift the use of lands ill-suited to crop production to livestock grazing. This
program evolved into the Bankhcad-Jones Farm Tenant Act in 1937 (U.S.C. §§ 1001-40).
53 16 U.S.C.A.§ 528-531.
54 43 U.S.C.A.§ 1701-84.
" 43 U.S.C.A. § 1701(a)(l).
56 This legislation is discussed in greater depth in Section III.
57 § 1701(a)(5).
58 43 U.S.C.A. § 1701(a)(8). § 1701(a)(12).
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No doubt inspired by the failure of the "district boards" system under the Taylor
Grazing Act to noticeably improve range conditions on the public lands, FLPMA was
augmented in 1978 by the Public Rangelands Improvement Act (PRIA), which establishes a
modified system ofgrazing advisory boards as well as a formula for setting grazing fees.59
More recently in the 1990's, an experimental system of"resource advisory councils" or
RACs has been employed to seek bottom-up, consensus-based solutions to rangeland
management controversies. Nevertheless, critics maintain that grazing fees remain
significantly below market prices and problems of overgrazing, while regionally variable, are
still prevalent (Wilkinson, 1992; Coggins et al., 1992; Davis, 1997).
Further Experiments in Preservation: Protecting the Wild Places
While the most visible articulation of the preservationist philosophy is our National
Park system, several additional efforts have been made to ensure that settlement and
•'civilization" of the nation, especially the West, does not bring an end to all things wild.
These efforts have had a significant influence in determining the magnitude and management
of the public lands. Of particular significance has been the recognized value of protecting
wildlife and wildlife habitat, for both "intrinsic" preservationist values and, in a more
utilitarian vein, to maintain future hunting opportunities. Since passage ofthe Fish and
Wildlife Coordination Act of 1934,M federal agencies have been required to explicitly
consider the wildlife impacts of various federal projects, including water development and
water pollution control activities. Habitat protection for wildlife was further solidified by
the creation ofthe U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service within the Department ofthe Interior in
193961 with a mandate to conserve and manage migratory birds, to control predator
populations, to conduct ongoing wildlife research, and to manage lands set aside for these
purposes (Clarke and McCool, 1985; Bates, 1992).
Establishing a tradition of federal land reservations for wildlife purposes was a major
accomplishment of the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt—often regarded as the nation's
premier conservationist president—who established the first national wildlife refuge at
Florida's Pelican Island in 1903, eventually establishing an additional 50 wildlife refuges
over the next 6 years (Wilkinson, 1992; Hays, 1959). It was not until the National Wildlife
Refuge Administration Act of 1966,62 however, that these and similarly reserved lands were
consolidated into the modern system ofNational Wildlife Refuges and placed under the
express jurisdiction of the Fish and Wildlife Service. Today, the National Refuge System
covers almost 93 million acres organized into 752 administrative units: 509 National
59 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1702, 1753, 1901-08.
"'See, 16 U.S.C.A.§§ 661-667.
61 16 U.S.C.A.§ 742(b).
62 This legislation proclaims "all lands, waters, and interests therein administered by the Secretary [of the
Interior] as wildlife refuges, areas for the protection and conversation offish and wildlife that are threatened
with extinction, wildlife ranges, game ranges, wildlife management areas, or waterfowl production areas are
hereby [collectivelyl designated as the 'national Wildlife Refuge System,'... which shall be administered
by the Secretary through the United States Fish and Wildlife Service" (16 U.S.C.A. §§ 668dd-668ee).
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Wildlife Refuges, 193 Waterfowl Protection Areas, and 50 Coordination Areas (FWS,
1996)- . 63
A more explicitly preservationist motive underlies the Wilderness Act of 1964,
which created a National Wilderness Preservation System to preserve wild areas by initially
designating 9.1 million acres of existing public lands as wilderness preserves, much ofwhich
had been protected previously as designated "primitive" areas under National Forest,
National Park, or Wildlife Refuge classifications. By recognizing the special attributes of
wild areas, the congressional definition ofwilderness illustrates a growing realization that
the public lands contain many values that extend beyond traditional human land-uses:
Wilderness, in contrast with those areas where man and his own works
dominate the landscape, is ... an area where the earth and its community
of life are untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does
not remain. An area of wilderness is further defined to mean... an area of
undeveloped Federal land retaining its primeval character and influence,
without permanent improvements or human habitation, which is protected
and managed so as to preserve its natural conditions and which (1)
generally appears to have been affected by the forces of nature, with the
imprint of man's work substantially unnoticeable; (2) has outstanding
opportunities for solitude or a primitive and unconfined type of recreation;
(3) has at least five thousand acres of land or is of sufficient size as to make
practical its preservation and use in an unimpaired condition; and (4) may
also contain ecological, geological, or other features of scientific,
educational, scenic, or historical value.64
Unlike many other types of federal land reservations, the authority to designate
wilderness areas is a power retained exclusively by Congress (Bates, 1992). The
designation ofwilderness is an ongoing and often highly controversial political process.
Most wilderness designations follow an extensive period of agency study, as both the BLM
and the Forest Service are required to conduct wilderness studies of primitive, roadless
areas under FLPMA and the Wilderness Act, respectively.65 Many activities are expressly
prohibited in such designated study areas, including road-building, commodity production,
the use of motorized equipment, and the erection of structures; however, several annual
appropriation riders have passed Congress authorizing exceptions, such as allowing limited
mineral development within study areas (Bates, 1992). Additionally, the Wilderness Act
itself allows many pre-existing uses to continue within the wilderness system.66 Several
63 16 U.S.C.A.§§ 1131-36.
64 16U.S.C.A. §U31(c).
65 Among the better-known, and highly controversial, studies have been the RARE I and II studies. The
purpose of these "Roadless Area Review and Evaluations" was to identify undeveloped areas within the
National Forest system with the potential for inclusion in the Wilderness system. RARE I (1967 to 1973)
identified 12.3 million acres for study as wilderness areas. Later in the 1970's, RARE II identified over 62




administrative components ofthe federal public lands have been formally designated by
Congress as wilderness, including approximately 35 million acres ofForest Service lands,
39 million acres within the National Park system, 21 million acres managed by the Fish and
Wildlife Service, and 1.4 million acres managed by the BLM.67
Similar in philosophy to the wilderness system have been efforts to protect other
special types of wild environments. One prominent example of these efforts is the National
Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968.68 This Act proclaims that "certain selected rivers of
the Nation which, with their immediate environments, possess outstandingly remarkable
scenic, recreational, geologic, fish and wildlife, historic, cultural, or other similar values,
shall be preserved in free-flowing condition, and that they and their immediate environments
shall be protected for the benefit and enjoyment of present and future generations."69 The
system currently contains over 10,000 river miles along more than 200 rivers, concentrated
primarily in northern California, Oregon, Alaska, and Michigan's Upper Peninsula.70
Statutory protection has also been extended to the preservation of biodiversity, most
directly through a program designed to prohibit activities that imperil the survival of
threatened and endangered species. The Endangered Species Act of 197371 provides a
process for recognizing (i.e., "listing") those plant and animal species that are in danger of
extinction, and requires the development of long-term management plans to protect these
threatened and endangered species from further decline and to provide for the recovery of
such populations. Under the Endangered Species Act, it is a federal offense to kill, injure,
trap, harass, or otherwise "take" any animal species listed as threatened or endangered.72
The legislation further instructs all federal agencies to insure their actions do not
"jeopardize" threatened or endangered species or their habitats, a requirement that has
significant ramifications on how the public lands are managed.73 Nowhere is this more
evident than in the Pacific Northwest, where federal management of timber-rich public lands
has been significantly influenced by the recovery programs in place for the northern spotted
owl, and where water management programs have been radically transformed to address the
needs of endangered salmon (Carroll, 1995; Volkman, 1997). The impact of the program
67 Forest Service statistic taken from Table 9 ofLandAreas ofthe National Forest System, available on the
"world wide web" at <http://www.fs.fed.us/database/lar/>. Park Service statistic is from Coggins et al.
(1992). Fish and Wildlife Service statistic is from FWS (1996:Table 10). Bureau of Land Management
statistic taken from Table 5-10 of Public Land Statistics 1996, available at
<http://www.blm.gov/nhp/Iandfacts/pls96.html>. The total amount of wilderness is not simply the sum of
these figures, due to overlapping jurisdictions. All wilderness areas arc listed in the Historical Note after
16U.S.C.A. §1132.
68 See 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1271-1287.
6916U.S.C.A.§1271.
70 Determining the exact number of rivers included in the system is complicated by the fact that some
reports count streams and tributaries as rivers, and some rivers have multiple sections included in the
system. The statistic provided in the text is from Palmer (1993), who provides an excellent summary of the
wild and scenic river system.
71 16U.S.C.A. §§ 1531-1543.
7216U.S.C.A. § 1538(a)(l)(B).
73 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536. These determinations are made by either the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service or the
U.S. National Marine Fisheries Service.
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on private land management has also been considerable and highly controversial. Over 900
species are currently listed as threatened or endangered.
Minerals and Energy Resources: Incremental Federal Retention of Sub-
Surface Resources
The last significant remnant from the era of land disposal is undoubtedly the General
Mining Law (or Hardrock Act) of 1872; however, even this legislation and the associated
federal program of mineral regulation has been modified in accordance with the modern
philosophy of land retention and preservation. Several types of minerals have now been
excluded from coverage under the General Mining Law and do not transfer immediately
into private ownership upon discovery of a valuable mineral deposit on the public lands. Of
particular significance are many energy resources. The 1920 Mineral Lands Leasing Act74
began the practice of leasing the right to mine coal, oil, natural gas, oil shale, and other
energy fuels on the public lands. Behind the imposition of a leasing system for these
valuable fuels was a policy recognition by Congress that these substances were too
important to the general public to be allowed to pass into private ownership. Instead, a
leasing system was implemented to facilitate more strict management and control of energy
fuels in the public interest, and to prevent the obvious dangers of a private monopoly of
resources upon which the nation as a whole depends.
Leasing systems for energy resources have also been extended to offshore minerals
on lands beyond state jurisdiction.75 In addition to governing the leasing of drilling rights
on submerged federal lands, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 195376 also regulates
the exploration, production, and delivery of energy fuels and other minerals on these lands.
Mineral extraction on so-called "acquired lands"—those lands acquired or purchased by the
federal government after the establishment of the original public domain—also do not fall
under the General Mining Law, but instead are subject to a leasing system established under
the Acquired Lands Act of 1947.77 Congress took a slightly different approach that same
year in the Common Varieties Act78 by establishing a competitive bidding system for sand,
gravel, and similar minerals, ending the practice of allowing patentable mining claims for
these common materials.
Along with specific minerals being excluded from disposition by discovery, other
legislative acts occasionally reserved the right of the federal government to manage the
"4 See 30 U.S.C.A. §§181-287.
75 The Submerged Lands Act of 1953 (43 U.S.C.A. §§1301 et seq.) made an explicit distinction between
lands under federal versus state jurisdiction, with the first three miles from the coastal boundary being state
lands.
76 Amended in 1978.
77 See 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 351-359.
78 However, particularly large deposits of certain common varieties deposits are still patentable under the
Hardrock Act. See 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 601-604.
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surface estate for multiple-use. For example, the Surface Resources Act of 195579 provides
that all mining claims established after 1955 "shall be subject, prior to the issuance of a
patent therefor, to the right of the United States to manage and dispose ofthe vegetative
surface resources thereof and to manage other surface resources thereof (except mineral
deposits subject to location under the mining laws ofthe United States.)." That is, the land
on the surface is subject to the right "ofthe United States, its permittees, and licensees, to
use so much of the surface thereof as may be necessary for such purposes or for access to
adjacent land . . . ." Legislation such as this has become increasing necessary as much as of
grasslands under the control of the BLM are now highly valued for their underground
mineral and energy resources, while alternative uses of the public lands—like recreation—
have steadily increased in importance..
As the discovery of new and valuable resources progresses, Congress continues to
consider additional exclusions under the General Mining Law, such as the exception made
for geothermal steam energy.80 The prevailing judicial opinion in cases involving
development of novel resources is that nothing passes from the government to private
interests unless Congress explicitly expresses intent to provide for such passage in
legislation. This judicial interpretation of federal statues provides a further articulation of
the modem policy of public lands retention.
The Special Case ofAlaska
While the public lands policies of the nation have evolved over two centuries,
gradually moving from an era of disposition to one of retention, the policy evolution in the
nation's second-youngest state, Alaska, has occurred within a much shorter time frame.
This observation, when combined with an appreciation of the immense size of Alaska—
approximately one-fifth the size of the continental United States—makes the public lands
history of Alaska unique and highly significant.
In 1971, the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA)81 extinguished all
aboriginal Indian title to land in the state, instead transferring 44 million acres of federal
lands—an area the size ofMissouri—to Alaska Native corporations (Bates, 1992).82
ANCSA also authorized the Secretary of the Interior to temporarily withdraw up to 80
million acres of"national interests" lands, for possible permanent inclusion as federally
protected lands.83 Soon thereafter, the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act
(ANILCA) of 198084 designated over 103 million acres of public lands as National Parks,
National Wildlife Refuges, and Wilderness Areas, as well as adding 13 new rivers to the
79 See 30 U.S.C.A. §§611- 615. Quoted material taken from section 612(b). Also see United Slates v.
Curtis-Nevada Mines, Inc., 611 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1980) (surface rights of unpatented claim must be left
open to the public for recreation).
80 Geothermal Steam Act of 1970 (30 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-1025).
81 43 U.S.C.A. § 1601 et scq.-1629(f).
82 This program, financed by a federal fund of nearly $1 billion, has made Native American corporations
commonplace in Alaska.
8343U.S.CA.§1616(d)(2).
84 See 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 3101-3233.
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National Wild and Scenic Rivers system, and continued many existing uses ofWilderness
Areas.85 The state also features more than 2 million acres in BLM conservation and
recreation areas (Coggins et al., 1992).
Potentially overshadowed by the enormity ofthe ANELCA land reservations is the
legislation's articulation of the modern tenets of public lands policy: multiple-use
management, land retention, and balance between human use and preservation. The ideals
of multiple-use management and land retention are clearly conveyed in language describing
the legislation's purpose "to preserve for the benefit, use, education, and inspiration of
present and future generations certain lands and waters in the State ofAlaska that contain
nationally significant natural, scenic, historic, archeological, geological, scientific,
wilderness, cultural, recreational, and wildlife values ... ."86 The desire to balance human
use and preservation is also clearly articulated: "This Act provides sufficient protection for
the national interest in the scenic, natural, cultural and environmental values on the public
lands in Alaska, and at the same time provides adequate opportunity for satisfaction of the
economic and social needs ofthe State of Alaska and its people; accordingly, the
designation and disposition of the public lands in Alaska pursuant to this Act are found to
represent a proper balance between the reservation of national conservation system units
and those public lands necessary and appropriate for more intensive use and disposition ..
"87 Modern public lands conflicts in Alaska—including proposals for oil exploration in the
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge and the continued logging of old-growth forests in the
Tongass National Forest—suggest that striking a "proper balance" between human use and
preservation will remain an issue of contention in Alaska, as elsewhere, as public demands
on these resources continue to grow and diversify.
85 Although ANILCA primarily deals with Alaska and serves as that state's foremost public lands statute, a
few portions of the legislation also apply to the rest of the nation. One notable example is ANILCA's access
provision, which requires the Secretary of Agriculture to provide access to private inholdings within
national forests boundaries to an extent necessary to ensure the "reasonable use and enjoyment" of such
private property. For more information, see § 3170(a) of the legislation, as interpreted in Montana




III. PUBLIC LAND VALUES IN CONTEXT:
PHILOSOPHICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL
CONSIDERATIONS
[T]hefirst duty ofthe human race is to control the earth it lives upon.
Gifford Pinchot
The Fightfor Conservation (1910:45)
The curious world we inhabit is more wonderful than convenient; more beautiful
than useful; it is more to be admired and enjoyed than used.
Henry David Thoreau
Familiar Letters ofHenry David Thoreau (1894:9)
The western world is now sufferingfrom the limited moral outlook ... [born of]
the habit of ignoring the intrinsic worth ofthe environment which must be allowed
its weight in any consideration offinal ends.
Alfred North Whitehead
Science and the Modern World (1925:274)
The accurate determination of public land values raises a host of difficult issues.
Perhaps most fundamentally is the observation that any individual's assessment of value
cannot be adequately understood or articulated without first considering issues of
philosophy. As shown by the foregoing quotations, radically different viewpoints exist to
describe the desired relationship between humanity and the natural environment. Whether
deriving from explicit theological or political doctrines or evolving from more ad hoc
socioeconomic processes, the context within which individuals and societies view natural
resources shapes how value is defined. The United States, like many countries, is not a
philosophically homogeneous nation on issues of natural resources valuation, and the clash
and integration of ideas has resulted in a wide variety of frequently contradictory statutes,
regulatory and property rights regimes, management programs, and social norms regarding
the public lands. While some of these philosophical differences can be accounted for by
economic valuation tools, others raise overwhelming methodological challenges.
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Philosophical Underpinnings of Public Land Management
An Evolving Framework of Competing Valuation Systems
The rules regarding the management of the nation's natural resources, including
those of the public lands, are generally assumed to have derived from two competing
philosophical perspectives: conservationism and preservationism. Furthermore, these two
perspectives are generally described as taking hold in the United States during the
Progressive Conservation era (circa 1890 to 1920), an era in which the modern preference
for public lands retention and management evolved (Hays, 1959). An additional
generalization is to nominate Gifford Pinchot, the father of American forestry, as the
founding father of the conservation philosophy—sometimes referred to as utilitarian
conservationism, or just utilitarianism; and John Muir, the founder ofthe Sierra Club in
1892, as the originator ofthe preservationist philosophy in the United States. More
detailed historical reviews trace Pinchot's conservationist philosophies back to the
European tradition of "telic forestry,"88 While many of the tenets of preservationism are
found to derive from the transcendentalism school ofthought, and the works ofmen such as
Henry David Thoreau, Ralph Waldo Emerson, and George Perkins Marsh.89 This popular
history of American environmental thought, although suffering from all the omissions and
imprecisions associated with generalizations, provides a useful philosophical starting point
for reviewing issues in public lands valuation.90
The underlying tenet of conservationism is that the natural environment is something
to be manipulated and utilized for human benefit, and that prudent management involves
scientifically-grounded practices that allow for the efficient, long-term use of natural
resources. As chief forester during the Teddy Roosevelt administration, Pinchot tailored
this philosophy to suit the forests of the public lands, proclaiming that the National Forest
system should be "devoted to its most productive use for the permanent good of the whole
people ... and where conflicting interests must be reconciled the question will always be
decided from the standpoint ofthe greatest good ofthe greatest number in the long run"
(Forest Service, 1906:16-17).91 This philosophy was rejected by Muir and other
88 Telic forestry is the term used to describe the European, particularly German, tradition of forest
management in which forests are intensively managed to provide desired outputs. In telic forestry, trees are
essentially viewed as crops.
89 The transcendentalist school of thought is illustrated in the essays of Emerson, who attributed a
theological mysticism to the natural environment, and Thoreau, best known for On Walden Pom/ (1854), an
account of his life at Walden Pond, Massachusetts.
90 An additional common generalization is that these two philosophies can be correlated with the
ideological positions of the modem political parties: conservationism with Republicans, and
preservationism with Democrats. While this is undoubtedly true in many instances, overall this correlation
is much too weak to be useful in this discussion (Pachlke, 1989).
91 While Pinchot's motto of the "greatest good of the greatest number in the long run" has been widely
quoted as an insightful management philosophy, even a rudimentary understanding of mathematics is
sufficient to reveal that the statement is a technical impossibility, as an equation cannot be manipulated to
simultaneously maximize more than one variable.
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preservationists as being overly materialistic and invasive, advocating instead the protection
of wild areas from human development. Muir found pristine wilderness to be the highest
good of the public lands, its preservation a spiritual, aesthetic, and intellectual boon to
humanity providing primarily non-material benefits. Although Muir and Pinchot began as
close friends, their philosophical differences ultimately turned them against one another. In
the end, Pinchot and his "wise use" followers accused Muir and his Sierra Club of wanting
to freeze valuable natural resources in a primitive state rather than providing for their
careful management for human use and prosperity (Nash, 1982; Lyon, 1972; Paehlke,
1989). The establishment ofthe National Park system, exactly the type of action feared by
Pinchot, is the best modern manifestation of the preservationist philosophy.
While the conservationist/preservationist dichotomy is often raised in valuation
discussions distinguishing between traditional market and non-market values of resource
use, it is perhaps more enlightening is to understand that there exists an ideological division
within the preservationist philosophy itself. To understand this division first requires some
comprehension of the concept of utilitarianism, which is often utilized as a synonym for
conservationism, but which in reality is equally applicable to one division ofthe
preservationist school. Utilitarianism is a belief that promoting human welfare is the
appropriate objective of policy, a theme that underlies the majority of economic and
political theories (Toman, 1994; Turner and Pearce, 1993). It is a "consequentialist... or
teleological" approach in that it assumes that environmental policy should be evaluated
according to its human consequences: a right action is one which has good consequences
for humanity; a wrong action is one which has bad consequences for humanity (Gunn and
Vesilind, 1986:137). In this way, utilitarianism is inherently anthropocentric, for the value
of something is based on its human use.92 The protection of public lands as National
Parks—the crowning achievement of preservationists like Muir—is, at least in part, an
objective pursued on utilitarian grounds, as National Parks provide a resource primarily
valued for human recreation and reflection.
It is the other branch of the preservationist philosophy which has the most
significant ramifications for the discussion of public lands valuation. This division, best
characterized by the Deep Ecology movement, asserts that any human benefit or value
accruing from natural resource protection is merely an incidental, and not a primary, reason
for environmental preservation. This is because natural systems and the individual species
which make up ecosystems are believed to have "intrinsic value" or "inherent worth"
(Devall, 1988; Roughgarden, 1995; Brown and Moran, 1994)94 This ecologically-centered
or "eco'centric" perspective is rooted in notions ofjustice for the environment: that is,
j: Anthropocentric is defined as "[regarding the human being as the central fact or final aim of the
universe" or in the alternative as "[ilnterpreting reality solely in terms of human values and experience
(Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary, 1994:112; Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,
New Riverside Publishing Company). In short, anthropocentrism is human-centered thinking. Deep
Ecologists regard anlhropocentrism as "human chauvinism," an outgrowth of the notion that humans arc
the pinnacle of creation, the measure of all natural things, and the source of all value (Seed 985:243)_
93 Pinchot never saw the logic of the preservalionism-oriented Park Service, remarking in 1911 that a Park
Service was "no more needed than two tails to a cat" (Hays, 1959).
94 "lljnherent worth means that the value of a natural object is not dependent on a human observer of that
object nor on the monetary value of the natural object to some human" (Devall, 1988:15).
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because non-human entities have value in themselves, apart from any contribution to human
happiness, human beings have an ethical obligation to respect the rights of non-human
entities to continued existence. It is underlying concepts of "justice," "rights," and "moral
obligations" associated with ecocentric preservationism that distinguishes this school of
thought from the concepts of conservationism and anthropocentric preservationism.
Perhaps more than any other individual in the American conservation movement,
Aldo Leopold articulated the philosophy of ecocentric preservationism. Leopold used the
phrase "thinking like a mountain" to describe the revolutionary transformation of self and
culture required to cultivate an "ecological consciousness" and thereby achieve genuine
"biocentric equality" (Devall, 1980:309; Devall and Sessions, 1985:66). His "land ethic"
placed human beings in the context ofbiological interconnectedness with their surrounding
ecosystems in a way that implied moral obligations to the natural world. "All ethics,"
Leopold tells us, "rest upon a single premise; that the individual is a member of a
community of interdependent parts The land ethic simply enlarges the boundaries of the
community to include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land" (Leopold,
1968:239-240). A land ethic thus implies that the "role" of humanity is ethically
transformed from "conqueror of the land community to plain member and citizen of it. It
implies respect for fellow-members, and also respect for the community as such" (Leopold,
1968I210).96
These observations are not meant to suggest that Muir was insensitive to the
inherent rights of nature, for he once said that most of humanity is "blind to the rights ofthe
rest of creation" (Muir, 1916:98). Similarly, it is unfair to conclude that Pinchot's
motivations were strictly utilitarian, or were limited exclusively to the obvious market
values of natural resources. As a practical matter, most environmental leaders ofyesterday
and today see natural resources through several lenses, and recognize that these resources
have several types ofvalues91 In practice, an array ofpolicies can be supported through
each ofthese viewpoints. For example, protection of waterfowl habitat is endorsed by
conservationists as a way of maintaining hunting opportunities, by anthropocentric
preservationists as a way of preserving natural beauty and wonder, and by ecocentric
preservationists who feel that humanity has a moral responsibility to respect the rights of
waterfowl and their wetland habitat to exist (Toman, 1994).
A Partial Congressional Philosophy: Multiple-Use and Sustained Yield
Most policies directing the management of the public lands are based upon an
anthropocentric, utilitarian justification, and are usually best characterized as conservation-
oriented programs. This is not to imply, however, that anthropocentric preservation is
unrecognized, as the National Park and Wilderness systems provide compelling evidence to
95 Note that the three quotations used at the beginning of this chapter roughly correlate to these three
viewpoints.
96 A highly similar concept is the "ethic of place" advocated by Wilkinson (in Udall et al., 1990).
97 For example, Teddy Roosevelt, the so-called "conservation president" found wisdom in the philosophies
ofboth Pinchot and Muir (Hays, 1959).
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the contrary.98 Similarly, the philosophy of ecocentric preservation is also articulated in
statute, particularly the Endangered Species Act of 1973, which has been interpreted to
mean that the value of endangered species is "incalculable" and should therefore be
protected "whatever the cost."99 Notwithstanding these notable exceptions, the dominant
themes permeating the management ofmost public lands are multiple-use and sustained-
yield management—ideas most commonly ascribed to the conservation philosophy. The
statutory origins of this philosophy are best articulated in the aptly named Multiple-Use,
Sustained-Yield Act (MUSY) of 1960, which defines multiple-use management on the
National Forests as involving several considerations, including:
management of all the various renewable surface resources of the national
forests so that they are utilized in the combination that will best meet the
needs of the American people, making the most judicious use ofthe land
for some or all of these resources or related services over areas large
enough to provide sufficient latitude for periodic adjustments in use to
conform to changing needs and conditions; that some land will be used for
less than all of the resources; and harmonious and coordinated management
of the various resources each with the other, without impairment of the
productivity of the land, with consideration being given to the relative
values of the various resources, and not necessarily the combination of uses
that will give the greatest dollar return or the greatest unit output.100
The complementary concept of sustained-yield is defined to require the Forest Service to
"achieve . .. and maintain] in perpetuity... a high-level annual or regular periodic output
of the various renewable resources of the national forests without impairing]... the
productivity of the land."101
98 For example, the Wilderness Act is designed, in part, to preserve areas offering "outstanding
opportunities for solitude" (16 U.S.C. § 1131(c)).
99 See Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 178, 184 (1978). In this landmark case, the
opening of Tellico Dam on the Tennessee River was temporarily halted to protect the endangered snail
darter. The Endangered Species Act requires that every federal agency "insure that any action authorized,
funded, or carried out... is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or
threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species which is
determined by the Secretary" (16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(a)(2)). Implementation of this requirement in cases such
as Tellico Dam can have significantly negative economic ramifications. This concern was addressed during
the Reagan era by the creation of the Endangered Species Committee (or "God Squad"), which can
authorize an exemption to the requirement of §1536(a)(2) if the following conditions are satisfied: "(i) there
are no reasonable and prudent alternatives to the agency action; (ii) the benefits of such action clearly
outweigh the benefits of alternative courses of action consistent with conserving the species or its critical
habitat, and such action is in the public interest; (iii) the action is of regional or national significance; and
(iv) neither the Federal agency concerned nor the exemption applicant made any irreversible or irretrievable
commitment of resources prohibited by... this section ..." (16 U.S.C.A. § 1536(h)(l)(A)(i-iv)). In only a
few isolated cases has the "God Squad" been utilized to override the rigid standards of the Endangered
Species Act.
l0016U.S.C.A§531(a).
101 16 U.S.C.A § 53 l(b).
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The dual managerial themes of multiple-use and sustained-yield in the National
Forests were later reinforced by Congress in the National Forest Management Act (NFMA)
of 1976, which cautions federal land managers that, in order "to serve the national interest,
the renewable resource program must be based on a comprehensive assessment of present
and anticipated uses, demand for, and supply of renewable resources from the Nation's
public and private forests and rangelands, through analysis of environmental and economic
impacts, coordination of multiple use and sustained yield opportunities as provided in the
Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, and public participation in the development of
the program."102 Under this legislation, the Forest Service must specify guidelines for land
management plans which "insure consideration of the economic and environmental aspects
of various systems of renewable resource management, including the related systems of
silviculture and protection of forest resources, to provide for outdoor recreation (including
wilderness), range, timber, watershed, wildlife, and fish."103
These dual themes also pervade management of public lands controlled by the BLM.
The Federal Lands Policy Management Act (FLPMA) of 1976, in language highly similar
to that found in NFMA, illustrates the formidable challenge of multiple-use, sustained-yield
management by requiring:
the management of the public lands and their various resource values so
that they are utilized in the combination that will best meet the present and
future needs of the American people ... a combination ofbalanced and
diverse resource uses that takes into account the long-term needs of future
generations for renewable and nonrenewable resources, including, but not
limited to, recreation, range, timber, minerals, watershed, wildlife and fish,
and natural scenic, scientific and historical values; and harmonious and
coordinated management ofthe various resources without permanent
impairment of the productivity of the land and the quality ofthe
environment with consideration being given to the relative values of the
resources and not necessarily to the combination of uses that will give the
greatest economic return or the greatest unit of output.104
Despite the obvious and laudable congressional efforts to provide the Forest Service
and BLM with similar management mandates, the multiple-use, sustained-yield philosophy
is, itself, an embodiment of contradictions, trade-offs, and compromises. Management for
multiple, often incompatible, objectives is inherently problematic. As clearly exemplified by
these statutes, implementation ofthis management philosophy requires the consideration
and balancing of a staggering variety of factors, of both an economic and non-economic
nature, over both short and long time periods. However, while these statutes provide
thoughtful language about what factors deserve agency consideration, and feature a
relatively coherent, albeit imprecise, picture of the desired management outcome, the
question of process is largely ignored. How can trade-offs among different objectives,
102 16 U.S.C.A. § 1600(3).
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103 16 U.S.C.A. § 1604
lw 43 U.S.C.A. § 1702(c).
different uses, and perhaps more fundamentally, different types ofvalues be made in
practice? Deciding among values is not solely a technical exercise suited to agency
expertise, but instead is a challenge better suited, at least in theory, to a more explicitly
political process.105 Yet, in MUSY, FLPMA, and related statutes, the responsibility to
make these choices is delegated to the land management agencies. This delegation of
authority is probably not so much a vote of confidence for the Forest Service and BLM, as
it is a recognition that some technical skills are associated with defining the range of
possible choices, and perhaps more importantly, a recognition that making trade-offs among
competing values is often a zero-sum undertaking without political benefits.106 What is
more politically expedient from a congressional standpoint is to state that all values are
important and deserve consideration, and that existing uses should be maintained in
perpetuity—this seemingly impossible task is, in a nutshell, what is promised by the
multiple-use, sustained-yield philosophy.
These observations should not be interpreted, however, as a repudiation of the
multiple-use, sustained-yield philosophy. To the contrary, it is a reasonable approach that
recognizes the many values and uses of the public lands, and that states a commitment to
preserving these values and uses over the long-term while assuming periodic adjustments to
meet changing conditions. The Achilles' heel of this philosophy is simply that it is extremely
difficult to apply in practice, as it involves making trade-offs among fundamentally different
types ofvalues. This process-related challenge has rightly been a focus of considerable
public debate, legislative experimentation, and agency innovation. For example, process is a
major focus ofNFMA and FLPMA, both ofwhich require the use of public input in the
periodic preparation of land management plans (Hardt, 1997).107 In practice, satisfying
these planning requirements has proven to be a costly, lengthy, and litigious undertaking,
leading to frequent criticism of the multiple-use, sustained-yield approach as terminally
inefficient.
Even more sweeping has been the process-related requirements ofthe National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969,108 and namely the requirement that federal
agencies must develop environmental impact statements before undertaking major federal
actions that influence the environment.109 Federal agencies are procedurally directed in
105 In a critical assessment of western water management, Lord (1984:653) observes: "Science and
technology are concerned with facts and means, not with values and ends. Ethics and politics are concerned
with values and ends. Bad water management often occurs when facts are confused with values, when
means arc confused with ends, and when technical judgments arc made by citizens and politicians while
value judgments are made by scientists and professionals." This observation is equally applicable to issues
of public land management.
106 Culhane (1981) argues that this lack of specificity and mandated public participation requirement works
to the advantage of the agencies, in that it allows them to strategically play competing interests off against
each other in order to reach outcomes pre-determined by the resource manager.
107 Many of the planning requirements associated with NFMA and FLPMA derived in part from the
Resources Planning Act of 1974.
108 See 42 U.S.C.A. §§321-4361.
109 The broader purpose of NEPA is "to declare a national policy which will encourage productive and
enjoyable harmony between man and his environment; to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate
damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the
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NEPA to "include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other
major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a
detailed statement by the responsible individual on (i) the environmental impact ofthe
proposed action, (ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the
proposal be implemented, (iii) alternatives to the proposed action, (iv) the relationship
between local short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement
of long term productivity, and (v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of
resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented."
Often used as a basis for lawsuits by environmental activists, the courts have generally
interpreted potential NEPA violations by reviewing agency adherence to procedure, rather
than finding in the statute new substantive requirements for environmental protection.111 In
this way, legislation such as NEPA acknowledges and reinforces the need to consider
competing uses and values on the public lands, but offers little practical guidance for
actually making the difficult choices.
Use of Economic Valuation Methods
More than any other discipline, economics provides a variety ofprinciples and
methodologies for making difficult choices among competing outcomes. The economic
marketplace, after all, is a forum where individuals interact to determine relative values of
goods and services, with the outcomes ofthese choices being very well documented and
analyzed as part of normal business operation. Economic valuation methodologies have
found their way into many facets of public land management, a trend that is likely to
continue. Despite tremendous recent advances in the science of economic valuation, in
many cases it remains difficult to assemble credible economic statistics to fully quantify and
illuminate all public land values. Problems ofboth a methodological and philosophical
nature suggest that economic valuation methods should not, by themselves, be applied as de
facto decision-making tools for selecting appropriate trade-offs among natural resource
values. On the other hand, good economic statistics can be invaluable in introducing
objective and empirical data into the public policy debate, and can provide the initial
baseline from which to assess the significance of those public land values that defy monetary
quantification. An understanding ofthe opportunities and limitations provided by the
economic valuation approach is an essential prerequisite to effective participation in debates
concerning public land values.
understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources important to the Nation...." (42 U.S.C.A. §
4321).
110 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332 (2)(C)(i-v).
111 NEPA requires that all potential environmental impacts be considered, but docs not necessarily require
avoidance or mitigation of these impacts. This conclusion has been articulated by the courts in many cases,
particularly Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, (1989); and Natural Resources
Defense Council. Inc. v. Morton, 388 F.Supp. 829 DC D.Ct. (1974).
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A Primer in Natural Resource Economics and Valuation Techniques
At the core ofeconomic theory is the "rational actor"—also known as "economic
man"—model of individual behavior. The rational actor can be assumed to make choices
that will maximize his own pleasure, or in the language of economics, his "utility." By
comparing these choices, some appreciation can be developed for how individuals value
competing outcomes. The true elegance of economic theory is revealed when this concept
is extrapolated to consider a society of decision-makers (i.e., consumers), who interact in
the marketplace to influence pricing regimes, production levels, and product innovations.
Using a phrase made famous by economic theorist Adam Smith, an "invisible hand" is at
work guiding these interactions, automatically translating the utility-maximizing behaviors
of individuals into defacto macroeconomic policies reinforcing the dominant preferences at
the expense ofthe less frequently expressed preferences.
These concepts can be utilized as a basis for evaluating public policy decisions if it is
assumed that proper policy decisions are those with the highest level ofbenefits, relative to
costs, measured by summing all the preferences of individuals (Turner and Pearce, 1993).
The classic tool used to implement this philosophy of"welfare economics" is the cost-
benefit (sometimes called benefit-cost) analysis, which involves comparing and choosing
among particular management options based on a comparison of total benefits and costs
incurred by all individuals considered in the analysis (Hufschmidt et al., 1983). Typically,
the option with the highest ratio ofbenefits to costs is assumed to be the preferred
option.112 Originally used primarily in the evaluation of proposed federal water projects,
cost-benefit analysis, and its many incarnations, is now used in a wide variety of natural
resource decision-making settings.113 For example, President Clinton recently directed all
federal agencies to evaluate proposed environmental actions in terms of the "need for, and
consequences of, the intended regulation," to ensure that the social "benefits of the intended
regulation justify its costs."114
In order to use economic valuation decision aids such as cost-benefit analysis, the
analyst must compile information on all positive and negative impacts of a proposed action,
112 A more useful decision rule in some situations is to select the option featuring the greatest net benefits,
calculated by subtracting total costs from total benefits. To illustrate, consider two alternative actions:
option A involves costs of $1 million and benefits of $2 million, while option B involves costs of $6 million
and benefits of $10 million. Option A has the higher benefit-cost ratio, 2.0 versus 1.67, but Option B offers
the higher net benefits, $4 million versus $1 million. According to a benefit-cost analysis, both options
would be worth pursuing as both feature a benefit-cost ratio greater than 1.0. If only one of the two options
could be chosen, the best choice would likely depend on an assessment of other factors. For example, if
capital resources were limited, Option A might be preferred over Option B since the initial investment in
the former is substantially smaller (SI million versus $6 million). Other factors to consider include the
distribution of the costs and benefits under each scenario.
113 The origins of the cost-benefit analysis can be traced to administrative efforts to implement the 1936
Flood Control Act, and particularly, the development by the U.S. Federal Interagency River Basin
Committee of the so-called "Green Book" (circa 1950), a cost-benefit "how to" manual. Cost-benefit
analysis was not widely used in other substantive areas until the 1960's, at which time it was phased into
planning programs for transportation, urban development, and environmental regulation (Huffschmidt et
al., 1983).
114 Executive Order #12866, 1993: § (l)(b)(6).
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and then convert this information into common measurement units, in this case dollars, in
order to facilitate comparisons. For products with correctly functioning markets, the
marketplace can often be relied upon to provide appropriate indications ofvalue in the form
of prices. Market prices, however, are frequently not available or appropriate to measure
goods and services associated with public lands (Freeman, 1993).
One reason for this is market failure—i.e., situations which prohibit the normal
functioning of competitive markets. Common sources of market failures in the natural
resources realm include externalities, common pool resources, and public goods.
Externalities are situations in which some byproduct, usually a negative byproduct,
associated with the production of a good creates social costs that are not reflected in the
market price of the product. For example, the market price of silver may reflect the
production expenses associated with labor, materials, and other "costs of doing business,"
but may not reflect the negative costs of scarred landscapes, pollution, and impact on
endangered species resulting from the mining operation."5 A somewhat similar type of
problem occurs in common pool resource situations, which can occur when several parties
have access to a commonly owned and finite resource, for example, a common aquifer
underlying a farming region. In these situations, individuals have incentives to maximize
their own use of the resource, since the negative costs of resource overuse will be
distributed equally among all parties—including those that use only a small amount.
Finally, a public good situation involves a natural resource good or service that, once
provided to one party, cannot be withheld from others. For example, it would likely be
impossible for one company to build a flood control structure that would protect its
property without automatically protecting its neighbor's property as well. Since the market
provides the company with no mechanism for forcing these other beneficiaries to
compensate it for its investment, the investment will not be made—even ifthe net benefits
to all parties exceed the net costs.117 The public lands are most frequently described as
featuring public goods situations, but all types of market failures can be readily found.118
In addition to these classic types of natural resource market failures, many other
related complications can impede the development of useful price signals. Some ofthese
115 When externality situations exist, the price of the good produced is usually artificially low, and
consequently, production levels are usually artificially high. Problems of this nature are usually corrected
by either prohibiting the behavior outright, by requiring the externality generator to invest in new
technologies or processes to reduce the problem, or by imposing some form of tax on the undesirable
behavior (Baumol and Oates, 1988).
116 In a common pool resource situation—also known as a "tragedy of the commons" problem (Hardin,
1968)—each individual has the incentive to maximize their own ratio ofbenefits to costs by increasing Uieir
consumption; yet, the collective group incentive is to minimize consumption in order to preserve the
resource. It is this conflict between individual and collective incentives which creates the market failure.
These problems are typically addressed by regulating individual behavior or by converting the common
resource to a private property regime.
117 For this reason, the government normally assumes responsibility for providing "public goods," financed
through tax and user fee systems that, in theory, allocate the costs in a manner that reflects the allocation of
benefits.
118 Externalities are best thought of as involving negative impacts; common pool resource problems
typically involve situations of overuse; public goods situations generally involve situations of under
investment.
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other complications include the fact that some goods have no obvious substitutes or are
provided through monopolies, thereby discouraging competition; many goods are
subsidized in some manner; and some "non-market" uses of a resource, such as watching a
sunset over a quiet lake, may go unrecognized as no market transactions may exist to
suggest the importance ofthe use.
These and related problems are generally well understood by natural resource
economists, who utilize a wide variety of techniques to approximate natural resource
values.119 One of the most common methods is known as "contingent valuation," which
typically features surveys asking individuals what they would be willing-to-pay to receive a
specified desirable change in the condition of an environmental resource.120 Another
common approach used to approximate market value is the "travel cost" method. This
approach assumes that the costs incurred in travel by individuals to visit a natural site
reflects the natural amenity values offered by that site. An additional category ofvaluation
techniques relies on "shadow prices," which entails using prices paid for substitute goods as
a measure of the value of the targeted good.121 The "land value" approach compares the
market values of private property before and after a development modifies the physical
attributes ofthe area. Along a somewhat similar vein is the "wage differential" approach,
which relies upon a comparison ofwages for similar jobs in areas featuring different natural
amenities. Still other methods rely on the "replacement cost" of a damaged natural asset to
measure the value of the undamaged asset, or on the "opportunity cost," which assumes
that the benefits associated with a given economic activity approximates the upper bound of
the worth of the environmental assets damaged by the activity. The creative use ofthese
and related techniques can be highly useful in quantifying economic values of resources and
resource uses that might otherwise escape the attention ofpolicy-makers.
Limitations of the Economic Perspective
Methodological constraints can limit the usefulness of many economic valuation
exercises. For example, approaches reliant upon surveys suffer from the observation that
people often do not answer surveys truthfully or accurately, or that the phrasing of
questions may introduce a bias into the study.122 Another problem plaguing survey methods
and many other opinion-based valuation techniques is simply the question of determining
who should be interviewed: locals, activists, tourists, retirees, landowners? What about the
value that future generations may attribute to a resource? These issues are particularly
119 A full review of these techniques is well beyond the scope of this report. Detailed reviews are provided
by Freeman (1993) and Hufschmidt et al. (1983), among others. Additional information on many relevant
topics is available in the Journal ofEnvironmental Economics andManagement.
120 Some surveys also ask parties what they would be willing-to-accept in compensation for a negative
change in an environmental variable. This is sometimes done to partially compensate for the "income
effect"—i.e., the observation that an individual's willingness-to-pay/accept is not simply a reflection of their
values, but of their financial status.
121 For example, prices paid for swimming pools can potentially be used to assess the value of a public pond
used for swimming.
122 Survey estimates of willingness-to-pay, for example, are notoriously high.
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salient in many public lands debates. In many other techniques, it is difficult to control or
account for all relevant variables. For example, in the travel cost method, it is difficult to
know if the expenses oftravel reflect the value ofthe destination site, such as a National
Park, or reflect a value attributed to intermediate destinations or simply the act oftravel
itself.123 Similarly, approaches based on land values or wages may not be able to distinguish
between the values of natural resources amenities and other amenities, such as baseball
stadiums, shopping facilities, employment opportunities, and transportation networks. Also
troublesome is the challenge of quantifying values that most people do not understand, such
as the role of wetlands in controlling floods and purifying water.124 As these examples
suggest, all methodological assumptions and uncontrolled variables associated with the
production of public land value estimates must be rigorously evaluated if decision-makers
are to place valuation statistics in proper context.125
Significant and inherent philosophical deficiencies also underlie economic valuation
techniques, ensuring that these techniques will never fully be able to capture the full range
of public land values (Sagoff, 1988). Of particular concern is the anthropocentric focus of
economic valuation techniques. For the economist, value resides in people, with gains in
human value labeled as benefits and losses in human value labeled as costs (OECD, 1992;
Goulder and Kennedy, 1997; Brown and Moran, 1994). National resource policy-making,
it is therefore concluded, can be based on a "direct monetization" of the various elements
which constitute the "total economic value" (TEV) of a natural resource or a particular
ecosystem (Brown and Moran, 1994:214).126 This approach is inherently anthropocentric
123 Perhaps the money spent on travel reflects a dislike of the home area more than a special appreciation of
the destination.
124 The identification and valuation of these and related processes is described in detail in Nature's Services,
edited by Gretchen Daily (1997). Among the many issues addressed is the value of the soil conservation
function provided by forests. Research summarized by contributor Norman Myers indicates that India's
forests provide an annual soil conservation benefit of $5 to $12 billion ($100 to $240 per hectare), while
nationwide, the annual value of forests in regulating river flows and containing floods is $72 billion. While
it is difficult to determine the credibility of such statistics without evaluating the methodologies utilized, the
major conclusion of the book is undoubtedly sound: i.e., that public policy decision-makers have notoriously
underestimated the values of "nature's services" when considering land and water use proposals.
125 A report by the National Academy of Sciences evaluating environmental risk regulation by cost-benefit
analyses concluded that there are some 50 points in the risk assessment process where value-judgments
requiring choice from "among several scientifically plausible options" must be made (NRC, 1983:5-8). The
numbers emerging from these analyses are only as good as the underlying assumptions.
126 The intent ofa total economic value (TEV) calculation is to provide a full accounting of environmental
resource values, usually organized into primary and secondary values (Brown and Moran, 1994; Pcarce and
Moran, 1994; Costanza et al., 1997). Primary values are akin to the "nature's services" described by Daily
(1997), in that they include the basic biophysical and systemic properties upon which ecologic systems are
dependent, and upon which all specific resource uses (i.e., the secondary values) are, to some degree,
dependent. Primary values include macro environmental qualities such as climate regulation and nutrient
and energy cycles. Primary values are notoriously difficult to quantify in precise, economic language;
however, this is an active area of research and innovation {e.g., see Daily, 1997). Secondary values are
generally defined to include both use and non-use values. Use values include the benefits associated with
direct and indirect resource uses, as well as the "option value" of a potential future use ofa resource. Direct
resource uses, such as timber harvesting, are generally the easiest to quantify in economic terms. Indirect
uses, such as the role of an undisturbed forested watershed in providing a clean, reliable drinking water
source for a community, are typically more challenging to quantify in economic terms. Secondary non-use
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because it does not directly attribute value to the natural environment, but instead defines
values in terms ofhuman preferences associated with various changes in the state of the
environment (Brown and Moran, 1994; Toman, 1994; Turner, Pearce, and Bateman, 1993;
Kellert, 1996).
It is difficult to assess the significance of this underlying limitation because, as
Toman (1994:3) observes, "while the economic paradigm is anthropocentric rather than
ecocentric, and utilitarian rather than based on inherent rights, it encompasses a very broad
range of values that are advanced by proponents of ecosystem preservation on 'intrinsic
worth' grounds." Economic valuation techniques can produce excellent estimates of
natural resource values as viewed from the anthropocentric conservationism perspective of
Pinchot and others, and in many cases, can produce useful estimates ofvalues as viewed
from the anthropocentric preservationism perspective articulated by Muir and others. What
is completely omitted, however, is the perspective ofthe ecocentric preservationists who
advocate environmental protection for its own sake.127 This is because any attempt to place
a monetary figure on the intrinsic value of nature commits what is sometimes known as a
"category mistake," which occurs whenever one attempts to treat particular facts or
concepts as if they belong to one logical type or category, when in fact they belong to
another. For some public land activists, comparing economic values with natural rights—or
more precisely, attempting to reduce natural rights to economic value—is philosophically
tantamount to asking, 'What color is seven?' This is a category error, and not a simple
measurement error (Sagoff, 1988). No improvements in economic valuation methodologies
can be expected to address this philosophical limitation.
A related limitation ofusing economic valuation methodologies in decision-making
exercises is the frequent failure of these techniques to acknowledge the problems associated
with translating individual preferences into social policy. As shown by the earlier discussion
of"tragedy of the commons" situations (i.e., common pool resource problems), individual
and collective preferences are not always consistent. While in that example familiar to
virtually all economists the inconsistency was defined in the economic language of market
failures, inconsistencies between individual and collective incentives are also well known in
the world of political science. Many economic valuation methods inappropriately confuse
citizens and consumers, values and preferences, and public and private interests. For this
reason, it is "conceptually impossible," according to Sagoff (1981:1410), to attempt to
values can, in turn, be defined to include bequest and intrinsic values. Bequest value is a measure of a
resource's potential value to a future generation, while intrinsic value is some measure of the inherent value
of a resource. As discussed later in the text, the inclusion of "intrinsic values" in the TEV calculation can
be problematic due to the methodological challenge of assigning monetary measures to resources valued, at
least in part, for non-economic purposes, and due to the philosophical argument that resources that do not
satisfy human needs or desires still have an inherent worth that cannot be captured by the anthropocentric,
economic viewpoint.
127 The distinction is between arguments for environmental protection based on the grounds that this
protection will provide some human benefit, either a direct monetary benefit or a benefit such as human
happiness, and arguments based on the notion that a resource should be protected in that it has an inherent
value beyond its influence on humans. This concept is most clearly debated in the public policy arena in the
context of the Endangered Species Act, with most parties understanding the rationale of protecting
"popular" species such as bald eagles, but with many parties questioning the logic of protecting obscure and
seemingly useless species such as the snail darter.
39
measure "public values" like environmental protection by economic valuation techniques
because this "confuses what the individual wants as an individual and what he or she, as a
citizen, believes is best for the community"128 Public values lie in the logical category of
"social responsibilities," while market preferences measure the entirely different logical
category of"individual wants."129
An additional problem associated with translating individual preferences into social
policy involves distributional effects. Often, economic valuation techniques ignore
distributional effects entirely, since they are not an issue of efficiency—the primarily
criterion of economic evaluation—but rather a question of equity (OECD, 1992). For
example, an analysis of the potential impact of a water project on the public lands may
reveal that individuals would suffer $10 million in costs, but receive $20 million in benefits.
This benefit-cost ratio of 2.0 and net benefits of $10 million would normally be sufficient to
justify construction; however, what if it was shown that one group would receive all the
costs while another group all the benefits?
These observations suggest that while economic valuation techniques can and do
provide useful statistics about public land values, this empirical data should not be
considered independently ofthe methodological assumptions underlying these techniques,
nor should these tools by themselves be expected to provide a mechanism for public policy
decision-making. When utilized properly, valuation statistics can be employed to illuminate
only that sub-set of costs and benefits that can readily be converted to a common monetary
scale. Other types of values should be described independently, if necessary through
discussions of philosophy and equity that, while lacking the formality and self-importance
ascribed to empirical economic data, may better capture some types of public land values.
Extreme efforts to assign monetary estimates to resources valued largely for non-economic
qualities performs the dual disservice of unjustly ignoring some viewpoints while
discrediting the economic valuation discipline through the production of nonsensical
statistics.130
128 Some economists, particularly those associated with public choice theory (e.g., James Buchanan), reject
the argument that individuals behave differently in making public (i.e., group oriented) decisions in a
political setting than they do in making private (i.e., individual oriented) decisions in the marketplace.
This, however, is primarily a methodological assumption. It is widely recognized that much of human
behavior cannot be adequately explained by assuming the blind pursuit of self-interest (Dolan and Lindsey,
1988).
129 By way of demonstration, Sagoff (1988) quizzed his students about a proposal by Walt Disney
Enterprises to develop a ski resort in the Mineral King Valley, a quasi-wilderncss area in the middle of
Sequoia National Forest, accessible via a proposed road through Sequoia National Park. Only a few
students indicated an interest in visiting the area should it remain undeveloped, while many more students
indicated a desire to visit should the resort be constructed. However, when asked if the Interior Department
should approve die plan, the students responded, nearly unanimously, that it should not be allowed, as the
nation had a responsibility to protect the site. Why the different responses? The first question was posed to
individual consumers, the second to citizens. This case was the subject of landmark litigation in Sierra
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). An excellent discussion of this case, couched within the larger
philosophical issue of environmental ethics, is provided by Stone (1972).
130 As Roughgarden (1995:150-151) remarks: "Economics is not morality.... Yet phrases such as 'we
need to take costs into account when setting environmental objectives' confuses economics with morality."
It seems clear that Congress recognizes this fact in language, found in both MUSY and FLPMA (as quoted
earlier in the text), stating that the best management option is not necessarily the combination of uses that
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The Continued Search for Appropriate Valuation Criteria
Sustainabilitv as a Valuation Criterion?
For many decades, even centuries, scholars and philosophers have openly
recognized the need in public policy-making to better integrate the anthropocentric
perspective ofhuman resource use and consumption with a more biocentric focus that
recognizes human beings as components of natural systems. An over-reliance on the
institutions of utilitarianism, such as the unregulated economic marketplace, not only
forebodes the well documented problems ofmarket failures and the neglect of intrinsic
resource values, but can also foster an unreasonable dependence upon scientific
innovation,131 while failing to adequately consider temporal issues, cumulative impacts,132
and related challenges unique to resource management (Ophuls, 1977; Vickers, 1970).133
However, it has also been persuasively argued in recent decades that properly structured
market mechanisms can be highly useful tools for efficient environmental protection and
restoration.134 As part of this evolving struggle to craft a stable marriage of economics and
ecology, the role of economics in natural resource policy-making has been reassessed,
increasingly leading to the conclusion that economic principles and tools are well suited to
the efficient pursuit ofmanagement objectives, but are largely inappropriate tools for the
initial determination ofmanagement objectives. This realization has a profound relevance
to public lands management, as it shapes our expectations about how to best value these
will give the greatest dollar return or the greatest unit output. (See 16 U.S.C.A. § 531 (a) and 43 U.S.C.A. §
1702(c)).
131 An extreme faith in technological solutions is evident in remarks by Scott and Pearse (1992:164), who
conclude that natural resource scarcity is ephemeral: "Any raw material need can be satisfied from the
expanding range of sources and the invention of new combinations of new resources. The ultimate resource
is innovation."
132 As John Muir once remarked, "When we try to pick out anything by itself, we find that it is bound fast by
a thousand invisible cords that cannot be broken to everything in the universe" (Fox, 1981:291; see also
Lyon, 1972:37).
133 In theory, many of these issues can be addressed under a liberal definition of externalities. However, as a
practical matter, most discussions of environmental externalities do not explicitly address issues of
intergenerational impacts and impacts of a synergistic or cumulative nature.
134 For a theoretical discussion of the role of market-based tools in environmental protection, see the classic
text of Baumol and Oates (1988). For a recent review ofhow these tools have actually been implemented in
the United States, and for a discussion of the somewhat disappointing track record of many of these
strategies, see Hockenstein et al., (1997). The rationale behind using carefully structured market
mechanisms as part of environmental regulation is aptly described in a recent report by the National
Academy of Public Administration (NAPA, 1997:25): "Governments can use their authority to intervene in
the markets in ways that change the prices of goods and services. Those changes, when carefully
implemented, can encourage individuals to change their behavior in ways that are both environmentally
beneficial, and in their financial self-interest. Because the strategies work through prices rather than
prescription, individuals in the market have more choices, the results are more dynamic, and the overall
cost of reaching the desired goal is likely to be lower."
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lands and how to select the objectives to pursue in our use or preservation of these
resources.
One of the primary origins of this modern debate—and more generally, to the
modern environmental movement—was the "limits to growth" controversy ofthe 197O's.13S
This debate focused public attention on the finiteness of many natural resources, including
the world food supply, and how population growth and consumerism threatened to result in
potentially devastating problems of scarcity. Over the next two decades, this dialogue
evolved away from the narrow "source limits" focus to include "sink limits"—, a concern
for the assimilative capacity ofthe biosphere, as evidenced by global issues such as the
impact of chloroflurocarbon (CFC) emissions on ozone depletion and carbon dioxide
induced global warming (Paehlke, 1989; Turner and Pearce, 1993).136 One output of this
thinking was the Bruntland Commission,137 which in 1987 articulated what has become a
widely acknowledged global prognosis: the world is becoming increasingly economically
and ecologically interdependent, but that it is possible—at least in principle—to have
"growth that is forceful and at the same time socially and environmentally sustainable"
(WCED, 1987:9). In proclaiming that "humanity has the ability to make development
sustainable," the Commission offered a new criterion of"sustainable development" by
which all environmental policy, including public lands policy, could, in theory, be evaluated
(WCED, 1987:8). Good policy is policy that promotes both ecological and economic
sustainability.
In many nations, including the United States, this concept is quickly gaining
acceptance, no doubt in part due to its vagueness and its promise of continued resource use
practices—features already found in the multiple-use, sustained-yield (MUSY) philosophy.
One example of the modern support for the sustainable development concept comes from
the establishment ofPresident Clinton's Council on Sustainable Development, which in
1996 called for a new "ethic of stewardship" which can "sustain natural resources
protection and environmental quality" into the future, recognizing that "America is blessed
with an abundance of natural resources which provide both the foundation for its powerful
and vibrant economy and serve as a source of aesthetic inspiration and spiritual sustenance
for many" (President's Council, 1996:110). This philosophically diverse statement and
Commission report, when considered alongside other recent writings, suggests that the next
evolutionary step in public lands management beyond the existing MUSY mandate may be
to more explicitly introduce the idea of ethics in public lands stewardship and to more
135 The seminal essay examining the issue of resource depletion is Thomas Malthus' Essay on the Principle
ofPopulation (1798), in which Malthus shows that all species, presumably including humans, do not
independently regulate population growth, but instead tend to grow beyond the carrying capacity of the
environment and are then decimated by famine or other compensating processes. Almost two centuries
later, a modern but only slightly less horrific discussion of resource limits was cultivated in the 1960's and
1970's, in works such as Limits to Growth (Meadows et al., 1972), Paul Ehrlich's Population Bomb (1968,
1975), William Ophuls' Ecology and the Politics ofScarcity (1977), and Robert Heilbroner's An Inquiry
into the Human Prospect (1974). Paehlke (1989) provides an excellent overview of this literature.
136 Global environmental issues were the primary focus of the "Earth Summit," held in Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil, in 1992, attended by heads and senior officials from 179 governments (Keating, 1993).
137 The official name of the commission was the World Commission on Environment and Development
(WCED), established by the United Nations and chaired by Ms. Gro Harlem Bruntland.
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clearly acknowledge the frequently symbiotic relationship between vibrant economies and
stable and pristine ecological systems.138 This is the promise offered by this interpretation
of "sustainable development";139 however, in order to ensure that this concept is utilized as
a practical tool for valuing and management public land resources, rather than simply a
hollow political buzzword, the challenge remains to find processes and criteria to translate
noble ideas into agency practice.
Future Directions in Public Lands Valuation
Despite some of the aforementioned limitations oftraditional economic theory, there
remains a central role for economics and economic statistics in efforts to value public lands,
and in attempts to operationalize philosophically inclusive strategies of public lands
management—such as the interpretation and implementation of sustainable development.u0
It is increasingly apparent that, among economists, this role is best suited to researchers in
the sub-discipline of environmental economics.141 One of the central themes of
environmental economics, also central to most interpretations of sustainable development, is
the importance of explicitly addressing the failure of most socioeconomic systems to
adequately value the life-sustaining "services" provided by environmental systems, and not
just the more obvious extractive benefits associated with short-sighted consumerism
(Pearce, Markandya, and Barbier, 1989; Daily, 1997). This macroeconomic, long-term,
systems approach to resource valuation is a useful contribution, as it fully acknowledges
that our public lands are more than the sum oftheir parts, and certainly much more than the
sum of those parts for which credible market prices are readily available.
The challenge of public lands valuation, however, will remain more than an
economic exercise. In part due to its continued reliance on the cost-benefit framework, the
usefulness of environmental economics and economic valuation methods as policy-making
tools will continue to be limited by the formidable methodological deficiencies of economic
valuation techniques, including most fundamentally, by the inability ofthe utilitarian focus
to account for issues of rights and ethics, by the failure of the efficiency concept to
illuminate important distributional issues, and by the danger of extrapolating individual
138 One of the more interesting studies contributing to this evolution in thinking is Thomas Power's Lost
Landscapes and Failed Economies (1996), in which it is shown that the key to economic success in many
communities is to maintain clean and healthy environments which, in turn, attracts skilled labor and
investment capital.
139 Pearce, Markandya, and Barbier (1989:173-185) provide a summary of several other definitions of
sustainable development.
M0 Loomis (1994), Toman (1994), and Sagoff (1981) are among those authors who see a role for economic
valuation methods in public policy exercises, but only if placed within a proper context. As Sagoff
(1981:1410) cautions: "Economic methods cannot supply the information necessary to justify public policy.
Economics can measure the intensity with which we hold our beliefs; it cannot evaluate those beliefs on
their merits. Yet evaluation is essential to political decision making." A similar argument is made by Lord
(1979:1233): "Most economists will admit, if pressed, that economic science has been unable to determine
what is or is not in the public interest."
141 An excellent survey of environmental economics is provided by Krishnan et al. (1995).
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preferences into sweeping social objectives.142 These deficiencies can also exist in the
generally more promising set oftechniques that create empirical data by asking stakeholders
to make trade-offs among different "bundles" of resource goods and outcomes, but which
avoid the artificial step of converting all variables to standard economic measures.143 Public
lands valuation is destined to remain an awkward marriage of philosophy and economics,
bound together by the continued need to supplement the public policy process with sound
statistical data regarding resource use and economic activity, but plagued with the
irreconcilable disciplinary differences that unavoidably arise when attempting to calculate
net resource values using fundamentally different units of measure.
W!J I
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142 Several of the theoretical and methodological deficiencies of environmental economics are described by
Daly and Townsend (1993) and Daily (1997). The overwhelming challenge of measuring process-related
environmental values has led Daily (1997:7) to conclude "there exists no absolute value of ecosystem
services waiting to be discovered and revealed to the world by a member of the intellectual community."
143 Many such techniques have emerged from the science ofMAUT (Multi Attribute Utility Theory). One
example of this type of approach is MATS (Multi-Attribute Tradeoff System), a computer program
developed by the U.S Bureau of Reclamation to help decision-makers express value trade-offs associated
with western water developments (Brown et al., 1986; Henderson and Lord 1995)
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IV: PARTIAL STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF PUBLIC
LAND USES AND VALUES
Summary of the Information Presented
While it is undoubtedly impossible to empirically describe the full value of the public
lands, some relevant statistical data can be presented for most ofthe major uses and values,
especially those ofan explicitly economic nature. For those uses with well documented
economic values, it is possible in theory to sum the relevant statistics to generate a picture
of total economic value (TEV) for a given resource. A TEV calculation is not attempted in
this paper for many reasons, including the practical impossibility of compiling and
evaluating all needed statistics, and due to problems of double-counting that would
inevitably occur in any categorization scheme. For example, consider the value of a
particular National Forest. Forests have many types of values, from systemic (or "primary")
values such as streamflow regulation and atmospheric carbon fixation, to particular
secondary values such as timber production and the provision of habitat and recreation
opportunities. These and other functions of the National Forests are interrelated through a
variety of biological, physical, and economic mechanisms, occurring both within and outside
of the forest boundaries and over variable temporal scales. Economic value generated from
one type ofuse, such as timber harvesting, may augment or decrease the availability of the
forest to provide a different type of value, such as the provision of wildlife habitat.
Experience with cost-benefit analyses aptly demonstrates the difficulties inherent in
performing an accurate accounting ofthis nature at the micro-scale of a particular project
and in the context of a particular stakeholder group; at the scale of a vast, multifaceted, and
intensively managed resource, nested within a larger national system of resources reserved
to provide broad societal benefits, the challenge of the TEV calculation is overwhelming.144
Furthermore, even if this challenge could be overcome, the TEV calculation would still omit
those "biocentric values" that lie outside the range of the utilitarian, anthropocentric
perspective associated with economic valuation techniques.
This report, consequently, does not try to provide a numerical answer to the
overriding question of "what are the public lands worth?" To the contrary, a central
premise of this research is that this question will continue to defy a precise numerical
answer, for both methodological and philosophical reasons.145 It is possible, however, to
present statistical data that partially describes the resources of the public lands, how they
are utilized, the economic ramifications of particular uses, and the salient long-term trends
and consequences associated with these patterns ofuse. Furthermore, it is frequently
possible to discuss these factors using monetary measures, which not only provide a
144 Perhaps the most ambitious study of this nature estimated the value of the services of the ecological
systems and the natural capital stocks of the earth as a whole to be worth somewhere between S16 and $54
trillion (Costanza et al., 1997).
145 This material is covered in depth in Section III.
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useful—albeit philosophically limited—measure ofvalue, but which also provide a
preliminary basis for considering trade-offs and evaluating policy alternatives.
Categorization of Statistical Information
This section of the report features a partial statistical summary of the uses and
values of the public lands. As shown below, the information is organized into two general
categories: primarily consumptive uses and values, and primarily non-consumptive uses and
values:
PRIMARILY CONSUMPTIVE USES AND VALUES
• Minerals and Energy Resources
• Rangeland and Grazing
• Timber and Forest Products
• Water Resources
PRIMARILY NON-CONSUMPTIVE USES AND VALUES
• Recreation
• Research and Knowledge
• Biodiversity Preservation
The consumptive/non-consumptive use criterion is commonly utilized in the natural
resources vernacular, and provides a practically useful scheme for organizing statistical
information primarily collected in regards to specific resource uses.146 The
consumptive/non-consumptive use criterion, however, has some inherent drawbacks. In
particular, it is important to appreciate that the term consumption in this context is utilized
to describe resource extraction and use rather than actual depletion, as the so-called
"renewable resources," such as timber and range, can be consumed at levels either above,
below, or at the level of natural regeneration. For renewable resources, the requirement of
ecological sustainability, increasingly a fixture in modern public lands policy, provides
resource managers with a mandate to evaluate levels of consumption relative to levels of
regeneration. Consequently, any discussion of renewable resources is incomplete without
some assessment ofhow levels of consumptive use compare to levels of regeneration. In
contrast, consumption of the so-called "non-renewable resources," such as mineral deposits,
carbon-based energy reserves, and genetic biodiversity, can more accurately be equated
with depletion.147
146 The synonymous use of "use" and "value" in this scheme, a classic utilitarian assumption, is entirely
appropriate for describing economic statistics, the major focus of this statistical summary. Public land
values of a non-utilitarian nature, such as those based on notions of rights and ethics, are not readily
amenable to statistical discussions, and are consequently largely outside the scope ofthis statistical
summary.
14' The rcncwable/non-rencwable resource distinction is not used as the basis for classification in this report
due (o these ambiguities. Of particular concern is the fact that many resources considered to be
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Also of concern is the observation that not all resource uses and values can be easily
contained within the consumptive/non-consumptive use dichotomy. For example, some
forms of recreation, such as fishing and hunting, are intended to be at least partially
consumptive—i.e., part of the attraction of these activities is the consumption ofgame—
while most other types of recreation, including hiking, boating, camping, and sightseeing,
are not intended to be consumptive. Yet, any type of recreation when pursued to the
extreme—including those activities which are intended to be non-consumptive—is likely to
inadvertently cause temporary damage or deplete key attributes of the resource in question,
and as such, can be characterized as consumptive in nature. Thus, it is difficult to evaluate
the economic values of primarily non-consumptive uses without considering issues of
unintended impacts and the costs of (and prospects for) resource restoration, much as it is
difficult to evaluate the economic nature of consumptive uses without explicitly considering
rates of resource regeneration or depletion. The true economic value of a resource use,
after all, is not determined solely by the revenues associated with that use, but involves
considering these revenues in the long-term context of depleted or degraded resources.148
Types of Information Presented
Several types of biophysical and economic relationships must be considered to
accurate describe the values associated with public land uses (Howe, 1979). In many cases,
desired statistical information is not readily available to illuminate or quantify all important
factors. In this report, statistical information was primarily collected and organized to
document two types of parameters relating to resource values:
• (1) Resource Inventory, Use and Prognosis. The values of public land resources are,
in large part, a function of the sheer magnitude of those resources as influenced by
current levels of use. Some understanding of resource inventories and levels of use and
consumption, when considered along with information about resource regeneration and
discovery, is essential to developing a "prognosis" of future resource availability. For
many types of resource uses and values this information is readily available; however, in
nonrcnewable, such as fossil fuels, are renewable if viewed from sufficiently long time periods—such as
geologic time. Most scholars tend to define as non-renewable those resources which cannot be replenished
within a reasonable human planning horizon, perhaps as long as a century, a convention that is useful to
distinguish between non-renewable fossil fuels and renewable streamflows, for example, but still
problematic for considering resources which develop over longer time periods, such as redwood forests.
Other challenges to the "non-renewable" concept are provided by changes in technology or human behavior,
such as the modern practice of recycling minerals, and the emerging ability to modify and even re-establish
exhausted gene pools. The terminology of consumptive/non-consumptive use tends to better elude these
complications by avoiding any implications about whether the resources will eventually be replenished.
Consumption implies only an immediate, short-term extraction and use of a resource, without speculating
on how this will influence long-term reserves (Tietenbcrg, 1992).
148 A common proposal today which captures this attitude is the suggestion to reform the computation of
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in order to account for the loss of "natural capital" associated with revenue
generating activities.
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other cases, particularly those involving non-consumptive uses, this information is often
difficult to compile. In those cases where an inventory of current and future resource
reserves is impossible or inappropriate to quantify, the status ofthe resource can often
be described qualitatively using various types of"surrogate" statistics.
• (2) Market Values and Revenue Streams. Those economic uses of the public lands
that generate revenues are, at least in theory, the easiest to value. Many activities,
especially those that involve consumptive uses, deliver public land resources into the
marketplace, where market prices provide a measure of economic value. In practice,
however, these figures can be of limited value unless factors such as subsidies (including
hidden environmental costs) and revenue streams are considered. For example, while
public land management agencies generally maintain useful, if not altogether coherent,
records on revenues generated for the federal treasury and related governmental
expenditures, this tells only part ofthe economic picture. The other component
concerns profits generated by the private entities utilizing these resources, and the
multiplier effects that natural resources production and depletion have on a national
economy. This macroeconomic information can be extremely difficult to acquire.
Furthermore, as discussed earlier, statistics summarizing the economic value of some
uses are likely to hide the extent to which these activities modify, either positively or
negatively, the values associated with other types of public land uses. These factors
should be considered when evaluating the relevance of economic statistics.
The issue of revenue streams is of particular interest to public lands communities.
Because public lands are immune from nonfederal taxation, state and local efforts to obtain
revenues from public land uses has been a contentious part of public lands policy for most
of the nation's history (Fairfax and Yale, 1987). The concerns of state and local
governments have primarily been addressed through federal tax exemptions and resource
revenue sharing programs. While most public revenues collected from public land activities
go to the Federal Treasury, a specified percentage is normally allocated to the relevant state
government for general purpose uses, and another specified percentage is channeled
through special Kinds serving particular needs.150 These percentages vary depending upon
U9 A primary strategy employed in the discipline of economic valuation is to use readily available value
statistics to illuminate those values thai cannot be measured directly. For example, a description of current
consumptive uses of a resource can provide some measure of the value attributed by society to the
competing, non-consumptive uses.
150 For example, two of the most significant special funds are the Reclamation Fund and the Law and Water
Conservation Fund. The Reclamation Fund, created by the Reclamation Act of 1902 (32 Slat. 388; 43
U.S.C.A. § 391), was originally designed to function as a revolving fund, collecting revenues from the sale
of public lands and making it available to western states to finance water projects. For most of its history,
however, congressional expenditures from this fund have greatly outstripped collections, as a long scries of
subsidies have been introduced into the reclamation program. For example, the irrigation subsidy provided
by Bureau of Reclamation projects averages 82%; other uses are also subsidized: e.g., hydroelectric power
generation, 35%; water supply, 29% (Wahl, 1989; WRC, 1975). Most of the funds made available through
the Land and Water Conservation Fund (LWCF), administered by the National Park Service, come from
lucrative rents gleaned from offshore oil leases along the Continental Shelf. Revenues from the LWCF can
be used by federal, state, and local governments to buy parks and recreation areas, and to plan, acquire, and
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the type of resource and the type of land in question, and are discussed in more detail in the
following pages under the appropriate resource use headings. While these amounts can be
significant in some localities, it is important to note that, on average, resource revenue
sharing program on the federal public lands constitute less than 1% of most western states'
annual revenues (Fairfax and Yale, 1987).
While revenue sharing programs help to compensate state and local governments for
federal control of land and resources, these revenue sources have many drawbacks (Fairfax
and Yale, 1987). Perhaps most important is the fact that some localities possess federal
lands that are generally lacking in valuable resource commodities, resulting in small revenue
sharing payments. The quantity and timing of revenue sharing payments are also highly
vulnerable to normal market fluctuations influencing a given commodity. Additionally, a
reliance on revenue sharing programs can create a strong economic incentive for a local
government to promote these commodity uses, often at the expense of other public land
values. Nationally, most local governments avoid these fiscal uncertainties by relying on the
stability of property tax revenues, an option foreclosed in public land regions by federal land
ownership. In many communities, this deficiency is now partially offset by the Payments in
Lieu of Taxes (PILT) program, which originated in response to the federal acquisition of
state lands for military and economic recovery purposes during the Great Depression and
both World Wars. Under this program, the federal government now provides the public
land states with some compensation for the loss of property tax revenues associated with
federal landholdings (Fairfax and Yale, 1987).
Primarily Consumptive Uses and Values"1
The consumptive uses and values of the federal public lands are generally defined to
include all goods extracted from these public areas, even if the extracted element is actually
privately owned. While this may seem like an odd convention, it is of particular importance
in the following discussion of mineral reserves, as split estates on the public lands often
involve federal surface land ownership, while the mineral rights are privately owned. For
purposes of gross resource valuation, the distinction between public and private ownership
is not necessarily relevant. For example, while it is typically assumed that a private mining
develop land and water resources for recreational uses. (The acquisition of sites with historical significance
can also be financed with resources from the National Historic Preservation Fund, also administered by the
Park Service.) LWCF is a "matching grant" program, appropriated on an annual basis by Congress and
shared with the states on a 50% matching basis. Of the annual congressional appropriations to states, 40%
is apportioned equally among all fifty states, while the remaining 60% is apportioned based on need,
population, and on the quantity of federal property in the particular state (Fairfax and Yale, 1987; Nelson,
1995).
151 The statistics included in this report mostly derive from the federal government, usually the particular
agency in charge of land and resource management. However, it is important to note that critics question
the validity of some federal statistics, suggesting that their reliability may be compromised by political
prerogatives. Whether or not these concerns are valid, rarely do adequate alternatives exist to the federal
statistics. In this report, every effort is made to explicitly identify known shortcomings in the statistics
utilized, and the reader is urged to use this information with caution and skepticism.
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company will patent the discovery ofvaluable hardrock mineral resources and gain superior
fee title interest, in some cases, the company may find it advantageous to not take a claim to
patent. Once minerals are discovered, the company enjoys legal protection from competing
interests except those of the United States, a situation that may be more beneficial to the
company than bona fide legal ownership, which subjects the operation to state property
taxation schemes and other responsibilities incidental to fee ownership. While many of
these "dicey" issues must be considered in an analysis of revenue streams, they do not
directly influence the more general determination ofgross consumptive resource values on
the public lands, roughly estimated herein as the product of market prices and quantities
consumed.
Minerals and Energy Resources
Resource Inventory. Use, and Prognosis
The category of minerals and energy resources includes a tremendous diversity of
hard and soft metals, rocks, fuels (including oil, gas, and solid energy fuels), and related
tangible items extracted or "mined" from the public lands for their economic value.
Although aggregating statistics obscures wide differences in the economic value of different
deposits, maintaining separate accounts for all types of deposits results in an unwieldy
mountain of statistics far beyond the scope of this report. Consequently, the statistics
utilized in this report generally follow two classification conventions found in the statistical
literature. The first point of distinction is between onshore and offshore resources, an
important difference primarily due to the different administrative arrangements associated
with the management ofthese two classes of resources. A second and generally more useful
distinction in the valuation context is to follow the statutory framework (presented in
Section II) that differentiates between hardrock minerals (which are generally patentable152),
leasables, and salables. This approach is utilized heavily in this discussion due to its utility
in tracking revenue streams, and because these same categories are frequently used by the
agencies that compile available statistics. These categories do not, however, provide a
highly useful tool for discussing resource inventories, which are best characterized as being
a product ofgeologic, technological, and market forces.153
The United States Geological Survey (USGS), the agency primarily responsible for
assessing the U.S. mineral resource base, addresses the resource inventory question through
the use of a three-part "resource taxonomy": (1) current reserves, (2) potential reserves, and
152 One major exception is hardrock minerals located on acquired lands, which are generally only leasable..
153 In order to have a practical use, the "resource inventory" concept must provide a measure of availability,
which in the realm of mineral and energy resources, is that percentage of total geologic deposits that is
practically available given technological limitations and costs ofextraction. It can be generally assumed
that technological advancements will continue to make resource extraction easier and less costly, and that
resource scarcity will result in higher market prices, thereby encouraging greater exploration and
technological innovation. It can also be assumed that changes in resource using practices, such as recycling
of minerals, can also influence a practical measure of resource availability. When viewed from this
perspective, resource inventory is a dynamic factor, even if the resource in question is, from a geologic
perspective, relatively constant (Tietcnberg, 1992).
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(3) resource endowment. The term "current reserves" refer to those known resources which
can be extracted for profit given current technologies and resource prices. Statistical
estimates of"current reserves" are often readily available, although the accuracy of this
information can be compromised by trade secrets guarded closely by private mining
companies and, potentially, by national security considerations. Estimates of "potential
reserves" are best described as a "function" rather than a number, as the magnitude of
resources potentially available is calculated based upon an estimate ofwillingness-to-pay.
Higher resource prices result in larger estimates of potential reserves. Finally, the concept
of "resource endowment" ignores these socioeconomic issues entirely, and is instead a
geological concept representing the physical magnitude ofresources believed to exist in the
earth's crust—a theoretical ceiling on the total availability of mineral and energy resources.
These three categories should not be viewed as separate entities, but rather as points upon a
continuum formed by considering economic and geologic issues in tandem.
The distinctions between the USGS concepts of current and potential reserves, and
resource endowments, have significant policy implications. A common fallacy is treating
data on current reserves like it represents the maximum potential reserves, an assumption
that often leads to inaccurate resource prognoses (Tietenberg, 1992).154 For example,
although it was estimated in 1934 that copper would be exhausted in 40 years, revised
estimates forty years later in 1974 suggested that known reserves would last another 57
years, a consequence ofnew exploration, technological advances, and shifting market
signals.155 Another common mistake is to assume that the total resource endowment can, at
some point in the future, be made available through price increases. This is probably a poor
assumption for resources which are "geochemically scarce," such as copper, lead, zinc,
molybdenum, and gold. It is unlikely that a future society would be willing to pay the high
costs necessary to extract traces of these minerals once the readily available deposits are
depleted. For many ofthe more plentiful minerals and energy resources, including iron,
aluminum, titanium, magnesium, and silicon, the relationship between price and availability
must feature a consideration of ore grade. As higher grades of such ores are depleted,
costly, but highly abundant, lower grades of ore become potential targets of exploration, but
only as market prices rise.
While considerations of technology and market prices largely preclude the
calculation of precise resource inventory and prognosis estimates, they do not discredit
statistics showing current levels of production. The United States is among the top three
world producers for all of the following minerals: aluminum, barite, beryllium, boron,
bromine, cadmium, cement, copper, diatomite, feldspar, industrial garnet, germanium,
gypsum, helium, lime, magnesium, mercury, mica, molybdenum, ammonia, perlite,
phosphate, quartz crystals, rare earth metals, rhenium, salt, silicon, sodium carbonate,
154 It is common for estimates of resource availability to be based on a simple division of current reserves by
current rates ofconsumption. This is called a "static reserve index," which tends to underestimate the time
until resource exhaustion. A static reserve estimate will only be valid if one assumes that (1) the
consumption of the resource in question will remain steady at current levels until the point of resource
exhaustion, and that (2) the mineral reserves will not be augmented during this period of time. These
assumptions rarely prove to hold up in practice.
155 Many additional estimates of this nature can be found in the "limits to growth" literature of the 1970's.
summarized earlier in Section III and by Paehlke (1989).
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sulfur, talc and prophyllite, titanium, and vermiculite (Forest Service, 1989). A variety of
U.S. production statistics for minerals and fuel resources are provided in Table Al.li6
It is frequently difficult to accurately ascertain or generalize about how much of
these yields originate from the public lands; however, there is no doubt that the public lands
are the primary repository of most accessible mineral and energy resources. This
accounting problem is particularly troublesome for hardrock minerals, the subject of the
General Mining Law of 1872, which pass from public to private ownership upon the
patenting of mineral discoveries. From a conceptual standpoint, it is useful to classify these
patented claims as a component of public land values; but as a practical matter,
governmental statistics tend to only include those activities still under federal jurisdiction.
As shown in Table A2, almost 3 million hardrock mining claims have been filed on BLM
lands from 1976 to 1996, of which about 307,000 are currently active. Approximately
136,000 of these active claims, and almost 700,000 of all claims, are located in Nevada.
The category of leasable minerals and energy resources primarily includes those
resources explicitly covered by the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920: coal, phosphate, sodium,
potassium, oil, oil shale, natural gas, and gilsonite.157 However, the leasable category also
includes many hardrock minerals located on acquired lands, except those in National Parks
or Monuments, as specified in the Acquired Lands Act of 1947.1S8 Geothermal energy is
also a leasable as of 1970 under the Geothermal Steam Act.159 This category is typically
further subdivided by location: offshore, onshore, or on Indian Trust Lands. Offshore
leases involving the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS)161 are primarily liquid energy resources
such as oil and gas, while onshore and Indian leases are likely to include a greater variety of
mineral and energy resources.
156 All tables are located in the Appendix.
157 See 30 U.S.C.A. §181.
!58 See 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 351 through 359.
159 See 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001 through 1025. Geothermal energy is derived from the intrinsic heat of the
earth. To distinguish this resource from water, the statute defines geothermal steam and resources as "(i) all
products of geothermal processes, embracing indigenous steam, hot water and hot brines; (ii) steam and
other gases, hot water and hot brines resulting from water, gas, or other fluids artificially introduced into
geothermal formations; (iii) heat or other associated energy found in geothermal formations; and (iv) any
byproduct derived from them" (section 1001(c)). There is a 10% royalty on the value of steam, heat, or
energy derived from production (section 1004(a)) and a royalty of 5% for any byproduct of such lease for
sale (sectionl004(b)). Geothermal leases last for ten years, or if resources are found, continue as long as
geothermal steam is produced or utilized in commercial quality for up to 40 more years, with a preference
option on renewal (section 1005(a)).
160 Indian trust lands are lands held in trust for Native Americans by the federal government which are
administered by the Department of the Interior.
161 See the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953 (43 U.S.C.A. § 1331-1356). The submerged land
which lies beyond the limit to territorial waters is known as the outer continental shelf, extending seaward
from as little as one mile to as much as 800 miles, covering approximately 1.7 billion acres. Because this is
such a large land mass capable of generating huge revenues, there has been a long history ofjurisdictional
conflicts between states and the federal government over who should control the development of the shelf
and the resulting revenue stream. This debate was largely resolved in the 1953 legislation by the
determination that state boundaries extend three miles from the coast, with all other submerged lands being
federal property. The legislation also includes most of the requirements that comprise the federal leasing
program.
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Although highly dependent upon imported energy reserves, the United States is one
of the world's largest producers of crude oil, natural gas, and coal, much ofwhich is located
in (and under) the public lands and subject to leasing programs.162 Despite a general decline
in production levels over the last decade, the United States remains a formidable crude oil
producer, extracting over 6.5 million barrels in 1995. Production of natural gas has been
slowly, but steadily, increasing in the United States, exceeding 18 quadrillion Btu's annually
since 1990. Coal production in the United States is also significant, supporting exports of
approximately 109 million short tons in 1991. Much of this production originates from the
25,916 producing federal onshore, offshore, and Indian oil, gas, and mining leases at the
end of 1997 (MMS, 1998:28). As shown in Table A3, these producing leases only account
for approximately one-third of total leases (MMS, 1998:29).
The category ofsalable minerals primarily includes those resources excluded from
the jurisdiction of the 1872 General Mining Law in the Common Varieties Act of 1947 and
the Surface Resource Act of 1955.163 Minerals covered include sand, stone, gravel, pumice,
pumicite, cinders, clay, and other mineral-like substances, as well as vegetative materials
including but not limited to yucca, manzanita, mesquite, cactus, timber and other forest
products. Sale of such common variety resources found on the public lands goes to the
highest bidder after formal advertising or other public notice. As shown in Table A4, BLM
statistics for 1996 recorded the actual removal of 8.89 million cubic yards of these materials
in 3,432 active sales. Helium is also deemed a salable public lands resource, as the United
States has reserved ownership of and the right to extract helium from all gas produced from
leases on public lands or otherwise granted by the federal government.164
Market Values and Revenue Streams
The consumptive use of mineral and energy resources on the public lands generates
a substantial amount of public revenue. The Minerals Management Service (MMS),
through its Royalty Management Program, is the primary federal entity responsible for the
collection of fees. The vast majority of fees collected are associated with leasing programs
in which the title to the land remains with the federal government, thereby entitling the
government to collect royalty payments. A wide variety of formulas exist to calculate the
required monetary payments.165
The legal status of the resource in question is the primary factor determining the
nature of public revenues, if any, created by disposition of the resource. Once hardrock
minerals have been patented, virtually all revenues generated from the private marketing of
these resources go entirely to the companies involved as long as nominal public fees are
162 The following statistics are taken from table numbers 1158 (world crude production), 1159 (world
natural gas production), and 1166 (world coal trade), respectively, of the Statistical Abstract ofthe United
States (Census, 1996).
163 Common Varieties Act (30 U.S.C.A. § 601); Surface Resources Act (30 U.S.C.A. § 611).
164 30 U.S.C.A. § 181. Helium production from the public lands has been steadily decreasing for several
years.
165 Note that under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953, the
Federal government may take all or part of its oil and gas royalty "in kind," which means that the federal
government asserts a right to a specified quantity of the mineral resource extracted in lieu of monetary
royalty payments based upon a percentage figure of the total market value of the resources extracted.
paid and procedural requirements are respected.166 In contrast, leasable minerals entitle the
federal government, as owner ofthe land in question, to a combination ofbonuses, rents,
minimum royalties, and production royalties.167 Salable are disposed of either by straight
cash sales or by a production-based revenue formula akin to that for leasable minerals.
As of 1992, the annual market value of minerals and energy resources produced in
the United States was approximately 136 billion dollars: 104 billion from energy fuels
(primarily petroleum, coal, and natural gas), 12 billion from metals, and 20 billion from
"industrial minerals," which include many of the materials classified herein as salable}69
Although a majority of this income is derived from activities on public lands, only a small
fraction of this total is directly captured by the Federal treasury, and most of this amount is
derived from leasing programs associated with energy resources, especially those located
along the OCS. As shown in Table A5, the MMS collected over $6.2 billion in receipts
from leasables in 1997. Approximately $4.8 billion of this total came from offshore leases,
mostly from oil and gas royalties. Onshore leases generated approximately $1.2 billion,
while Indian trust land leases provided an additional $208 million. This is the highest level
of revenue collection since the 1980's, a period during which revenues from the OCS
leasing program trailed only IRS income tax collections and U.S. Customs fees as a source
of federal revenue (Nelson, 1992; MMS, 1998:9).169
Formulas for the disbursement of federal oil, gas, and mineral revenues are
exceedingly complex, much like the rules for revenue collection.170 In general, revenues
collected from oil, gas, and mineral leases on the public lands are distributed to four types of
recipients: (1) to the U.S. treasury, (2) to "special accounts" established by Congress to
finance specific programs, (3) to the states where the production occurs, and to (4) tribal
governments and allottees. Most public revenues associated with federal offshore leasing
programs—the largest source of public revenues—are retained in federal accounts,
distributed among the General Fund ofthe Treasury, the Land and Water Conservation
Fund (LWCF), and the National Historic Preservation Fund (NHPF). Annual deposits to
166 One major exception is those hardrock minerals on acquired lands subjected to leasing programs, which
are frequently assessed a 5 percent royalty.
167 Bonuses represent the cash amount successfully bid to win the rights to a lease in an area known to
contain valuable minerals. Rents are annual payments, usually a fixed dollar amount per acre, designed to
preserve the rights to a lease when a well or site is not in production. Minimum royalties are annual
payments per acre required to maintain the rights to a lease until production exceeds a specified value.
These modest fees (onen tabulated as "other revenues") are designed to enable the lessee to gain back some
of the capital costs involved with implementing extraction of the resource. Once these start-up costs have
been recouped and production value exceeds the specified minimum, however, production royalties become
due. These royalties are typically defined as a stated share or percentage of the total value of the mineral
produced, which the federal government is entitled to as owner of the land (MMS, 1998).
168 Statistic taken from table 1147 of the Statistical Abstract ofthe United States (Census, 1996).
169 As a point of reference, compare these figures to revenues derived from saleable minerals. Over 2,500
new contracts sales and use permits were issued for saleable resources in 1996 covering 1S.3 million cubic
yards of material valued at S10.2 million. The exercise of 3,432 contracts/permits in that same year
generated S5.8 million in federal revenues (BLM, 1996a). These figures do not even approach one percent
of revenues earned from offshore oil and gas leases.
"° For a detailed review ofdisbursement formulas, consult the annual Mineral Revenues publication of the
Minerals Management Service. These and other MMS documents can be found online at
<http://www.rmp.mms.gov/>.
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the LWCP and NHPF can go as high as $900 and $150 million, respectively, with most of
the remainder going to the Treasury's General Fund. One notable exception is payments to
coastal states located within three miles of the offshore oil or natural gas field covered by
the federal lease. In these cases, the states are entitled to a "fair and equitable" division of
leasing revenues, which is currently interpreted as 27 percent of revenues from royalties,
rent, and bonus payments generated within the state's coastal zone.
Different rules apply for revenues collected on the acquired lands, Indian lands, and
the remaining public lands. On the acquired lands, the MMS collects all royalties, rents, and
bonuses from mineral and energy leases issued under the Mineral Leasing Act. In general,
revenue sharing on the acquired lands managed by the Forest Service and BLM follows a
75-25 split, with the larger share going to the Treasury's General Fund and the remaining
25 percent to the state or county in which the lease is located. Several other arrangements
exist for remaining categories of acquired lands.171 For Indian lands, the Bureau of Indian
Affairs (BIA) collects bonuses and rents from nonproducing wells or sites, while MMS
transfers mineral royalties and rents from producing leases on Indian trust and allotted lands
to the Office ofTrust Funds Management (OTFM). Then, with some exceptions, BIA
generally makes disbursements of revenues to the appropriate tribes. In the remaining
public lands, states generally receive 50 percent of all royalties, rents, and bonuses within
their boundaries, except for Alaska which receives 90 percent. The remainder is distributed
to the General Fund (10 percent) and to the Reclamation Fund (40 percent), which is used
to finance federal water projects in arid and semiarid regions. This revenue distribution
formula is also frequently applied to coal mines subject to the Federal Coal Leasing
Amendments of 1976172 and to leases on military lands acquired after 1981.
In fiscal year 1997, Federal and Indian lease revenues exceeding $6.2 billion were
collected and disbursed. The exact distribution of these funds is shown in Table A6. Over
half of these funds (approximately $3.9 billion) were channeled directly into the U.S.
Treasury, followed by special accounts ($1.5 billion), state payments ($0.7 billion), and
tribal payments ($0.2 billion). The state share of these disbursements is summarized in
Table A7. Among other findings, Table A7 illustrates the extreme importance of federal
onshore leasing revenues to the states ofWyoming and New Mexico.
Rangeland and Grazing
Resource Inventory. Use and Prognosis
Another significant consumptive value of the public lands is rangeland used for
grazing commercial livestock. While the economic value associated with grazing is
171 Receipts from flood control lands, managed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, are also split between
the General Fund and state and local governments, with the larger share going to the non-federal
governments. All receipts from lands managed by the Bureau of Reclamation go into the Reclamation
Fund. Leasing revenue from National Wildlife Refuge lands are split between county government and the
General Fund. Finally, for military lands acquired before 1981, all leasing revenues go to the General
Fund. For the purposes of leasing revenue allocation, military lands acquired after 1981 arc generally not
subject to the rules associated with acquired lands.
17290Stat. 1083.
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considerably smaller than that of minerals and energy extraction, grazing in many areas is
the most intensive use of the public lands (Wilkinson, 1992). This is specially true for lands
managed by the BLM and, to a lesser extent, National Grasslands and other areas managed
by the Forest Service. Direct statistical comparisons ofBLM and Forest Service grazing
practices are somewhat difficult since these agencies generate statistics that are not always
consistent, nor reported for the same time periods. Even more problematic is the
documentation ofgrazing on public lands outside of the BLM and Forest Service systems.
For example, grazing is occasionally allowed as a special use within National Parks under
the National Park Service Organic Act, however, statistics on these uses are not readily
available.173 Despite these complications, federal statistics provide a relatively clear picture
ofgrazing on the public lands.
More acres of the western United States are dedicated to grazing than any other
consumptive use. The BLM manages approximately 165 million acres open to grazing,
supporting about 4.4 million cattle, sheep, and horses; the Forest Service manages
approximately 105 million acres of public rangeland in the United States, almost exclusively
located in the West, grazed by over 2 million cattle, sheep, and horses (GAO, 1988; Forest
Service, 1997). Grazing animals on the public lands requires a permit which can last up to
ten years, and which includes a priority for renewal to the permit holder.m As shown in
Tables A8 and A9, approximately 27,000 grazing permits were authorized in 1996 for
almost 21 million AUMs.175 This included over 8,000 permittees allowed to graze more
than 8 million AUMs on Forest Service lands, as well as 11,900 grazing permits on Section
3 lands (i.e., lands within grazing districts) for 11.6 million AUMs, and 6,895 grazing leases
on Section 15 lands (i.e., lands outside grazing districts) for 1.5 million AUMs on BLM
lands. This intensity of use is significantly lower than historic levels (Foss, 1960;
MacDonnell, 1993; GAO, 1988).
As a potentially renewable resource, the quantity of forage available on the public
lands is largely determined by land productivity and rangeland health, which in turn are
highly dependent upon factors such as climate, seasonal weather abnormalities, national and
international food markets, and perhaps most importantly, intensity of use. Rangeland
quality is a hotly contested, politically charged issue, featuring frequent disputes about the
actual quality ofthe public rangeland. Although less than 2% of livestock ranchers use
public rangelands, overgrazing has been and continues to be a significant problem
(Wilkinson, 1992). Aggressive legislative reforms to address overgrazing of public lands
began in the 1930s with the passage ofthe Taylor Grazing Act of 1934,176 an era in which
the Department of Agriculture estimated that "a range once capable of supporting 22.5
million animal units... can now carry only 10.8 million" (Foss, 1960:4).177 In the modern
era, the most salient legislative attack on overgrazing has come in the Public Rangeland
16 U.S.C.A. § 3. Also see Special Park Uses (NPS, 1996).
173
mSee43US.C.A.§315(b).
17S AUMs refers to "Animal Unit Month," one AUM being equivalent to the average amount of forage
required by a thousand pound cow for one month.
175 See 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 315-315(r).
177 Overgrazing on the public domain lands—public lands not yet reserved or disposed by the federal
government —was even more pervasive during this era {Foss, 1960).
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Improvement Act of 1978.178 Legislative and administrative reforms have been successful
in reducing grazing levels, although poor range condition remains a chronic problem. The
Forest Service has overseen the most dramatic declines in grazing levels. By 1910, grazing
levels in the National Forests were as high as 15 million AUMs, later rising to over 20
million AUMs during World War I. This level of use was gradually reduced to the current
level from the 1920s to 1960s, driven by concerns about overgrazing. Levels of grazing on
BLM leads peaked in the 1940s at approximately 15 million AUMs before steadily declining
to just over 10 million AUMs in the late 1970s (MacDonnell, 1993).
Despite the fact that 40 percent ofthe nation's rangeland is in federal ownership,
these lands support only 14 percent of the total AUMs consumed by livestock
(MacDonnell, 1993). This statistic not only illustrates the fact that public rangelands tend
to be more arid, and thus less productive, than private rangeland holdings, but also
underscores the fact that these lands are relied upon to support millions of wild horses,
burros, antelope, deer, moose, mountain sheep, bison, and other ungulates (MacDonnell,
1993). It is these non-livestock species that are most at risk from chronic overgrazing. As
of 1989, 68 percent ofBLM grazing lands are characterized as being in "unsatisfactory"
condition—defined as the sum of fair (42 percent) and poor (26 percent) condition lands—a
rating that is particularly disconcerting given that the working definition of "fair" lands are
those that cannot support more than half oftheir historic carrying capacity (NWF and
NRDC, 1989; Wilkinson, 1992; Bates, 1992). This information, shown in Table A10, is a
slight improvement from the 71 percent unsatisfactory rating compiled in the 1985
assessment (NWF and NRDC, 1989). Forest Service rangeland is generally considered to
be in slightly better condition, although only 27 percent is rated as "satisfactory" (Bates,
1992:48).l79
Another important consideration in evaluating resource condition is the status of the
riparian zones, those lush areas along streams and creeks that, in various ways, sustain the
majority of wildlife species in arid and semi-arid regions.180 In addition to providing wildlife
178 In the Public Rangeland Improvement Act (PRIA), Congress asserts that "(1) vast segments of the public
rangelands are producing less than their potentialfor livestock, wildlife habitat, recreation,forage, and
water and soil conservation benefits, andfor that reason are in an unsatisfactory condition; (2) such
rangelands will remain in an unsatisfactory condition and some areas may decline further under present
levels of, and funding for, management; (3) unsatisfactory conditions on public rangelands present a high
risk of soil loss, desertification, and a resultant underproductivity for large acreage's of the public lands;
contribute significantly to unacceptable levels of siltation and salinity in major western watersheds...
negatively impact the quality and availability of scarce western water supplies; threaten important and
frequently critical fish and wildlife habitat; prevent expansion of the forage resource and resulting benefits
to livestock and wildlife production; increase surface runoff and flood danger, reduce the value of such
lands for recreational and esthetic purposes; and may ultimately lead to unpredictable and undesirable long-
term local and regional climatic and economic changes " PRIA, 43 U.S.C.A. § 1901 (a)(l-3)
(emphasis added).
179 However, given that most Forest Service lands are at higher altitudes and thus less arid than BLM lands,
this slight statistical disparity may suggest that Forest Service grazing lands are even more abused than
rangelands managed by the BLM. Given relatively more moisture, Forest Service lands are often better
suited to rangeland productivity and may for this reason be more intensively used without harm than arid,
less productive BLM lands.
180 Riparian corridors make up less than 1 percent of total western lands, but provide critical habitat to the
majority of the approximately 3,000 species dependent upon the public lands for habitat (Bates, 1992).
habitat, maintaining vegetation along riparian zones is also important to minimize erosion,
sedimentation, and associated non-pointsource water pollution.181 In order for
riparian/wetland areas to remain healthy, deep-rooted vegetation normally must be
maintained to help dissipate the energy associated with high water flows. In areas
characterized by poor grazing management, cattle are allowed to consume or trample
riparian vegetation, leading to localized soil erosion along stream banks and the eventual
development of "cut banks" along stream channels from the scouring of exposed stream
channels during high flow periods. Furthermore, the loss ofgood soil reduces the ability of
the land to capture, hold and gradually release excess flows, resulting in a reduction in
groundwater recharge and the ability of root systems to locate water. As shown in Table
All, most riparian/wetland zones in BLM lands are considered by the agency to be in
"proper functioning condition"182; however several states, most notably Nevada, Arizona,
New Mexico, Montana, and Wyoming, have significant problems.
Market Values and Revenue Streams
Receipts for grazing in 1996 on BLM lands totaled about $14 million, nearly 11
percent oftotal BLM revenue collected for that year. Grazing receipts for the Forest
Service in 1996 totaled $7.3 million, a significant decrease from previous years. These
totals are shown in Table A12. While these are significant revenue amounts, it is frequently
asserted that public grazing fees are artificially low when compared to fees on private
grazing lands. Fees associated with public grazing permits are based on a formula found in
the Public Rangeland Improvement Act of 1978 (PRIA), provided in Table A13, which
specifies a required payment based on the total number ofAUMs consumed. In 1990, the
BLM assessed grazing fees of $1.81 per AUM, while Forest Service fees ranged from $0.84
to $4.36 per AUM (Bates, 1992).183 This federal rate rose modestly to $1.86 per 1993,
before falling again in 1996 to $1.35 (Olinger, 1998). Despite these occasional fluctuations
in public grazing fees, a stark disparity prevails between public and private grazing fees,
with private grazing fees being nearly five times greater on average than public fees (Watts
and LaFrance, 1994).184 Some parties have interpreted this discrepancy as a federal grazing
181 Pollution enters watercourses in two general ways: (1) through point sources, such as the outlets of
factories and wastewater treatment plants; and (2) through "nonpoint" sources, such as agricultural and
urban runoff, and occasionally through contaminated precipitation. The water pollution laws and programs
of the United States have generally been much more effective in the control of point sources than nonpoint
sources, as the former provides obvious sites at which to enforce technology standards and to concentrate
monitoring.
18: Under the BLM rating system, a riparian-wetland areas is considered healthy and functional when
adequate vegetation, landforms, or large woody debris is present to dissipate the energy associated with high
water flows (BLM, 1996a).
183 These fees have risen extremely slowly over time. For example, on BLM lands, grazing fees have
climbed 5 cents (per AUM) from 1936 to 1993 (Watts and LaFrance, 1994:62-63).
184 The authors suggest a more appropriate range of fees would lie between $6 and $15 per AUM, averaging
$9.22 per AUM. Supporters of current fee structures counter that the public lands are frequently less
productive than private grazing lands, as the most productive lands were converted to private ownership in
the homesteading era leaving the remaining, less productive lands in public ownership.
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subsidy as high as $1,435 per permittee.185 Several congressional and administrative
attempts have been made to raise grazing fees, however, it has proven to be a highly
contentious and politically resistant issue despite the statistically small number of total
ranchers dependent on the public rangelands (Olinger, 1998).186
The revenue collected from federal grazing fees go into a revenue sharing program
somewhat similar to those created for dispersing minerals leasing revenues. Federal grazing
receipts, from both BLM and Forest Service lands, are allocated into three categories
(Fairfax and Yale, 1987).187 One half of all funds roll into a "Range Improvement Fund,"
utilized exclusively for improvements in the western states. Another significant percentage
is allocated to states and counties. As provided by the Taylor Grazing Act, states and
counties receive 12.5 percent of revenues from grazing lands located within grazing districts
(Section 3 lands), while receiving 50 percent of revenues from lands outside districts
(Section 15 lands). All remaining funds are earmarked to the General Treasury Fund
established by FLPMA.
Timber and Forest Products
Resource Inventory. Use and Prognosis
The third category of consumptive values involve public forests. Forests provide
several functions, including wildlife habitat, recreation opportunities, watershed
maintenance, forage, wood products, and carbon dioxide reduction. The primary
consumptive value is commercial timber; other consumptive forest products include
Christmas trees, nuts and seeds, mushrooms, yew bark, plants such as cactus and yucca, and
other vegetative materials. Similar to rangeland, the full spectrum of forest products on the
public lands is not tracked by a single federal agency because federal timberlands falls under
the jurisdiction of several agencies, including the Forest Service, the BLM, and the National
Park Service. With very few exceptions, most public timber sales occur on National Forests
managed by the Forest Service or in lands in the Pacific Northwest, namely the O&C lands
in Oregon, managed by the BLM. Statistics on timber sales are generally readily available.
As seen with other renewable resources, public timber inventories are dynamic,
affected by factors such as climatic and weather trends, disease, fire, regional and
international timber markets, and management programs. Total timber inventories in a
given region can be calculated as the product of timberland acreage, the average biomass of
trees on that acreage, and the observed density (i.e., trees per acre). Most published
estimates of timber volume, however, customarily include only "commercial" timberland,
185 Comments of Congressman Synar (Oklahoma), U.S. House of Rep. report #99-593, Federal Grazing
Program: All is Mot Well on the Range, 99th Congress, 2d Session, 1986, page 61; as quoted in Wilkinson
(1992:101). Olinger (1998) estimates the subsidy, in 1996, to be approximately $787 per permittee.
186 In addition to the political challenge of raising grazing fees, legislative restrictions provide that "the
annual increase or decrease in such fee for any given year shall be limited to not more than plus or minus
25 percent of the previous year's fee" (43 U.S.C.A. § 1905).
181 A few exceptions exist. For example, no grazing receipts from the O&C lands under BLM jurisdiction
go into the Range Improvement Fund.
defined as land producing at least 20 cubic feet of timber per acre, per year.188 Commercial
forestland does not include lands with either a lesser annual growth rate or those lands
which have been withdrawn from timber management programs and placed under a
protective designation such as a wilderness area. Estimates of commercial forest volume
can include all types oftree stands, including tightly packed forests as well as older forests
with less tree density per acre—as long as the aforementioned commercial timberland test is
satisfied. Approximately 136 of the 483 million acres of forestlands in the United States
satisfying the "commercial" timberland criteria are publicly held.189 Total forested acreage
decreased by a total of 8 million acres (1.6 percent) between 1977 and 1987.190 As of 1989,
72 percent of commercial timberland is located in the eastern United States (Forest Service,
1990).
Table A14 provides a detailed accounting of timber inventories, harvests, other
removals,191 and regeneration in the United States as a whole; while Tables A15 and A16
focus exclusively on the National Forest system, examining softwoods and hardwoods,
respectively (Haynes et al., 1995). As of 1991, total "growing stock" inventories of timber
in the United States are shown to total approximately 785 billion cubic feet, about 450
billion cubic feet (57 percent) in softwoods and 335 billion cubic feet (43 percent) in
hardwoods.192 For softwoods, approximately 41 percent (185,574 million cubic feet) is
found in the National Forest system, followed by 33 percent in farm and other private
holdings, 15 percent in forestry industry holdings, and the remaining 11 percent in other
public lands. While slightly more than half of the softwood inventory is found on public
lands, the distribution of harvests, totaling 10.7 billion cubic feet in 1991, is skewed heavily
in favor of private lands, with only 17 percent (1,789 million board feet) from the National
Forest system and 7 percent (769 million board feet) from other public lands. Rates of
regeneration exceed rates of harvest overall and in all land ownership categories, with the
188 The productivity of a given stand is an important consideration in determining long-term inventories,
and in considering future inventory prognoses. Growth rates not only vary by species and location, but by
the age of the stand in question. In some cases, for example, the harvesting of old growth forests is
advocated as a means of increasing long-term inventories, as younger stands will feature higher rates of
growth (Carroll, 1995).
189 Approximately 85 million acres of the 136 million acres of public commercial timberland is located
within the National Forest system. Other major public holdings ofcommercial timberland include the O&C
lands in Oregon under BLMjurisdiction. The nation's remaining commercial timberland is held by the
forest industry (approximately 71 million acres) and by other private sources (approximately 276 million
acres).
190 However, much of this decrease was due to withdrawal of four million acres of land in Alaska for
classification as national parks or wilderness areas, as well as withdrawals of timberland in Oregon and
Washington for similar preservation purposes.
191 The category of "other removals" shows timber that was removed from the forest for a variety of reasons
other than a timber sale, including fire, disease, and mortality. Removals of dead timber do not modify
calculations of growing stock inventory.
192 Major softwood species in the West include firs (especially Douglas fir), pines (primarily Ponderosa and
Lodgepole), and spruces. In the East, major softwood species include a variety of pines (including Lobolly,
Longleaf, Red, White, and Yellow), spruces, and Balsam fir. Western hardwoods primarily include Red
alder and a variety of aspens. Eastern hardwoods forests show much greater variety, including oaks,
(especially White and Red), maple, yellow birch, sweet gum, yellow-poplar, ash, black walnut, and black
cherry.
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notable exception of forest industry lands.193 Future projections show significant increases
in softwood inventories both nationally and on the public lands.
In contrast to softwoods, only about 8 percent ofhardwood inventories (25,641
million cubic feet) as of 1991 are found in the National Forest system. Relatively small
holdings are also found in other public lands (10 percent of total) and forest industry
holdings (10 percent of total). In contrast, approximately 72 percent (242,177 million cubic
feet) are found in farm and other private holdings. Statistics for harvests and regeneration
follow a similar pattern. Of annual hardwood harvests of approximately 6,979 million cubic
feet, only 9 percent occur on National Forest or other public lands and 16 percent (1,120
million cubic feet) on forestry industry lands, leaving a remainder of 75 percent (5,252
million cubic feet) on farm and other private holdings. Overall, net annual growth (totaling
9,650 million cubic feet nationally) significantly exceeds harvests for all land ownership
categories except forest industry lands, a similar trend to that seen for softwood forests.
Hardwood inventories are expected to increase both nationally and on the public lands in
coming decades, continuing a long trend.
Clearcutting on National Forests declined between 1994 and 1995 from 100,796 to
67,899 acres, in part due to a general decline in harvesting levels. While this decline
resulted in a corresponding decrease in acres reforested, dropping from 441,000 acres in
1994 to 387,000 acres in 1995, efforts to restore the health ofNational Forests generally
were intensified. Approximately 273,000 acres received timber stand improvements in
1995, compared to 264,000 acres in 1994194, while the number of watershed improvements
increased between 1994 and 1995 from 24,836 to 35,500 acres (Forest Service, 1995a).
Market Values and Revenue Streams
Timber is among the most important cash crops in the United States economy, with
Forest Service programs contributing an estimated $123 billion to gross domestic product
(about 2 percent of total GDP) and 3.1 million jobs in 1993 (Forest Service, 1995b). The
magnitude of the public lands contribution to the industry is closely tied to harvesting levels,
which are generally declining. In 1996, approximately 3.7 BBF (billion board feet) of
National Forest timber was harvested under Forest Service contracts, a decline of more than
1 BBF from 1994 levels (Forest Service, 1997). This decline is largely a result of
environmental restrictions, especially those associated with the Spotted Owl controversy in
the Pacific Northwest, the exhaustion of easily harvested federal stands, and broader
economic trends hampering the timber industry. Timber harvest reductions in 1995 would
193 However, net growth on forest industry timbcrland averages 52 cubic feet/acre annually, higher than
lands in any other ownership category, reflecting the high productivity of intensively managed timberlands
(Forest Service, 1995a). At the other end of the spectrum are National Forest lands (growing at 40 cubic
feet/acre), which are less productive because of lower net annual growth rates resulting from less intensive
harvesting rotations and the maintenance of large areas of old-growth stands of trees with relatively little, if
any, annual growth. In fact, some old growth forests of the Pacific Northwest actually have a negative
growth rate. This observation has encouraged some timber proponents to recommend clearcutting of old-
growth stands, which would increase short-term harvests and long-term growth rates at the expense of the
old growth ecosystems. Approximately 90 percent of all old-growth forests in the Pacific Northwest have
been cut, with the remaining 10 percent located largely on public lands (BLM, 1996a:50).
194 Typical timber stand improvements include thinning, pruning, and fertilization projects.
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have been even more precipitous if not for special timber sales implemented pursuant to the
Emergency Timber Salvage Sale Program,195 which authorized an additional 1.8 BBF of
salvage volume for sale. This "rider" has expired, and further declines in harvest levels are
expected to continue.
As shown in Tables A17 and A18, receipts from federal timber harvests in 1996
exceeded $619 million, of which $544 was collected by the Forest Service. This is less than
half the level of receipts collected in 1991 (BLM, 1996a; Forest Service, 1997).
Approximately 95 percent of the remaining $75 million in 1996 federal timber receipts,
generated from BLM timber sales, came from the timber rich O&C lands of western
Oregon. BLM revenues are also declining due to the same factors affecting National Forest
harvests, and it is unlikely that projected modest increases in stumpage prices, summarized
in Table A19, will be sufficient to notably offset federal timber revenue declines.
As is done for other consumptive uses ofthe public lands, a significant proportion of
federal timber receipts are distributed back into the local economies based on formulas
unique to each type land classification (Fairfax and Yale, 1987). These funding
arrangements between Federal, State, and local governments are a means of compensating
western states with large federal landholdings immune from local property tax requirements.
One fourth of all gross revenues (i.e., receipts) generated from National Forest timber sales
are distributed to the states for expenditure on roads and schools in the counties producing
the revenues. As shown in Table A17, payments of this nature totaled over S255 million in
1996. While this is a formidable sum, National Forest timber royalty payments to states
exceeded $309 million just two years earlier, graphically illustrating one economic impact
on state and local governments of reduced federal timber sales (Forest Service, 1997). An
additional 10 percent of these revenues is also available to the Forest Service for
expenditure on roads and trail construction in the affected states.
Revenue sharing of timber receipts generated on BLM's O&C lands in western
Oregon are considerably more favorable to state and local governments (Fairfax and Yale,
1987). The O&C formula, re-authorized annually by Congress as part of the appropriations
process, directly disperses 50 percent of gross revenues to the general funds ofthe affected
counties, prorated according to each county's proportion ofthe 1925 assessed value of the
land. An additional 25 percent is generally invested in roads and O&C land productivity
projects. The local generosity of this formula is evident by examining Oregon's share of
federal forestry receipts, which total over 95 percent ofBLM and 37 percent ofForest
Service forestry receipt disbursements to states (see Tables A17 and A18). Remaining
revenues from BLM and Forest Service timber sales not allocated to state or local
governments are generally returned to the treasury, or allocated to specific federal funds
serving land or water management purposes.




Resource Inventory. Use and Prognosis
While a complete inventory ofvalues associated with water resources is well beyond
the scope of this report, at least a partial overview of these values is a needed element of a
public lands valuation as most of the major river systems of the United States originate on
the public lands, and the use and development of public land and water resources are
frequently closely related. Water is clearly the most difficult of all public land resources to
classify- nonetheless, it can be concluded that most ofthe major economic uses of water are,
at least'partially, consumptive. The most obvious exceptions are many forms of recreation
and the maintenance ofbiodiversity and undisturbed habitats, uses which are discussed later
with other primarily non-consumptive values.
Major consumptive values include water supply for domestic, industrial, and
agricultural purposes; energy production, including both hydroelectric and thermal power;
and waste disposal.196 The degree to which these water uses are truly consumptive is
influenced by many factors and by the method of accounting.197 From a quantity
standpoint, municipal and industrial water supply withdrawals, for example, are usually
mostly offset by returns of sewage flows to the same water source. Similarly, most
agricultural withdrawals also generate return flows, albeit at lower percentages. These
uses are consumptive not only in that some flows are not directly or promptly returned to
the system of origin, but these flows are returned in a somewhat degraded condition, which
limits the range and values of other potential uses. While this concept of reduced
opportunities can be applied to virtually all types of public land uses, it is particularly
relevant in the context of water since values typically accrue in the right and opportunity to
use water in a highly specified manner and time. It is this concept that justifies the
classification of hydroelectric power generation and waste disposal activities as partially
consumptive, for the water developments, facility operations, and water quality and flow
modifications associated with these operations dramatically modify the qualities and
opportunities inherent to the undistributed resource.
196 Note that commercial navigation is largely excluded from discussion in this report, as it has been
determined that the relationship between navigation industries and the public lands is generally too weak to
merit its inclusion. This, of course, is a somewhat arbitrary determination, but is based on several
observations First, many river systems in the major public land regions, especially the West, do not
support significant navigation industries. Navigation is primarily an industry confined to the main channels
of drainage basins, whereas the location of public lands is typically confined to upper watersheds.
Furthermore, where these industries do exist, the connection between this use of the stream channel is often
not closely tied to land uses. Recreational boating is discussed under the recreation heading.
197 If a sufficiently long geographic and temporal perspective is utilized, then the concept of "water
consumption" loses its utility altogether and gives way to the broader systemic perspective of the hydrologic
"^Postel (1988) estimates that 55 percent of agricultural withdrawals in the United States are not directly
returned to the water system. The magnitude of return flows from M&I uses varies significant based on
factors such as climate and season. Generally, water that is used for landscaping is not directiy returned to
the system, while most indoor water uses are almost completely returned. A M&I return rate of 70 percent
is fairly typical.
Because water often starts, but rarely ends, its journey through the hydrologic cycle
on the public lands, it is difficult if not impossible to inventory the entire water supply.
Additionally, determining the quantity of freshwater is complicated by the fact that
availability of water is influenced by technological and economic variables, and by shifting
patterns of water reuse.199 Globally, the prevailing scientific consensus is that only 3
percent of all water is freshwater, most of which is located underground or in a few massive
lakes (e g Lake Baikal and the Great Lakes), leaving only a small fraction in streams and
other freshwater bodies (White, 1988).200 Much of this surface water in the United States is
captured by impoundments. The United States is a nation of dams, with over 75,000 of
these structures at least six feet high, creating reservoirs covering 3 percent ofthe nation s
surface area and able to store approximately 60 percent of annual streamflows (Collier et
al., 1996).201 Approximately one-third of groundwater in the United States is considered to
lie'within an economically feasible pumping depth (White, 1988).
Given these considerations, most statistical assessments ofwater quantity do not
directly provide inventories, but focus on patterns of withdrawal and use. A general histonc
summary of water use in the United States is provided in Table A20. Water quality
statistics typically focus on the value of various biochemical parameters or on the suitability
of a given water body to support a specified use with predetermined water quality
requirements. Six major categories of pollutants limit the uses ofwaters: (1) disease-causing
organisms, (2) nutrients, (3) silts and suspended solids, (4) biochemical oxygen demand
(BOD) (5) salinity and total dissolved solids, and (6) toxins (Guldin, 1989).
The western United States is the location of most public lands, most federal water
supply projects (especially for irrigation), and most consumptive water uses. As shown in
199 For example improved seismic and geological surveys, well drilling, and pumping methods are
currently opening up a huge volume of water previously ignored or inaccessible. Additional* ;advance; in
water treatment methods have made the reuse of water an increasingly pracucal measure in both urban and
agricultural settings. Other technological fixes which can influence the water supply equation include
augmentation strategies such as cloud seeding, desalination, and perhaps even iceberg reclamation while
countless demand management technologies and pricing regimes are having a more immediate, if less
exciting, influence on the water balance (White, 1988).
200 Miller (1990) estimates that only 0.003 percent of all freshwater globally is readily accessible and
useable Still this amount translates to approximately 2.2 million gallons per person.
101 Guldin (1989) estimates that 2,654 of these reservoirs have capacities of 5,000 acre feet or more, with
the 574 largest structures accounting for over 90 percent of total storage. The federal government is the
owner of approximately 2,100 dams, including most large structures (USCOLD, 1997). Major federal water
projects are constructed by both the Bureau of Reclamation and the Army Corps of Engineers. While the
Corps operates under a variety of authorizing statutes, particularly related to navigation and flood control,
the Bureau is primarily guided by the Reclamation Act of 1902, which limits the agency's focus to projects
in the 17 western-most states and typically to those with a strong irrigation component. The states within
the Bureau's jurisdiction generally have large percentages of public lands.
:o2 Note that water statistics for the western United States arc typically measured in million acre-feet
(MAF), while eastern and national statistics typically are in billion gallons per day (bgd). One bgd is
approximately 1.12 MAF. , . . ,„
203 A detailed summary of water quality parameters in the United States is provided in the National Water
Summary 1990-91, prepared by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS, 1993).
204 As of 1980, federal projects supplied either full or supplementary irrigation water to over 11 million
acres of farmland (Frederick, 1988).
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Table A21, freshwater withdrawals in the West totaled approximately 179 million acre-feet
(MAF) in 1990: 140 MAF for agriculture, 17.5 MAF for domestic and commercial uses,
16.2 MAF for thermoelectric power, and 5.6 MAF for industrial and mining activities.205
Approximately 120 MAF ofthis total (or 67 percent) were from surface water sources, with
the remainder (59 MAF or 33 percent) from groundwater.20* Approximately 82 MAF of
withdrawals were used consumptively, about 75 MAF ofthis total (91 percent) being
attributed to agriculture. The high level of consumptive use by western agriculture has
significant national implications, perhaps accounting for as much as 78 percent of national
water consumption (Solley, 1997). Approximately 1,730 MAF in 1990 was used in-stream
by hydroelectric power facilities, generating 195 billion kilowatt hours of electricity. Net
generation of hydroelectric power at Bureau ofReclamation facilities exceeded 53 billion
kilowatt hours in 1996, an increase of 16 billion kWh from 1994 levels.207 An additional 80
billion kWh is annually generated by facilities of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
approximately three-fourths in the West (COE, 1997). For both agencies, the Columbia
River system is the major site of hydropower generation.208
Water use continues to increase in most areas ofthe United States, including the
West. From the period of 1960 to 1990, total water withdrawals in the West increased by
approximately 30 percent, with the percentage of withdrawals devoted to agriculture
dropping from 86 to 78 percent, while domestic uses rose from 5 to 8 percent (Solley,
1997). This rise in domestic uses was fueled by a 75 percent increase in population and by
a per capita use increase from 129 to 160 gallons per day.209 Translating statistics of this
nature into a resource prognosis is difficult given that water resources, particularly surface
water supplies, are renewed on annual cycles. Consequently, for surface water resources,
resource depletion is perhaps best described in terms of de-watered watercourses, shrinking
supplies of water reserved for the natural environment, and increased risks of shortages. A
consideration ofthese factors suggests that the water resources of the public lands will
continue to be the subject of intense use and scrutiny, as the impacts of overuse escalate.
For example, several regions dependent on flows originating in the public lands have already
lost significant percentages of functioning wetlands and riparian areas, a finding shown
205 Total water withdrawals in the United States are currently in the range of 390 MAF (Guidin, 1989).
206 Nationally, about 93 MAF (or 83 billion gallons per day, bgd), about 8 percent of total groundwater
recharge (or rate of flow), was pumped in the United States in 1985, representing about 24 percent of all
withdrawals. While over half of this total was for irrigation, it is important to note that roughly half the
United State's population depends on groundwater for domestic uses, making groundwater pollution an
acute public health concern (Guidin, 1989). This is especially true in rural areas, where groundwater
comprises approximately 96 percent of drinking water supplies (Miller, 1990).
207 A prqject-by-project accounting of this information is available at
<http://www.usbr.gov/power/data/fy96gen.htm>.
208 The Bureau ofReclamation and the Corps of Engineers own/operate seven of the ten largest
hydroelectric plants in the United States, all seven in the western United States (Driver, 1997).
209 Note that most of the fastest growing states in the nation have heavy concentrations of public lands,
suggesting that the water resources of the public lands, as well as other resources, will likely encounter
further stresses. From 1990 to 1994, the ten fastest growing states (in order) are: Nevada, Idaho, Arizona,
Colorado, Utah, Alaska, Washington, New Mexico, Georgia, and Oregon (WWPRAC, 1997).
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earlier in Table Al I.210 Furthermore, the risk of drought, already high in many public land
states, is a growing concern in many regions as the possibility of global climatic change is
considered.
For groundwater resources that are not readily renewable over short time periods,
the concept of resource depletion is much more tenable. Nationally, groundwater
consumption is well within limits of safe yield, however, many areas have acute
groundwater overdrafting problems. These problems are particularly significant in arid and
semi-arid agricultural regions, including parts ofKansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas,
and Arizona (Guldin, 1989). Much ofthis area is served by the massive Ogallala Aquifer,
which is being pumped at a level approximately 8 times that of natural recharge (Miller,
1990). Efforts to manage groundwater overdrafting can significantly impact the demands
placed on the surface water resources of the public lands.211
Market Values and Revenue Streams
Although most of the nation's rivers originate in the federal public lands, particularly
high altitude forested watersheds, water supplies are typically allocated among private
individuals and uses through state administrative and market-driven processes, utilizing a
variety of contracts, permits, and quasi-private property rights regimes. l The role of
federal agents primarily include the large-scale development of river systems, the interstate
allocation of major water systems using powers derived from the Commerce and Property
clauses, the allocation (through contracts) of water from federal projects, and in the modern
era, the regulation ofwater uses to achieve environmental and public health objectives
(WWPRAC, 1997).213 Very few of these allocation systems and legal conventions provide
210 In the West over 20 native fish species have become extinct in the past century, while approximately
100 more species, or 70 percent of all native species in the region, are endangered, threatened, or otherwise
of special concern (WWPRAC, 1997).
211 For example, the primary strategy being utilized by the City of Tucson, Arizona, to address decades of
groundwater overdrafting is the importation of Colorado River water via the Central Arizona Project. The
Colorado River Basin is 56 percent federal public lands, and over 8 percent state lands (Weatherford and
Brown, 1986).
212 In general, western water law is based on the doctrine of prior appropriation, which allows private
parties to acquire water rights by diverting currently unused (i.e., unappropriated) water from the channel
and applying it to a specified beneficial use, usually defined primarily in terms of consumptive uses. The
"first-in-time, first-in-right" principle of priority ensures that the rights of the oldest, or most senior,
appropriators are fully satisfied before those of the junior appropriators. In the East, the system of riparian
rights entities owners of riparian lands (i.e., lands adjacent to water bodies) to utilize water for "reasonable
uses." typically defined as those which do not significantly degrade the quality or quantity of the water
resource nor impose an undue inconvenience on other riparian landowners (Sax and Abrams, 1986).
Elements of both systems can be found in some of the "High Plains" states (e.g., Kansas, Oklahoma) and
the Pacific Coast states. Water rights are typically marketable under both systems, although under a
riparian doctrine, these rights are tied to the legal ownership of land. The right to use water from federal
water projects is typically allocated through contracts. The rights to transfer federal water often vary on a
case-by-case basis, but the trend is to encourage marketability (Wahl, 1989).
213 For example, eight federal statutes provide some protection to sources of groundwater, including the:
Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA); Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA); Clean Water Act (CWA); Toxic
66
tools for directly estimating market values for water, as the water itself is rarely privately
owned or valued—in fact, water is typically free. Instead, values are usufructuary in that it
is the "right" and "ability" to use water that are the real determinants ofeconomic value.
Costs paid by water users typically are designed to offset the energy and capital equipment
costs associated with transportation, and in some cases, the up-front costs associated with
acquiring the water right. These costs, however, do not necessarily correspond to market
values. A better approximation of market value is typically found by examining water
markets, as most types ofwater rights are in some way transferable. Even these figures,
however, are not always useful as subsidies and hidden costs (e.g., environmental
externalities) can distort price signals for water—as can similar market deviations found in
the energy sector—and factors such as the timing, location and reliability of allocations can
influence prices more so than simply quantities (Wahl, 1989).
Bureau of Reclamation projects are particularly fraught with subsidies and other
accounting abnormalities.214 While beneficiaries ofthese projects must repay some costs,
these repayments are limited only to the "reimbursable" project purposes, which include
water supplies for irrigation, municipal, industrial water supplies, and power generation
purposes, but exclude flood control, recreation, and fish and wildlife purpose costs.
Although a reimbursable function, irrigation water is particularly subsidized, primarily
through the use of interest-free capital construction charges, delayed repayment schedules,
and by "ability to pay" considerations. As of 1994, the General Accounting Office
estimates that irrigators have only been assessed $3.4 billion of the $7.1 billion in federal
irrigation project costs (GAO, 1996). On the other hand, with the notable exception of
environmental externalities, the hydropower component of Reclamation projects are
generally self supporting. In fact, revenues from hydropower are frequently used to help
offset the subsidies and non-reimbursable costs associated with other project purposes.
Federal hydropower revenues are not, however, based on market prices, but instead on the
costs of facility construction and operation. Federal hydropower rates are generally much
lower than market prices, which has the effect of providing an energy subsidy to major uses
of federal power—which in many regions is irrigators. As shown in Table A22 examining
the facilities managed by the Western Area Power Administration (which include the
Columbia and Colorado River hydropower networks), these subsidies are significant.
One recent study published by Resources for the Future summarizes the results of
41 studies featuring nearly 500 value estimates of water values based on different categories
of use and different geographic regions (Frederick et al., 1996). The study estimated values
associated with four major in-stream uses (waste disposal, recreation and fish and wildlife
habitat, navigation, and hydropower) and four major withdrawal uses (irrigation, industrial
processing, thermoelectric power, and domestic use). As shown in Table A23, national
economic values associated with withdrawal uses are considerably higher than in-stream
uses, with industrial processing, domestic use, and navigation being the most highly valued
uses averaging $282, $194, and $146 per acre foot, respectively. Table A24, focusing on
values for recreation and fish and wildlife habitat, is provided to illustrate how these
Substances Control Act (TSCA); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodcnticide Act (FIFRA); Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA); and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).
214 This subject is addressed in detail by GAO (1996) and Wahl (1989), among many others.
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calculations of value reflect the unique qualities of each major hydrologic region. Areas
with extreme shortages of water for environmental purposes, such as the Lower Colorado
River system, show the highest values for these uses, measured at $597 per acre foot.
While these estimates of value are based on dozens of methodological assumptions and
should be used cautiously, they do recognize that the economic value ofwater is a product
ofmany different factors.
Fees collected for federal water and power resources are used to satisfy project
repayment obligations on a project-by-project accounting basis. An additional public
revenue source is provided from the payment of hydropower license fees.215 Half of these
revenues are distributed to the states (37.5 percent ofthe total) in which the projects are
located, and to the United States Treasury (12.5 percent). The other half of revenues are
placed into the Reclamation Fund. The Reclamation Fund also collects a portion of receipts
from the sale and disposal of public lands, 95 percent ofthe proceeds from such
transactions in the West. These funds are used in the planning, construction and
maintenance of western irrigation projects. While the Reclamation Fund was originally
designed to be self supporting, congressional appropriations have far exceeded inflows to
the fund, as water and power prices assessed to irrigators have not been sufficient to recoup
federal investments (Wahl, 1989).
Primarily Non-Consumptive Uses and Values
While it is conceptually very easy to measure consumptive use values as the product
of extracted material and market prices, this same formula cannot be readily applied to
primarily non-consumptive uses and values. However, in many cases, surrogate measures
ofthe level of use can be obtained, and estimates of economic value can subsequently be
approximated. This strategy is perhaps most applicable to the quantification of recreation
activities, which are typically best measured in terms of activity levels, rather than through a
quantification of consumption. As described below, outdoor recreation is not only the
largest of the primarily non-consumptive use values, but is rapidly becoming the largest
overall economic activity in many public land regions. The rapid and largely unmanaged
growth of the outdoor recreation industry promises to have significant and, as ofyet, largely
unrecognized implications for the future of public lands management.
The value of the other major primarily non-consumptive uses of the public lands are
considerably more difficult to quantify, in large part due to the importance of"nonuse"
values. This broad category can include the value of merely knowing that wilderness or
public lands exist (i.e., existence values), including the value of vicariously experiencing
wilderness or public lands without a personal visit through either television or stories.
Quantification of these nonuse values often requires a survey approach or other contingent
valuation tool, because actual market and non-market behavior gives little hint of their true
magnitude as people do not leave a "behavior trail from which their valuations can be
215 Hydroelectric licenses are administered by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), created
under the Federal Water Power Act of 1920 (41 Stat. 1063).
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inferred" (Daily, 1997:34). As discussed in detail in Section III, it can frequently be difficult
to develop reasonable economic estimates ofthe nonuse values.
Further complicating the quantification of primarily non-consumptive uses and
values is the fact that some activities, like scientific research or environmental restoration
and preservation, are sometimes driven by economic incentives, while in other cases, the
motives are more nebulous, involving broader social or scientific goals. For example, some
advocates ofbiodiversity preservation utilize an economic justification, citing the potential
value of unique biochemicals and genetic stock in industrial applications, such as
Pharmaceuticals; others utilize arguments based on rights or other non-economic criteria, or
talk about broad objectives of ecosystem integrity that have both economic and social
dimensions. This observation suggests that it is frequently impossible to precisely
categorize or quantify the non-consumptive values on the public lands without considering
motives, something that can be very difficult to ascertain even if activity levels are known.
Although limited by these formidable methodological and philosophical
complications, the following pages provide a review ofthree major categories of primarily
non-consumptive uses and values: outdoor recreation, research and knowledge, and
biodiversity protection.
Outdoor Recreation
Resource Inventory. Use and Prognosis
A tremendous variety of outdoor recreational activities occur on the federal public
lands, ranging from highly mechanized and intensive activities such as off-road vehicle
(ORV) use and downhill skiing, to more primitive activities such as hiking and nature
photography. Other major recreational activities include sightseeing by automobile, hunting
and fishing, and boating. Most agencies maintain records of these activities, although many
such activities are poorly documented since access is often poorly controlled and fees are
frequently not collected—observations most directly applicable to recreation on BLM lands.
Recreation data is normally presented using the terms "visitors," "visitor hours," and
"visitor days." The term "visitors" is used to describe the number of different people
attending a site, or the same person entering one or more sites on multiple occasions; the
terms "visitor hours" and "visitor days," in contrast, provide a measure ofthe length oftime
spent on each visit.217
216 The methodological challenge is aptly summarized by Daum (1993:402-403): "When someone decides
to visit a park, the decision involves a real cost and also an economic choice. But when someone casts a
vote to set an area of land aside as wilderness-the type of conduct that is cited to prove the existence of
nonuse values-it is at least as plausible to explain the vote as the expression of a belief about how society
should act as to explain it as an economic choice... . [N]onuse values do not involve decisions about how
we will spend our money, but beliefs about how we and others should live our lives; in attempting to
monetize such values, one commits what a philosopher would describe as a category mistake, such as asking
for the street address of the average American family or investigating what color is three."
217 A visitor day is typically assumed to equate to 12 visitor hours, although other formulas are occasionally
used.
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Virtually all components of the federal public lands feature recreational use, with the
most intensive activity occurring on lands managed by the Forest Service, Park Service, and
BLM. In fiscal year 1996, the Forest Service recorded over 341 million visitor days on over
859 million visits. As shown (in part) in Table A25, major activities included camping,
picnicking, and swimming (87 million days); mechanized travel and viewing scenery (122
million days); hiking, horseback riding, and water travel (33 million days); winter sports (20
million days); resorts, cabins, and organization camps (18 million days); hunting (19 million
days); fishing (18 million days); non-consumptive fish and wildlife use (3 million days); and
other'miscellaneous recreational activities (21 million days). In 1995, the National Park
Service recorded over 110 million visitor days (from over 269 million visits). This total,
shown in Table A26, is approximately five times the number ofvisitors seen forty years ago
(NPS, 1995:29). Lands managed by the BLM are also increasingly becoming major
recreational destinations, attracting almost two-thirds as many recreation visitor days as the
Park Service and one-fifth of the Forest Service total (in visitor days/hours). As shown in
Table A27, the agency recorded almost 73 million visitor days in fiscal year 1996, with the
most common activities being camping, hunting and fishing, and trail activities. Over 5
million additional visitor days on BLM lands were recorded for activities requiring permits
and fees.220 Recreation is also a significant activity on many lands managed by the Fish and
Wildlife Service, Bureau of Reclamation, and Tennessee Valley Authority, among other
federal agencies.
Recreational demands on the federal public lands have increased dramatically since
the end ofWorld War II, and future increases are expected. Most projections suggest
future increases in visitation of approximately 2 percent annually for many components of
the federal public land and waterway systems.221 The Forest Service, in particular, has
recently embraced outdoor recreation as the central focus ofthe agency, primarily due to
economic considerations.222 According to Under Secretary of Agriculture Jim Lyons:
"Recreation is going to be our business in the future. By the year 2000, recreation will
amount for $97.8 billion of the $130.7 billion generated by activities on national forests.
Fish and wildlife [will] generate $12.9 billion, minerals $10.1 billion, timber $3.5 billion and
grazing about $1 billion."223 Over two-thirds of all adult Americans now participate in
some form of outdoor recreation, a fact reflected in escalating sales of outdoor recreation
equipment: e.g., sales of tents, backpacks and sleeping bags have increased from
approximately $270 million in 1992 to $450 million in 1995; mountain bike sales have
218 This figure includes all lands within the National Park System, which includes national parks;
monuments; historical, commemorative, and archeological sites; parkways; recreation areas; seashores and
lakeshores; and capital parks.
219 Given that recreational use ofBLM lands has not historically been closely monitored, agency statistics
may actually underestimate the magnitude of use.
220 Statistic adapted from Table 4-5 of Public Land Statistics. 1996 (BLM, 1996a: 127), produced by the
BLM using data from the BLMRecreation Management Information System Report #17.
221 A detailed review of outdoor recreation at federal water facilities is currently being conducted as part of
the National Recreation Lakes Study <http://www.doi.gov/nrls/>.
222 The agency projects recreational use to increase 64 percent by 2045 (Forest Service, 1995c).
223 Comments from the Western Summit on Tourism and Public Lands; December 1997.
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increased from $3.8 billion in 1993 to $4.6 billion in 1995.224 Future rapid growth in the
outdoor recreation industry is widely expected, as travel and tourism are now among the
top three employers in 34 states.225
Market Values and Revenue Streams 226
Preliminary data collected as part of the National Recreation Lakes Study
estimates that outdoor recreation now accounts for 10.5 percent of all consumer spending,
up from 6.5 percent in 1980, contributing approximately $350 billion annually to the Gross
Domestic Product. Over half of this total (about $180 billion) is generated by public lands
and waterways.227 Despite this huge economic contribution, recreation on the public lands
is highly subsidized, in part because recreational user fees are rarely correlated with
management costs, and because there is rarely an explicit connection between the amount of
revenue generated at a public land facility and the operating budget of that facility.
Additionally, most profitable recreational services on the public lands have been, or are ^
increasingly being, privatized, with most benefits flowing directly to the private sector.
As a result use fee and royalty collections from agencies rarely are sufficient to offset
management costs.229 Modest recreational user fees at Forest Service facilities totaled S46
million in 1995" Park Service receipts were approximately $80 million in 1995; and BLM
recreational receipts totaled approximately $1 million in 1996.230 Most user fee receipts are
channeled into the federal Land and Water Conservation Fund (LWCF), where they join
with the considerably larger revenues collected from Outer Continental Shelf oil and gas
leases. Expenditures from this fund—which have been declining since 1979—are used
224 Statistic is from Human Powered Outdoor Recreation: State ofthe Industry Report. 1995; available on
line at <http://www.outdoorlink.cotn/infosouice/StateOnndusUy/stateJndustiy.sect. 1.2.html>.
225 Statistic provided in USDA News by Secretary Dan Glickman (Volume 55, Number 6, July 1996)
available on-line at <http://www.usda.gov/news/pubs/newsleti/old/vol5no6/article3.hun>.
226 The National Recreation Lakes Study was authorized in the Omnibus Parks and Public Land
Management Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-333), which created a nine-member commission to "review the current
and anticipated demand for recreational opportunities at federally-managed manmade lakes and reservoirs
and "to develop alternatives for enhanced recreational use of such facilities." For more information, see
<http://www.doi.gov/nrls/>.
2:7 Preliminary research suggests that nearly 1,800 federal water facilities combine to generate over $44
billion annually in economic benefits, including 600,000 jobs and a full 46 percent of all fishing activity
(excluding the Great Lakes).
228 For example concessionaires in the National Parks generated approximately $662 million in revenues in
1995 but paid only $15 million in fees to the federal treasury. Typical federal concessionaire royalties of
only 2 or 3 percent are dramatically below those received from state parks, which average 10 to 15 percent.
Consequently, reform of concessionaire arrangements has been a hot congressional topic in recent years.
For more information, visit the website of the National Parks and Conservation
Association:<http://www.npca.org/>.
329 For example, National Park Service entrance fees are normally sufficient to cover about 5 percent of total
operating costs or one-fourth of those costs directly associated with visitor services.
^Forest Service data is from Table 58 of Report ofthe Forest Service. 1995. (Forest Service, 1995a) Park
Service data is available from Michael Doyle in Open your wallet; visit a national park. High Country
News May 27, 1996, volume 28, number 10. Available on-line at ,,„.,.
<http://www.hcn.org/1996/may27/dir/Western_Open_your.html>. BLM data is from Table 4-5 of Public
Land Statistics. 1996 (BLM, 1996a).
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primarily to fund to the purchase ofnew federal, state, and local parks, while annual ^
operating budgets are typically provided through other congressional appropriations.
One of the hottest issues in the outdoor recreation industry involves the expanded
application ofuser fees to finance recreation on the public lands.232 These proposals tend to
feature two elements: first, a recognition that user fees must be increased in order to offset
the escalating recreational management costs; and second, a belief that collected user fee
revenues should be available for agency use in the area that generates the revenues, thereby
providing a direct accountability between recreationists and resource managers. In
recognition ofthese ideas, Congress in 1996 established a four-year experimental program
known as the Recreation Fee Demonstration Program authorizing all major public land
management agencies to modify fees at selected land management units and, more
importantly, to retain 80 percent of collected revenues for use in those areas, with the
remaining 20 percent being shared regionally with other participating units. This program is
expected to be particularly useful for units of the National Park Service, which currently
have a facility maintenance backlog estimated between $4 to 6 billion.
Another option to more equitably and completely finance public outdoor recreation
is the "Teaming With Wildlife" proposal (also known as the Fish and Wildlife Diversity
Funding Initiative), developed by the International Association of Fish and Wildlife
Agencies and backed by more than 2,500 outdoor recreation groups. The proposed
program would establish taxes on the sale ofvarious types of outdoor recreation equipment,
with proceeds going to recreation-oriented public land and water management programs.
This version of private cost-sharing of public land management is modeled after the
equipment fee programs used to finance public hunting and fishing managemen^including
the Pittman-Robertson, Dingell-Johnson, and Wallop-Breaux user fee systems. Even
more controversial than the Recreational Fee Demonstration Program and related proposals
:31 The use of the LWCF is becoming a hot political issue. In 1995, only $138 million of the scheduled
$900 million from the LWCF actually went to fund park acquisitions, with the remainder being used in
totally unrelated budget areas. Further curtailment of spending is under consideration, mostly in the name
of federal budget deficit reduction.
232 The issue of public land user fees is frequently addressed in High Country News, frequently available on
line at <http://www.hcn.org/>.
233 The program is targeted at a variety of products, including backpacks, sleeping bags, tents, canoes,
mountain bikes, binoculars, film and cameras, bird feeders, field guides, recreational and sport utility
vehicles. For more information on the Teaming With Wildlife proposal, see
<http://www.gorp.com/tearmvw/>.
234 The Federal Aid in Wildlife RestoraUon (or Pittman-Robertson) Act of 1937 imposes an 11 percent
federal excise tax (originally 10 percent) on the sale of"firearms, shells, and cartridges" to fund state
wildlife research and management programs (50 Stat. 917). The Federal Aid in Fish RestoraUon (or
Dingell-Johnson) Act of 1950 provides a similar support mechanism for state sport-fishing programs,
funded by a federal excise tax on "fishing rods, creels, reels, and artificial lures, bails, and flies" (64 Stat.
431) Typically, these funds were channeled exclusively tofreshwater programs, an arrangement that
proved to be controversial in coastal states with both freshwater and marine sport-fisheries. This issue was
addressed in the Wallop-Breaux Act (section 1014 of the Tax Reform Act of 1984), which calls for these
intrastate allocations among freshwater and marine sport-fishery programs to reflect the actual distribution
of fishing activity in each recipient state. These sport-fishery programs refer generally to a 10 percent tax
on non-commercial fishing equipment and a 3 percent tax on electric outboard motors, sonar devices,
motorboat fuel and import duties on fishing tackle and boats (98 Stat. 1017-1020) (Adams, 1993).
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involving public/private partnerships in outdoor recreation, the Teaming With Wildlife
proposal currently lacks adequate congressional support to qualify as a viable short-term
alternative to federal underfiinding and subsidization of recreation on the public lands and
waterways.
Research and Knowledge
Resource Inventory. Use and Prognosis
One ofthe most difficult types of public land values to describe and quantify involve
research activities designed to generate scientific or cultural knowledge. While some of
these activities, such as the search of native plant species for new medicinal compounds or
agricultural genetic stock, can result in commercially valuable products, historical and
archeological research is rarely pursued for economic gain. Nonetheless, this information is
valuable. Researchers in dozens of fields utilize public land and water resources as their
laboratories and libraries of uncatalogued information, generating knowledge that enriches
our lives and broadens our understanding in countless ways. Additionally, the public lands
are home to many sites of religious significance, particularly for Native American peoples.
Many of these historic, archeological, and religious values are particularly significant in that
they are place-specific and consequently do not have substitutes, and can be negatively
impacted by other types of land use activities and administrative classifications.
Approximately 60 million visits per year to National Park Service historical,
commemorative, and archeological sites provide tangible evidence ofthese values (Census,
1996:250). These visitation numbers, when combined with survey data (Pokotylo and
Mason, 1991), provide a clear indication of these values. An additional, albeit negative,
indication of value is also provided by the increased commercialism and looting of historical
artifacts on the public lands (Smith and Ehrenhard, 1991; Coggins et al., 1992). Preventing
the loss of historic artifacts and knowledge on the public lands has been a recognized
federal responsibility since passage of the Antiquities Act of 1906, which authorizes the
President to "declare by public proclamation historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric
structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest that are situated upon the lands
owned or controlled by the Government of the United States to be national monuments, and
may reserve as a part thereof parcels of land."236 To the extent possible, modern
235 The most complete listing of sites of historical significance is the National Register of Historic Places, a
system of over 66,000 properties under the jurisdiction of the Park Service.
236 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433. Small and largely ineffective penalties for looting under the Antiquities Act ^
helped encourage passage of the Archaeological Resources Preservation Act of 1979, which found that: "(1)
archaeological resources on public lands and Indian lands are an accessible and irreplaceable part of the
Nation's heritage; (2) these resources are increasingly endangered because of their commercial
attractiveness; (3) existing Federal laws do not provide adequate protection to prevent the loss and
destruction of these archaeological resources and sites resulting from uncontrolled excavations and pillage;
and (4) there is a wealth of archaeological information which has been legally obtained by private
individuals for noncommercial purposes and which could voluntarily be made available to professional
archaeologists and institutions" (16 U.S.C. § 470aa(a)). Among the items covered by the legislation include
pottery, baskets, bottles, weapons and projectiles (e.g., arrowheads), tools, structures (or portions of
archeology calls for the preservation of these sites in situ (in place) in order to better
maintain the historical context and record.237
Market Values and Revenue Streams
The generation of economic revenues from research and knowledge on the public
lands is extremely difficult to quantify, and is an exercise of dubious merit since some of the
most significant values are undoubtedly of a non-economic nature. This observation is
particularly relevant to efforts to value archeological resources, which are "finite,
depletable, and nonrenewable" (Gerstenblith, 1995:564), comprising a "bank ofunique
values for future recreationists, believers, and scientists" (Knudson, 1991:5). This
observation is occasionally discussed using the phrase "cultural capital," an expression
reflecting the fact that the value of a historical site of interest is, in part, dependent upon its
cultural attributes (Berkes and Folke, 1994). The phrase also connotes that such cultural
resources are assets which should be conserved.
The predominance of non-economic values associated with research and knowledge
on the public lands does not mean, however, that this category of value is without an
explicitly economic component. A few significant sources of economic value include those
revenues associated with tourism and recreation at historic sites, the frequently illegal
marketing of cultural artifacts, and the marketing of genetic and biochemical extracts
primarily in medicinal and industrial applications. Recreation, as discussed earlier, generates
vast revenues, primarily concentrated in the private sector but still containing a notable
public component. In contrast, revenues from cultural and biochemical knowledge gained
from the public lands are much less likely to be economically significant, and in those few
cases, are typically concentrated almost exclusively in the private sector.
There is no realistic potential for collecting sizable public revenues from the
marketing of cultural artifacts, because such exchanges usually involve trade in private
collections which were amassed prior to statutory protection being extended to cultural
resources, or because such exchanges involve black-market transactions of artifacts
obtained illegally. Illegal looting of historical and archeological resources remains a serious
problem on the public lands. For example, the General Accounting Office (GAO, 1987)
conservatively estimates that one-third of all surveyed areas in the Four Corners region have
been impacted by looting, while research for the House Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs (1988) suggests the figure may be as high as 90 percent. System-wide, the Park
Service reported over six hundred thefts of artifacts from Native American sites in 1994
(Gerstenblith, 1995).238 The economic magnitude of looting, while difficult to measure, is
structures), pit houses, rock paintings, rock carvings, graves, human skeletal materials, and related items
over 100 years in age (16 U.S.C. § 470bb(l)). Additional protection is provided by the Native American
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990 dealing with Native American cultural items, human
remains, and associated funerary objectives of Native Americans (25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-13).
237 As one commentator has observed of the traditional approach to excavation, "[ajarcheology is perhaps
unique among scientific disciplines in that it destroys its own research base in the course of doing the
research. Thus, yesterday's archaeologist, no matter how competent, missed many clues" (Michel,
1991:283).
238 Keep in mind that most federal public lands have not been systematically evaluated for archeological
resources; thus the magnitude of the problem is difficult to accurately assess (Smith and Ehrenhard, 1991).
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undoubtedly large, as evidenced by the fact that ancient Anasazi pots in excellent condition
can command tens of thousands of dollars apiece in market exchanges (Shields, 1991).
Biochemical and genetic research and product development is an area where the
collection of public revenues is theoretically viable, as plant extracts account for roughly
half of all new drug discoveries, with an annual value exceeding $1 billion. The vast
majority ofthese discoveries, however, occur in tropical rainforests in the third world and
not in the temperate forests of the U.S. public lands which only rarely yield compounds of
medical value (Krutilla and Fisher, 1975).239 Perhaps holding greater economic potential in
the U.S. is rare heat-tolerant microbes found in the geothermal waters ofYellowstone
National Park. Over 40 companies are currently exploring the economic potential of these
microorganisms, and one Swiss biotechnology firm has already developed a patent on a
microbe which earns the company more than $100 million annually (Miniclier, 1997). The
potential economic value ofbiochemical discoveries on the public lands is subject to wide
speculation, as are estimates ofthe economic rationale for preserving endangered species on
the grounds of maintaining genetic stock of potential future economic application (Pearce
andMoran, 1994; Benjamin, 1997). Despite the difficulties in valuation of research
activities on the public lands, however, it is safe to conclude that these values, ofboth an
economic and non-economic nature, are significant.
Biodiversity Preservation
Resource Inventory. Use and Prognosis
Most estimates of public land values are derived from measurements ofhuman
activities, such as timber harvesting, ranching, mining, recreation, and research. Since
direct human use and economic value are often readily correlated, statistically inventories of
the public land values disproportionately focus on these types of values, perhaps leading to
the erroneous impression that use and value are synonymous. In some cases, value may be
better understood by examining the activities that society expressly forbids. In the realm of
public lands management, for example, these types of values are particularly prominent in
environmental preservation efforts, including biodiversity maintenance and the protection of
environmental amenities (primarily through pollution regulation). While policies in these
areas are influenced by economic concerns to some extent, they are primarily pursued on
non-economic grounds. This is best illustrated on the public lands by the prohibition of
activities that threaten biodiversity, and similarly, by the implementation ofmanagement
programs to rectify past environmental abuses.
Biodiversity is perhaps the most commonly utilized concept to measure overall
environmental preservation, in part because the health of species, especially predatory
species, can provide an indicator of overall environmental health. The deceptively complex
concept of biodiversity can be applied at three distinct substantive levels: genetic, species,
For example, the Bureau ofLand Management has only inventoried about 12.3 million acres, while
identifying over 200,000 properties of cultural interest located within (BLM, 1996a:Table 5-6).
239 One of the few exceptions is the bark of the Pacific Yew tree, which contains an anti-cancer agent. This
agent is now synthetically reproduced and marketed.
and ecosystem. Genetic diversity refers to gene pool diversity within a particular species
necessary for robustness and adaptability over time, such as resistance to new diseases or
the capability to evolve and adapt to meet new environmental conditions. Species diversity,
the most common measure of biodiversity, refers to the total number of species found in a
particular region or biome, generally described in relation to the pre-human condition.
Finally, ecosystem biodiversity refers to the overall variety in habitats, biotic communities,
and ecological processes in a given region, as well as diversity within individualized
ecosystems. These concepts are useful for describing the breadth of environmental
variability, but may not be sufficient to give a true picture of net variability or environmental
health, as some species, or alleles241 or ecosystems, may be represented by only a few
isolated manifestations (Pearce and Moran, 1994). Despite this shortcoming, biodiversity
provides a clear example of a public land value that is, at least in part, outside of the
economic use approach to value quantification.
The value ofecosystem-level biodiversity is perhaps best illustrated by the
popularity ofthe National Park and wilderness systems, designed to satisfy the twin goals of
environmental preservation and outdoor recreation. A more explicitly preservationist (and
regulatory) focus is provided by the Endangered Species Act (ESA),242 which currently
focuses on species-level biodiversity maintenance. The act requires federal agencies to
"insure that actions authorized, funded, or carried out by them do not jeopardize the
continued existence" of an endangered species or "result in the destruction or modification
of habitat of such species . .. ."243 It is this habitat requirement that can be particularly
salient, requiring dramatic changes to land-use policies and water development and
management regimes.244 Concerns over spotted owls and anadromous fisheries in the
Pacific Northwest, for example, have forced dramatic modifications to federal land and
water management programs, influencing hundreds of species in addition to those listed as
threatened or endangered. The impact ofthe Pacific salmonid restoration programs are
geographically widespread, influencing land and water management regimes from Alaska to
northern California, and stretching inland as far as Eastern Idaho, covering over 15,000
miles of streams in the Columbia River Basin alone (BLM, 1996b).
240 In some cases it is important to distinguish whether this point of reference refers to the onset of Anglo
civilizations, or to the earlier establishment of Native American communities in North America. One of the
most significant periods of extinctions in North America occurred in this interim period, between 15,000
and 8,000 years ago. Some researchers argue that the so-called Pleistocene megafauna extinctions can be
correlated to hunting practices of Native American communities, although this point is hotly debated
(Brown and Gibson, 1983).
2Al An allele refers to the information found at a particular gene, which is simply a specific spot on a
chromosome known to be associated with a given trait.
242 See 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1531-1543.
243 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536.
244 Loss of habitat is the primary source of species endangerment. In the United States, about 30 percent of
all forest land, 50 percent of wetlands, and most Midwestern native prairies have been converted to
agricultural uses since Anglo settlement. Ten states have lost over 70 percent of their original wetland area,
and at least 20 percent of the nation's 1 million stream miles have been modified by channelization,
reservoir construction, or other conversions (Forest Service, 1994).
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Over 3,000 plant and animal species are dependent upon the federal public lands for
at least a portion oftheir habitat needs.245 As of 1994, 909 ofthese species were listed as
threatened or endangered (FWS, 1994). The Fish and Wildlife Service is responsible for the
recovery of 893 ofthese species, while the National Marine Fisheries Service is the lead
agency responsible for the remaining 16 species.246 Approximately 41 percent ofthese
listed species are stabilized in population or are improving; seven listed species have been
recognized as extinct and subsequently delisted. As shown in Table A28, species that have
been listed the greatest length of time are enjoying the greatest stability, suggesting that the
endangered species program is at least partially successful. Reform of the program in the
near future appears likely however, in order to address concerns over costs and private
property "takings," and to more explicitly shift the focus from species to ecosystems—an
approach commonly referred to as "ecosystem management."
Market Values and Revenue Streams
A wide variety of values are associated with the preservation ofbiodiversity and
related environmental values. While some of these values can be quantified in economic
terms, most measures of biodiversity are not easily quantified due to their non-use
orientation, their justification on grounds of ethics and responsibilities, and their status as
public goods.247 In some cases, estimates of economic value can be inferred from mitigation
costs expended to rehabilitate a resource or benefits foregone through the regulation of
environmentally harmful activities.248 Also increasingly common is the use of contingent
valuation methods (i.e., surveys) to measure public willingness-to-pay to achieve the
preservation objective. For example, one recent contingent valuation study determined that
245 The habitat range of most species includes both public and private lands, a factor that greatly
complicates species recovery programs. Private landowners are frequently involved in recovery programs
through the use of Habitat Conservation Plans (HCP's), negotiated on a case-by-case basis by the
implementing agency (either the Fish and Wildlife Service or the National Marine Fisheries Service) and
the private landowner(s). HCPs generally allow the landowner to take some actions that may harm the
species in question if, in exchange, the landowner limits other actions and implements mitigation measures
to encourage species survival. These agreements usually contain a "no surprises" clause, which ensures that
if the landowner honors the terms of the original HCP agreement, they will be protected from future
regulatory actions should a more aggressive recovery effort prove to be necessary. More than half of all
listed endangered species have over 80 percent of their habitat on private lands. There are currently over
200 HCPs in operation, with another 200 in various stages of negotiation. Over 18 million acres of land are
currently subject to HCP agreements, involving over 300 threatened or endangered species (Margolis,
1997a).
246 The National Marine Fisheries Service is the lead Endangered Species Act agency in those cases
involving marine species, including anadramous fisheries (e.g., salmon).
247 In the language ofeconomics, a public good is a benefit that cannot be provided to one person without
providing it to everyone (e.g., the preservation of an endangered species). The value of public goods are
impossible to accurately infer from market processes, as these benefits are not subject to private market
transactions.
248 For example, restoration of the Bay-Delta ecosystem in Central California is expected to cost between $4
and $8 billion, allocated over 20 to 30 years. The "CALFED" program has already secured federal and
state funding commitments of approximately $2 billion, to pursue objectives of anadromous fishery
recovery, water quality improvement, water supply augmentation, flood control protection, and general
environmental restoration. (For more information on the CALFED program, visit<http://calfed.ca.gov>.
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individuals, on average, were willing-to-pay $86 apiece (or $215 billion as a nation) to
preserve the Northern Spotted Owl (Mead, 1993). A similar study on the Whooping crane
yielded willingness-to-pay estimates within the range of $21 to $149 per individual (Mead,
1993).
These figures should be used very cautiously, as willingness-to-pay estimates are
notoriously high when compared to actual spending behavior, and since the values ascribed
to these individual species are probably more reflective of the perceived worth of the
ecosystems for which these species are indicators.249 The credibility of these estimates also
suffers from the observation that species which attract the greatest media attention and are
most "photogenic" are likely to yield the greatest value estimates from the public.250
Beyond these methodological issues is the more fundamental concern about the merits of
assigning an economic value to a preservation activity promoted on grounds of rights and
responsibilities, a real but largely unavoidable concern in all contingent valuation studies.
Perhaps more illustrative is the philosophy of the Endangered Species Act, which
utilizes biological, rather than economic, criteria to determine which species are listed and
protected under recovery programs. While the program does show an obvious bias in favor
ofwell known species, the most significant of all ESA cases involved a seemingly trivial and
largely unknown species, the snail darter. In Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill.2S1 the
Supreme Court found the value of the snail darter—and, implicitly, other endangered
species—to be "incalculable," asserting that the ESA was enacted to "reverse the trend
towards species extinction, whatever the cost."252 These costs can be significant, as
evidenced by 1994 congressional appropriations to the Fish and Wildlife Service of over
$29 million for recovery efforts.253 Approximately $10 million ofthis total was allocated to
specific species recovery programs, listed in Table A29. When the full economic costs of
the regulatory actions required under these programs are considered, however, the true cost
of biodiversity preservation is considerably higher than indicated by these totals.
249 For example, many parties advocating preservation of the Northern Spotted Owl are, in reality, more
concerned about the old growth forest ecosystem of which the owl is only one member.
250 Compare public support for preservation ofbald eagles, grizzly bears, and gray wolfs, for example, to
that for the mission blue butterfly, Stephen's kangaroo rat, surf thistles, sheath-tailed bats, Santa Cruz long-
toed salamanders, black legless lizards, and Southwestern arroyo toads.
251 See 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
252 Id. at 178, 184.
253 The funding history of the federal endangered species program is reviewed by Campbell (1991).
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V: POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVES TO FEDERAL
PUBLIC LANDS MANAGEMENT: MARKETIZATION.
PRIVATIZATION. AND LOCALIZATION
No sector ofthe government is more rife with wasteful duplication,
fragmentation and undependable service than the agencies that are
involved in environmental and natural resource issues.
— Senator Ted Stevens, R-Alaska254
This quote from a recent Senate hearing on public lands management underscores a
broadly held frustration with the multiple federal agencies responsible for public lands
management. Many parties have responded to these frustrations by advocating an expanded
use of market-based tools and incentive structures to encourage improved resource
management. A tremendous variety of market-based tools are potentially applicable and are
enjoying renewed political support in the modern era as the carefully arranged marriage of
economics and environmental policy promises tremendous efficiency gains (NAPA, 1997;
NPR, 1996).
Many other disgruntled parties advocate more sweeping reforms, interjecting a
fundamental question into the public lands debate: Should the federal government retain
ownership and control ofthe public lands, encompassing 29 percent of all the land in the
United States and nearly 50 percent of the land in the 11 Western States (Pendley, 1995)?
This question, more often drawing fiery rhetoric rather than rational discussion, is not new.
There have been several periodic challenges to federal ownership of public lands throughout
American history (Cawley, 1993). Many ofthese challenges predictably occurred in the
early 1900's, as the nation completed the dramatic shift in public lands policy away from
one of federal divestment to private and state interests to the modem policy of federal land
retention (discussed in detail in Section II). For example, the establishment ofthe National
Forest system beginning in the Progressive Era generated calls for state and private (rather
than federal) ownership of public lands, proposals that gradually escalated with the
imposition of grazing fees by the Forest Service in these areas. In 1930, President Hoover
even appointed a commission recommending transfer of surface rights offederal lands to
the western states, a proposal that generated additional support following the establishment
of a comprehensive federal grazing fee program in the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934.
Similar proposals have been a prominent feature ofmodern public lands policy. For
example, the Sagebrush Rebellion of the late 1970's and early 1980's, led by a loose
coalition of western politicians and economic interests, advocated the transfer of federal
BLM lands to the states (Lehmann, 1995; Cawley, 1993).255 A lesser known offshoot of
*54 Chairman of Senate Appropriations Committee (Public Lands Hearing, 1996:1).
255 The origins of the Sagebrush Rebellion can be traced to Nevada and to the decision of the Public Land
Law Review Commission rejecting Nevada's request for a land grant of six million acres of federal public
lands to be selected over twenty years. In response to that decision, the state legislature in 1978 formally
and independently asserted a claim to public-domain lands within the state, and in 1979, enacted the
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this rebellion, led by the "new resource economists," called for the privatization of
"unneeded public lands."256 The modern progeny ofthese unsuccessful efforts are the Wise
Use Movement and its close cousin, the County Supremacy movement.2" These efforts
primarily seek to unburden local commodity users and other economic interests ofthe
public lands from federally imposed burdens, especially those associated with environmental
regulation. Increasingly, these calls for state or local control of public lands are linked with
proposals for additional resource privatization or management using market-based tools.
Both individually and collectively, these types of reform proposals have the potential
to dramatically alter the administration and management ofthe public lands. In the
following pages, several potential options for change are described and evaluated based on
how they address the most commonly cited deficiencies with the current system of federal
land management.
Criticisms of Existing Arrangements: An Overview
The management of the public lands is extremely difficult, and to the causal observer
and critic undoubtedly appears disjointed, inefficient, and ripe for reform. Overall, it costs
about 30 billion dollars annually to manage federal lands and resources (Stevens in Public
Lands Hearing, 1996). Many public land management decisions and activities require that
multiple agencies with conflicting rules, regulations, and objectives take concurring actions.
Unfortunately, interagency negotiations often degrade into seemingly chronic power
struggles among largely autonomous bureaucracies, each vying for an upper hand in what
should be, by all accounts, a more cooperative effort. These struggles are ultimately tied to
the ongoing bureaucratic competition for authority and funding appropriations, best
maintained by the zealous guarding of regions and subject matters of exclusive agency
jurisdiction. In a mechanism with Darwinian parallels, those agencies which succeed in
these battles maintain dominant positions in the bureaucratic landscape, ensuring a
"Sagebrush Rebellion Act" flatly declaring the public-domain lands in Nevada to be the property of the state
based on the "equal footing" doctrine which requires that states must be entered into the Union on equal
terms with other states (Cawley, 1993). By 1980, Utah, Arizona, New Mexico, and Wyoming had followed
suit. California passed a related bill later vetoed by Governor Jerry Brown, while in Washington, voters
rejected a referendum item upon which the relevant bill was contingent. Several other states considered
similar actions.
256 The primary accomplishment of this effort was the establishment of the Cabinet Council Working Group
on the Sale of Federal Property, a product ofthe Reagan-Bush Asset Management Program (AMP)
established in 1982 (Klyza, 1996). Based on the deliberations of the Working Group, the President's FY
1983 budget proposal called for 5 percent of all federal lands (outside of Alaska) to be sold over a five year
period, generating $17 billion. Congressional and public opposition prevented these proposals from being
acted upon.
257 Ground zero in the County Supremacy movement has been Nye County Nevada, where the Board of
Commissioner recently declared that Nevada owns all federal public lands and associated mineral rights in
the state. The County backed away from this declaration after a threatened legal skirmish with federal
attorneys, but not before defiantly authorizing the bulldozing of a National Forest road that the Forest
Service had closed.
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perpetuation of this behavior (Clarke and McCool, 1985).258 Four agencies, collectively
managing 95 percent of the federal public lands, have generally prevailed in these struggles:
the Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture; and the BLM, National Park Service,
and Fish and Wildlife Service within the Department ofInterior.
Overlapping agency authority is generally seen as duplicative and unnecessary, as
"the responsibilities of the four major Federal land management agencies have grown more
similar over time, and managing Federal lands, has [at the same time] become very
complex" (Gryszkowiec in Public Lands Hearing, 1996:23).259 One example of this overlap
in agency objectives is the fact that both the Forest Service and the BLM are required by
statute to categorize land for potential wilderness designation by Congress. While there
may have been a historical reason to divide public land management responsibilities between
different agencies, the gradual merger of objectives between agencies over time suggests to
many observers that continued agency separation serves nothing more than bureaucratic
convenience and perpetuation. Proposals to establish "super-agencies," however, generally
lack political viability, and do not necessarily provide a realistic option to interagency
specialization and conflict, instead only promising to internalize these conflicts within
branches of the new "super-agencies".260
Perhaps the most fundamental deficiency of the public lands bureaucracy is found in
the conflicting statutory mandates of the major agencies, a problem best epitomized by the
conflict-producing concept of multiple-use management. For virtually all facets of public
lands management, the magnitude of statutes and agency regulations is overwhelming in
volume and complexity, a problem increasingly compounded by the addition ofmanagement
rules from both state and local authorities that often have overlapping jurisdiction over
some aspects of the federal public lands, such as hunting and fishing. This patchwork of
frequently inconsistent regulations governing federal land management often results in an
undesirable level of bureaucratic stasis and status quo maintenance, making agencies slow
to react to new or sudden developments—natural or manmade—that arise on the public
lands.261 One obvious example is provided by the federal legacy of fire suppression on the
public lands, a policy which in many areas has allowed the build-up of fuels on the forest
floors resulting in alarmingly high fire dangers. Although it is theoretically possible to deal
with this increased fire danger through management tools such as intensive harvesting and
prescribed burning, such actions would undoubtedly conflict with priorities specified in
other federal legislation such as the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, and the Endangered
258 Note that this problem is endemic to most components of the public sector, not simply the arena of
federal public lands. Further note that this type of competitive behavior is strongly encouraged in many
facets of society, and is a fundamental tenet of the private sector. This is one of many observations that
should be factored into ongoing debates about how to best pursue increased public sector efficiencies
utilizing private sector principles.
259 Michael Gryszkowiec is Director of Planning and Reporting Resources, Community and Economic
Development Division, within the United States General Accounting Office.
260 This observation should be obvious to any student of the Department of Interior, which is notoriously
fraught with internal conflicts regarding the management of public land and water resources.
261 The hesitancy of Congress to consider or implement meaningful reforms in the budgeting process also
contributes to bureaucratic inertia (Davis, 1994).
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Species Act, which incidentally, are generally administered by federal and state agencies
other than those with primary forestry and fire management responsibilities.
Many other criticisms ofthe federal public lands bureaucracy concern the location of
decision-making authority. Of particular concern to proponents of the Sagebrush Rebellion
and the Wise Use Movement is the seemingly undemocratic tradition of empowering
"outside" federal resource managers to control public land resources most intensively
utilized by local stakeholders. One component of this larger concern is the issue of where
should management decision-making authority be housed within a federal agency: at the
level of field-level resource managers sensitive to local concerns but potentially vulnerable
to undue local influence, or at more distant regional or national headquarters, where a
broader perspective can theoretically be maintained, but where local knowledge may be
unavailable?263 Along somewhat similar lines has been the historic challenge to find an
appropriate balance within agencies among scientific decision-making, an idea particularly in
vogue in the early decades of the twentieth century, and more politically sensitive decision-
making. This issue is gaining in importance as many resource managers and stakeholders
come to fully realize the biophysical complexity of the public lands and as the strategy of
"adaptive management" becomes more widely endorsed. The apparently declining ability of
the Forest Service to make autonomous, scientifically-grounded decisions is of particular
importance to many critics of the public lands bureaucracy, especially Senator Larry Craig
of Idaho-R, Chairman of the Forests and Public Land Management Subcommittee ofthe
Energy and National Resources Committee.
262 Many of these issues are discussed in Public Lands Hearing (1996), and in particular, the comments of
Gryszkowiec.
263 No agency has provided a better laboratory on this issue than the BLM, which was generally considered
in its early years to be dominated—or "captured" in the jargon of political science—by "grazing boards"
dominated by private ranching interests (Foss, 1960). As discussed by Culhane (1981), resource managers
within the BLM eventually regained the ability to control agency decision-making processes by pitting
divergent interest groups against each other, allowing the agency some discretion to pursue policies within
the middle ground. In recent years, the agency has began experimenting with Resource Advisory Councils
(RACs) in yet another attempt to find an appropriate balance between local involvement and agency
autonomy.
264 Craig's criticisms of Forest Service decision-making generally feature the following assertions: (1)
President Clinton's administraUon has involved itself in more of the Forest Service's detailed decisions than
any other administraUon, rather than allowing the Forest Service to make decisions based on its
administrative expertise; (2) other agencies lacking specialized knowledge have vetoed Forest Service
decisions, despite the fact that decision-making expertise lies within the Forest Service; (3) Forest Service
decision-making tends to be meek and dominated by fear of legal challenge; (4) the operating costs of the
Forest Service are increasing at an unacceptable rate; (5) the Forest Service is losing its ties to local
communities because of a lack of clear responsibility to take local needs into account as part of Forest
Service decision-making; and (6) laws drafted and interpreted by the judiciary often require the Forest
Service to meet an unrealistic standard for justifying decisions that unavoidably contain uncertainty. (For
more information, see the comments of Craig in Public Lands Hearing (1996).)
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Recent Proposals for Change
While the management of the public lands can undoubtedly be improved and
administrative reforms should be explored and pursued where appropriate, ultimately it is
important to recognize that the problems associated with fragmented, overlapping, and
frequently contradictory agencies and programs are not simply a product of an out-of-
control bureaucracy, but instead reflect that the public lands support many different types of
competing uses and values. This is a situation that is unlikely to change and should not be
viewed as a "problem" that can or should be completely resolved through bureaucratic
reform. Instead, the focus of reform efforts should simply be to better clarify the priorities
and goals ofmanagement regimes, and to more efficiently pursue desired outcomes.
Potential reforms for improving public lands management come from all ends ofthe
political and ideological spectrums. Proposals range from the tweaking265 of existing
statutory regulations and administrative responsibilities to wholesale privatization of the
public lands. This report does not attempt to survey the entire spectrum of potential
innovations, but instead focuses on three major categories of reform proposals generally
focusing on the location of decision-making authority and the nature in which market
incentives and processes are utilized to efficiently pursue objectives. For the purposes of
this discussion, these three strategies are termed marketization, privatization, and
localization.766 The broad category of marketization includes those proposals calling for
the application of market incentives and pricing structures to public land management,
allowing free markets, rather than political processes, for example, to establish grazing,
recreation, and royalty fees. A closely related—but more politically ambitious and
controversial—concept is privatization, which involves formally transferring ownership or
control of public land resources into private hands. Privatization is frequently discussed in
the context of federal divestiture, which in the language ofthis report, also includes those
reform proposals described as localization. Localization refers to the formal transfer of
federal public land resources into the hands of state and local governments. While these
categories do not capture the entire spectrum of potential management reforms, this
typology does provide a useful pedagogical division for discussing those proposals that
offer the most fundamental changes in the future of federal public lands management.
Marketization
Ofthe three categories of reform proposals, the category of marketization features
the widest variety and greatest political viability of innovations, as marketization elements
can be found in most areas of existing natural resources policy. These reforms are linked
by their use of market prices and economic incentives in the management of public land
resources. Marketization proposals differ from the two divestiture options (privatization
and localization) in two significant ways. The first and most obvious distinction is that the
265 Examples of"tweaking" include proposals to incrementally improve the coordination and integration of
functions, activities, programs, and field locations, as well as modest structural reorganizations
(Gryszkowiec in Public Lands Hearing, 1996).
266 As shown in the following discussions, these categories are frequently not mutually exclusive.
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marketization option does not require a formal legal transfer ofownership from the federal
government to either private hands or to state or local governments. The second, and
closely related, distinction relates to differing philosophies regarding the appropriate role of
nongovernmental processes in establishing policy. Proponents of marketization argue that
the establishment of public lands policy is an appropriate function ofthe federal
government, and that the use of markets should be confined to the development and
implementation of strategies to ensure an efficient pursuit of these politically determined
policy objectives. In contrast, proponents of divestiture are more inclined to see a role for
nongovernmental—at least non-federal—processes in the establishment ofgoals and
policies, in addition to using markets to implement the programs designed to achieve these
goals. It is this belief in decentralized market systems for implementing resource
management, allocation and use activities that unifies these three general categories of
reform proposals.
The market oriented practices of the private sector are increasingly being viewed as
holding the solutions to the modern problems of governmental inefficiency and bureaucratic
malaise. This broad trend in public administration is seen both nationally and abroad,
influencing virtually every substantive area ofgovernmental activity. This look toward the
private sector is not surprising, given the modern public demand for a government that is
more efficient and flexible—areas where the private sector excels. At the center of this
revolution is the notion of"reinventing government," a term pioneered by Osborne and
Gaebler (1992) to describe the recent proliferation of"entrepreneurial governments"
springing from this marriage of private sector principles in public sector agencies.267
Fashioning a federal government that "works better and costs less" is the goal ofthe
National Performance Review (NPR), established in 1993 as a major cost-cutting initiative
of the Clinton-Gore Administration (NPR, 1996).268 The NPR is an active and ambitious
program requiring all federal departments and agencies to devise customer-oriented
missions and to implement strategies to improve bureaucratic efficiency.269
267 Osbome and Gaebler (1992:19-20) define entrepreneurial governments based on the typical qualities of
these entities: "Most entrepreneurial governments promote competition between service providers. They
empower citizens by pushing control out of the bureaucracy, into the community. They measure the
performance ofthe agencies, focusing not on inputs by on outcomes. They are driven by their goals—their
missions—not by their rules and regulations. They redefine their clients as customers and offer them
choices—between schools, training programs, between housing options. They prevent problems before they
emerge, rather than simply offering services afterward. They put their energies into earning money, not
simply spending it. They decentralize authority, embracing participatory management. They prefer market
mechanisms to bureaucratic mechanisms. And they focus not simply on providing public services, but on
catalyzing all sectors—public, private, and voluntary—into action to solve their community's problems."
268 The roots of the NPR can be traced, in part, to the Reagan-Bush establishment of the President's Private-
Sector Survey on Cost Control, better known as the Grace Commission after chairman J. Peter Grace. The
Commission identified 2,478 recommendations to enhance governmental efficiency, promising $424 billion
in savings over three years, and $1.9 trillion annually by the year 2000 (Grace Commission, 1984). Public
land and water resources were not a major focus of the recommended cost savings, which were later shown
to be approximately three times higher than could be realistically expected (CBO and GAO, 1984).
269 The most publicized results of the NPR program from 1993 to 1996 include the elimination of almost
one-quarter million federal jobs, an approximately $118 billion reduction in the cost of government, and a
gradual reduction in federal budget deficits (NPR, 1996).
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The gains in efficiency sought through marketization programs are best understood
by comparing the nature of incentives and activities associated with market-based regimes
and more traditional prescriptive approaches to resource management. This comparison has
been most extensively explored in the realm of pollution control, where the traditional^
regulatory approach of"command-and-control" has long been viewed as inefficient.
Market proponents correctly argue that a more efficient approach is to allow individual
polluters to devise their own production strategies and technological innovations in order to
achieve pre-determined standards.271 Not only do properly designed market systems
establish incentives for limiting emissions and for encouraging technological and procedural
innovations, these systems also allow polluters to target their pollution-minimization
activities at their most inefficient and easily upgraded facilities, or if trading systems are
utilized, allow the already efficient companies to finance pollution reduction activities at less
efficient companies or industries.
While pollution reduction efforts are frequently a desired element of improved
public lands management, the more pressing need in most cases is to limit consumption and
overuse. Again, these are situations where market processes can potentially be used in lieu
of regulatory programs to provide incentives for conservation and efficient use. As
discussed throughout this report, prices charged for federal land and water resources are
frequently held below the level of market prices, a situation which encourages
overproduction and consumption while discouraging conservation and the development of
more efficient technologies and patterns of resource use. By using market-based strategies
in these and related areas, it is theoretically possible to improve the use of virtually all public
land resources while retaining federal ownership and oversight. This is exactly the type of
proposal introduced before the 105th Congress by Representative George Miller (D-
CaUfornia), calling for the use of market-based pricing to achieve the twin goals of
environmental health and fiscal responsibility. Specifically, the bill calls for "no timber,
minerals, forage, or other natural resource owned by the United States, no Federally owned
water, and no hydroelectric energy generated at a Federal facility may be sold, leased, or
otherwise disposed ofby any department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States
for an amount less than fair market value, as determined by such department, agency, or
instrumentality."272 While this and similar sweeping reform proposals generally lack
political viability, many types of marketization reforms are moving forward incrementally.
2:0 In a command-and-control pollution abatement program, governmental agencies require polluters to
utilize specific technologies or processes in order to minimize discharges. Familiar examples include
requirements for secondary (or higher) treatment facilities for controlling wastewater pollution and the use
of smokestack scrubbers to limit airborne emissions.
271 There is a rich literature exploring the pros and cons of market-based strategies for pollution control.
The classic theoretical discussion is provided by Baumol and Oates (1988), while a more focused and
balanced review of field-level experimentation is provided by Hockenstein et al. (1997). Issues associated
with regulatory versus market strategies utilized by the Environmental Protection Agency, the nation s
primary regulator of pollution, are explored by the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA,
1997).
272 See H R. 919 the Public Resources Deficit Reduction Act of 1997, section 101(a).
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^ proposals feature a sound theoretical basis, several
arguments are raised to effectively discourage many innovations of this nature. Among the
mSenrarguments are those derived from the general fear of allowing market forces to
^ Si bli ld licy as marketbased processes are unlikely toay a role in eSablishing public lands policy, as et-ba processes are unlikely to
adeauatelv acknowledge and protect those values lying outside ofthe utilitarian
Pe sT^Sea explored in detail in Section III. Although this skepticism o markets
e it is in actuality an argument more appropriately directedatis certainly reasonable, it is in cted^
privatization schemes which effectively delegate policy-making responsibilities to
nongovernmental bodies. Marketization schemes, as defined in this report, focus
exclusively on strategies of implementation and goal achievement, not pohcy-sett.ng.
None he ss even the use of market tools for the limited purpose of goal achievement is
viewed by some parties as improperly subordinating many non-economic values. This
concern is best illustrated by the rejection of market-based pollution control strategies on
the erounds that they appear to "legitimize" pollution, whereas traditional regulatory
pro^stpl^ aLore'p'unitive relationship.273 This argument is further buoyed by the
obsfrTtion that market-based pollution control instruments have generally not performed
as well as expected (Hockenstein et al., 1997).
A more politically practical argument against marketization proposals lies in the fact
that many companies and industries have evolved around existing patterns of resource
allocation and management, and any reforms that utilize pricing andlotto■market
mechanisms to encourage behavioral changes are bound to change the distnbution of costs
Tnd benefits associated with resource use.274 Similarly, what is considered to be an
unwarranted subsidy by one group may be viewed as an appropriate support or
compensation by another (Lehmann, 1995). ™e users of public land resources
undoubtedly receive benefits, they also are likely to provide certain types of b; nefitsand^to
L incur certain costs. As some ofthese costs and benefits may not be readily ubject to
market exchange, the development of appropriate price signals can be ^edmgly
difficult-through either a political process or a market-based process Add'Uonal^,
while there is a strong national tradition of assessing fees for consumptive uses of pub c
Tan r~, man/parties use or value public lands in ways that have not tra u.na ly ^
been subjected to fees. A below-cost timber sale, for example, may otJy be below cost in
that some ofthe benefits, such as improved deer habitat, are not directly recouped in fees
m The observations of Hockenstein et al. (1997:15) are illustrative: "Although some environmemal groups
have wekSned the selective use of [market-based] instruments, others are concerned that increased
flTx^ryT nvfronmental regulation will lead to .ess protection overall ^e™^mc.^dhe
environmental community still see environmental quality as an mahenable nght that market-based
programs curtail by condoning the'right to pollute."' rMniirce
^While this observation is primarily directed at resource users, it also has implications for resource
«^ AgentsS large staffs organized to handle the duties associated with regulatory programs
^SmS^Bcipersonnelreductions or dislocations in moving to market-based programs
^e^S
ofspecies in addition to livestock, shouldn't the cost of grazing fees reflect these larger contributions to the
public good?
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assessed to the timber interests. Arguments of this nature can provide a politically
formidable and philosophically potent obstacle to the establishment of market prices tor
public land and water resources, while not discrediting the larger desire to infuse greater
efficiency and flexibility into the pursuit of management objectives.
Potential Influence of Marketi/ation in Several Substantive Areas
In order to develop an appreciation of the many complex issues that can be
associated with marketization proposals, it is useful to briefly reconsider the way m which
public land resources are currently managed and the opportunities and constraints these
existing regimes pose for potential reforms.276 Several substantive areas of public lands
management are reviewed below, focusing on the primarily consumptive uses where the
market-oriented reforms are generally most applicable.
M^i. «wi Fn.nw Resources. The category of mineral and energy resources
provides one of the best examples of differing management approaches, with hardrock
materials subject to patenting (i.e., privatization), while most other mineral and energy
resources are covered by leasing and royalty programs. Policies which permit hardrock
discoveries to be patented allow a potential public revenue stream to dissolve into private
ownership A strong case can be made that the public interest would be better served by
reform of the General Mining Law of 1872 revoking this arrangement, and instead
implementing royalty or leasing schemes 277 Certainly, leases for many resources,
pSarly the Outer Continental Shelf energy reserves, generate vast public revenues that
are made available for many purposes, including public lands management. Sumlar
programs for hardrock minerals now patentable would undoubtedly also generate vast
public revenues However, would such a program be useful in more efficiently achieving
the goals of national hardrock policy? While answering this question is essential to
evaluating the potential merits of marketization in this substantive area, existing policy is
PrOba"uPffic^ntly clear to provide real guidance. What are the most .mportant pohcy
objectives: maximizing public revenues from public mineral and energy «»urccs^or
maintaining the strength of the mining and energy industnes? Similarly, what is more
important "minimizing the loss of mineral and energy reserves and the «""«»«£,
impacts of extraction, or maximizing mineral and energy production? Utamatdy, the
potential applicability of additional marketization elements in the mineral and energy
Resources area should not be considered outside of these larger policy issues, as the utility
of a tool is inexorably linked to the nature of the intended job.
Grazing Grazing on the public lands is currently controlled by a system of leases
betweenTa^hers and federal land managers.278 Two general types of proposals are
276 This material is also useful in the evaluation of privatization and localization reforms. .
- ^onTSorProSnents are the Mineral Policy Center, who estimates that over $245 b.lhon ,n
^ihave been given away sine* 1872 through patenting and royalty-free mitung
^^^^ notUSC AS 1701-84). Currently, grazing permits may last as long as ten years, but are not
rfgms (§ 1752(h)) Leases can be terminated by the government wnh two years noUce. or
currently under consideration to better utilize market incentives in these arrangements: (1)
raise grazing fees to reflect market rates; and (2) convert grazing leases to transferable
property rights279 It is the first ofthese two proposals that is the subject of most reform
proposals in part because grazing fee increases can potentially be implemented
incrementally and without significant transformations in administrative arrangements. Any
market-based modification of grazing fees should address two conditions. First, grazing
fees on the public lands are generally only one-fifth of that seen on the private lands, a
disparity only partially explained by the generally poorer natural productivity ofthe public
rangelands (Watts and LaFrance, 1994). Second, grazing fees on public rangelands are
based on a formula that does not account for regional differences, which can be significant:
for example, private grazing fees in 1993 ranged from $11.40 (per AUM) in Montana to
$5.72 in Arizona, a disparity primarily associated with climate and aridity (Watts and
LaFrance, 1994). .
While these deficiencies can theoretically be addressed in the political process
through revised public rangeland fee formulas, they could also be addressed by market
forces if grazing leases or permits were transferable property rights. Such a system may
also have the benefit of providing stronger incentives for leaseholders to invest in range
improvements, recognizing that the value of such investments could later be recouped
through a higher market price for the associated grazing lease or permit. Of course, the
impact that a marketable property rights approach would have on public revenues would
depend upon the rules of initial allocation of rights and upon the potential continuance ot
some form on annual fee assessed by the federal government, something that is clearly
implied by the concept of marketable "leases" but not necessarily by the concept of
marketable "permits "2S0 This observation suggests that, for the public rangelands, the
issues of economic efficiency and public revenue generation are "flexibly" related, as greater
efficiency through marketization can be pursued in reforms having a wide vanety of impacts
on revenue streams.
immediately in emergency situations if reasonable compensation is prov«ded (§ 1752(g)).
evaluation over time is expected, in which AUMs can be reduced if necessary to '7™ ^^
(§1752(c)). No compensation is required for AUM reductions (See McKinley v. United States, 1993 (N.M.
D Ct 1993))
27' Again these options are not necessarily mutually exclusive; in fact, a transferable property right system
mav be the best tool to identify market rates. Also note how the second proposal to privatize a nght of
use " rather than the resource itself, blurs the line between marketization and privatization proposals. This
line is further blurred by considering the different implications between privauzing a "lease and a
^Nmc that while these considerations about public revenues streams are extremely important they do not
necessarily influence the pursuit of economic efficiency. The goals of efficiency can be achieved by
privately allocating leases/permits through public revenue-generating auctions or by simply giving existing
leaseholders marketable property rights and then allowing subsequent market transactions to facilitate
efficient relocation. This second approach has the questionable merit of providing a financial windfall to
parties who already have received decades of subsidized grazing resources, although it would nonetheless
lead to more efficient allocations of forage. The issue of recurring annual payments is similar in nature in
that the goals of efficiency are achieved by allowing market transactions, whether or not an annual rent
payment" is pan of the cost of ownership. A required lease payment would reduce the market price of the
DroDcrtv right but would not hinder the pursuit of economic efficiency1.
F ^ b ' 88
Timber. Marketization proposals pertaining to the federal timber program generally
consider the manner in which timber sales are priced,281 which in many cases leads to
"below-cost" timber sales. A below-cost timber sale is one in which the public revenues
from the sale are insufficient to cover the federal administrative costs ofmanaging and
preparing the land for the timber harvest.282 The allocation ofthe implied subsidy is a key
issue of debate, as timber proponents argue that it is the costs of non-timber management
programs, including those for recreation, grazing, and habitat and watershed maintenance,
that are most significantly subsidized.283 Additionally, it is argued that timber harvests serve
many non-timber interests in several ways: for example, by reducing fire hazards, providing
some types of desired wildlife habitats, and creating roads used by recreationists. The
counter argument is that these other uses of public forests are adequately financed through a
combination ofuser fees and national appropriations, and that a proper accounting of forest
management activities would consider the negative costs inflicted by timber harvesting
programs upon the non-timber values.
To sort through these arguments conceptually can be a difficult challenge; to
perform the actual accounting duties associated with critically analyzing such claims is even
more difficult. This is especially true given the existence of many unique Forest Service
accounting conventions used in the tabulation of below-cost timber sales.284 In an analysis
of recent timber sales in 121 public forests, Shields (1995) found 50 to feature below-cost
timber sales, as compared to 36 as computed by the Forest Service. These different
estimates reflect divergent assumptions about how costs and benefits should be tabulated
and evaluated, a complex subject matter that is central to any meaningful discussion about
the merits of additional marketization reforms for national timber harvests.
Water Resources. The use ofwater resources, most ofwhich originate on the
public lands, is a subject area with a strong history of subsidies, inefficiencies, and
281 Market forces play a partial role in determining timber sale prices. Federal timber is sold after a
competitive bidding process, in which the agency typically establishes an appraised price to guide bidders.
The accuracy of the appraisal is often highly questionable, as many bids exceed the advertised price, and in
some regions—such as the South—private timber industry data is jealously guarded making it difficult to
determine credible market stumpage prices. Sealed bids are used outside the West, often with a base price
established to ensure that the agency will have enough to set aside for the mandatory "K-V fund." The K-V
fund refers to the Knutson-Vandenberg Act, which since 1930 authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to
collect fees from National Forest timber sales to establish nurseries and to finance reforestation and related
stand improvements (Fairfax and Yale, 1987).
232 There is some debate as to whether revenues allocated to local and state governments should count in
this accounting, or whether or not it should be confined to simply receipts into the federal treasury.
Proponents of federal timber prefer the first method, as it reduces the number of timber harvests deemed
below-cost.
283 For example, Anderson (1994:2) concludes that recreationists are the "biggest pigs at the federal
trough," with federal expenditures of $1.5 billion generating only $136 million in receipts.
284 For example, Forest Service calculations omit sales of less than one million board feet. Additionally,
salvage sales are also omitted from most official Umber sale accountings, in part because salvage sales are
small and often serve non-timber interests. Salvage sales do not have to be sufficient to cover the cost of
essential reforestation for the site logged or even the costs incurred to arrange the sale, nor must they
generate any revenues for the federal Treasury. Additionally, they can be exempted from the environmental
impact process under NEPA if they are under 1 million board feet in size (Shields, 1995).
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externalities (Anderson, 1983; Frederick, 1988). Consumers of a finite water supply, for
example, rarely have reason to consider the negative opportunity costs of foregone uses; in
fact, many water consumers (as discussed in Section IV) pay nothing for the water itself,
but only for costs ofconveyance. Similarly, parties degrading the quality ofwater are rarely
assessed charges to reflect this devaluation, outside ofthe costs of regulatory compliance.
A wide variety of potential marketization proposals are theoretically available to internalize
these costs, making water use more efficient and socially equitable, and likely reducing the
demands on the water resources ofthe public lands by encouraging less consumption. The
most heralded ofthe marketization tools concern the marketing ofwater rights, an activity
that increases efficiency ofuse through market-based reallocations, but which can impose
negative "third party" impacts influencing, for example, regions and economic sectors losing
water, the natural environment, and all non-market values ofwater (NRC, 1992; Frederick,
1994). Failure to adequately consider these impacts in the design ofwater marketing
programs is likely to create new externalities, thereby eliminating any potential efficiency
gains. Less risky are marketization programs that transform existing water rate structures,
such as efforts to limit municipal consumption through uniform rate increases or by the use
of increasing block rate pricing structures (Martin et al., 1984). Policies of this nature have
tremendous potential to improve the rationality of water use without requiring wholesale
changes in legal or administrative arrangements.
Privatization and Localization
Proposals classified as privatization and localization are conceptually quite
different. Privatization, after all, shares the same market-emphasis as marketization, calling
for the formal transfer of resources to private entities presumably responsive to the
incentives provided by the economic marketplace. Localization, in contrast, generally calls
for a retention in public ownership, primarily state or local governments, or quasi-
governmental bodies such as special districts. In practice, however, proponents of
privatization and localization have much in common; in particular, a strong faith in the
economic marketplace and an equally strong distrust of the federal government.285 These
two ideas are major pillars of the conservative political philosophy, and are often most
uniformly and forcefully expressed in the rural, public land communities of the West.286
Additionally, localization is frequently viewed by proponents as an incremental step toward
a system of privatization or, if not actual privatization, a close approximation as local
economic interests are expected to exercise more influence over state and local resource
185 One of the most forceful attacks on federal land management is provided in Pendley's (1995) review,
which advocates an expanded use of private property regimes on the public lands. In contrast, the anti-
privatization argument is perhaps best articulated by Lehmann (1996).
:86 A review of the 1997-1998 Congressional directory illustrates the conservative politics of the West.
Congressional representation in the twelve westernmost states, excluding Hawaii, is highly Republican: 16
Republican Senators to just 8 Democratic; 52 Republican Representatives to 39 Democratic. California and
Oregon and the major Democratic strongholds. Furthermore, the Council of State Governments reports
that, in the 17 westernmost states, Republicans occupy the governor's office in 12 states, control the state
senate in 13 states, and control the state house in 11 states.
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managers than the more politically isolated federal land managers. For these reasons,
these two types of reform proposals are most readily discussed together, as close cousins.
In fact the only time in which it may have real utility to rigidly distinguish between these
two categories is after federal control has been successfully challenged, and the anti-federal
forces will need to determine whether the future ofthe public lands lies with private parties
or state/local governments. Despite the intensity of anti-federal rhetoric, this day will
probably not arrive in the foreseeable future.
Arguments in favor of privatization and/or localization generally begin with an
assertion that federal land management is inefficient, followed with the corollary that private
or state/local control is more efficient. Federal revenues generated on Forest Service and
BLM lands, for example, are not sufficient to cover the full operating budgets ofthese
agencies (Nelson, 1995). Critics argue that this, in part, is due to the inefficiencies of
centralized planning, such as the use of standardized grazing formulas that do not account
for regional climatic and land productivity differences. It is also, in part, due to highly
fragmented land ownership patterns in many locales, with federal holdings interspersed with
state and private lands. Many other cited sources of inefficiency can be tied to the inherent
inefficiencies of government itself, including the costs of debate and collective decision-
making electoral politics, bureaucratic turf wars, and "rent seeking" (i.e., subsidies)
behavior (Lehmann, 1995). These costs can, in theory, be reduced through localization, and
eliminated through privatization. Specifically, proponents of privatization contend that
private property regimes lead to more efficient land uses and reallocates, more consumer-
responsive land management, and provide valuable individual incentives for investments in
resources productivity and technological innovations (Lehmann, 1995). These
arguments like those reviewed earlier for marketization, are based on the notion that
economic efficiency is an important and largely ignored goal of current public lands
management. Successes achieved in the realm of marketization further legitimize the case
for privatization. F
In no sector are these arguments more forcefully articulated than in regards to forest
management, as federal, state, and private parties hold large reserves that invite
comparisons. While it should be no surprise that private forest lands are almost always
managed at a profit, it is noteworthy, according to localization proponents, that state lands
also typically generate surplus revenues. As articulated recently by Senator Craig (R-
Idaho) the federal government manages about 190 million acres of forested land, while the
states manage 153 million acres of trust lands for mining, timber, grazing, recreational
properties, and wildlife habitat.289 Although these are roughly comparable acreages of
-*' As Lehmann (1996:224) observes, "Federal agencies tend to be better funded and better staffedwith
better people than corresponding state agencies. Stale legislatures are even more vulnerable to lobbyists
ulSuonal legislaTre, beLse state legislators, unlike their fatal counterparts, ^J™"
call on a professional staff or on resources similar to the Congressional Budget Office or Office of
Technology Assessment for independent assessment of the effects of contemplated ^fa"on .
288 Keep in mind thai the privatization option not only prormses increased management efficiencies, but
sigSSant g™ eternal budgetary savings as public expenditures are ceased and potenually massrve
windfalls are collected from the initial sale of public resources (Jeffery, 1996). «ionofsla,e
» Note that many scholars utilize different assumptions and statistics than Cnug in the discussionoffla e
public lands Bates (1992:57), for example, suggests that the actual state total is actually 68 million acres.
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frequently similar lands, the state lands were managed for two-thirds less; money'than.the
federal lands as nearly every acre returned a profit to the state agencies (Craig in Public
Lands Hearing 1996). In most areas, federal forest management operates at a net loss.
Furthermore according to Senator Craig, in almost every instance the states have met or
nearly met all national environmental standards in managing state lands, and in some cases,
state lands were in better shape than federal lands. This last conclusion is supported by a
recent study conducted by Montana's Forestry Division that found that state lands were
better managed to protect against the negative watershed impacts of logging than lands in
other ownership categories (Leal, 1994).290 .
The argument in favor of more localized management of public lands also is based
on the fact that states and local governments already manage a sizable quantum of
nonfederal public lands, many of which are managed for primarily non-consumptive values.
Approximately 60 million acres of state lands, 5 million acres of county lands, and 3 million
acres of municipal lands are found in parks, recreation areas, wildlife areas, and other
forested reserves. These areas draw approximately 724 million visitors per year and about
$400 million in annual revenue (Bates, 1992). Additionally, even on the federal pubhe
lands the federal agencies with primary management responsibility frequently defer to state
or local management agencies in many substantive areas, particularly in regards to hunting
and fishing management (Bates, 1992). Many critics of federal land management see this
type of intergovernmental arrangement as a potential incremental model of reform, perhaps
leading to more formal localization or even privatization.291 Proposals featuring a formal
transfer of ownership are particularly advocated in those areas featuring highly fragmented
land ownership.
Arguments Against PrivatJ7a*i"n and Localization
Critics of existing public land arrangements make a pervasive case that federal land
management is highly inefficient, and that greater efficiency can be achieved through
fundamental reforms, especially those involving privatization. What is frequently missing
from this argument, however, is the recognition that efficiency is not an appropriate
criterion upon which to singularly evaluate federal public lands management. Government
after all is generally not designed to be a profit-maximizing enterprise. To the contrary the
jobs that fall to government are usually those that the private sector has proven itself either
unwilling or unable to perform (Wilson, 1989). Federal reservations of forest lands, for
while the Western States Land Commissioners Association identifies 370 million acres in 23 western states
(http://www.wslca.org). These discrepancies are primarily due to whether or not Alaska or eastern states are
included in the summaries, and whether lands beneath navigable waterways (including offshore lands) arc
^^surprisingly, proponents of continued federal management are quick to offer examples of poor
management under state or local regimes (Lehmann, 1996). ,.,,•■
=" Babcock's (1996) review of three current institutional models is potentially useful in designing
localization strategies featuring shared intergovernmental decision-making authority in the context of
retained federal ownership and primacy. The models reviewed include the "dual regulation moddrf
federal pollution control, the "collaborative management" model of the National Estuary Program (within
the Clean Water Act), and the "federal consistency" (or "layered federalism") model of the Coastal Zone
Management Act.
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example, occurred only after rampant deforestation by private timber barons threatened the
long-term forest resources of the nation. Similarly, the protection of non-market values on
the public lands—for example, endangered species or ecosystems, such as the old growth
forests of the Pacific Northwest—is unlikely to occur outside of governmental control.
These values can be protected through public control, however, since the goals of
governmental action are more generally shaped by concerns of equity rather than efficiency,
and more driven by the goals of citizens than consumers.293 The inherent inefficiencies of
democratic decision-making are a largely unavoidable cost associated with pursuing these
types of goals.
These concerns about the appropriateness of the efficiency criterion for evaluating
administrative regimes raise serious questions about the merits of public lands privatization.
They do not immediately challenge the concept oflocalization, as reforms in that category
still call for public land resources to remain in governmental control. However, as
discussed earlier, an important part of the localization concept is to make governmental
resource managers more directly responsive to state and local economic interests, an
objective which makes the localization proposals somewhat vulnerable to the same
criticisms levied at the privatization proposals. Furthermore, the statistics that illustrate the
greater economic efficiency of state-managed public lands (versus their federal
counterparts) can be challenged on the grounds that efficiency is an inappropriate criterion
for comparison, especially considering that state public lands are often managed in
accordance with different mandates than federal public lands. For example, profit-driven
management regimes are a common feature of many state public lands, such as school trust
lands managed to generate revenues for educational purposes. Additionally, these profits
generated on state lands remain in state, whereas significant percentages of revenues from
federal public lands management are allocated to state, local, and private interests. These
differences in accounting can significantly influence the calculation of net profits (or lack
thereof) associated with federal lands management. These observations suggest that the
transfer of federal public lands to state or local governments will either not fully achieve the
efficiency gains promised by localization proponents, or will achieve these goals only at the
cost of shifting the focus of management from the protection of public goods and non-
market values to a more explicitly profit-maximizing orientation.
292 As Loomis (199472-73) explains, many of the values and uses of the public lands are not well suited to
control through privatization: "[M]ost of the natural resources on public lands do not fit the market model
of perfectlv divisible resources, the production of which does not impinge upon any third parties. That is
forests are'more than Umber; they are watersheds, wildlife habitat, and recreation areas; cutting timber mil
affect the value these other resources provide to people outside the Umber transaction. Rivers are more than
potential hvdropower and agricultural water supply; they are fish habitat and in many cases outstanding
recreationa'l resources. Thus although many of the resources on public lands have some private marketable
component, what makes them special is that they contain a large nonmarketable public goods component
that would be largely undervalued by private market transactions."
293 The distinction between citizens and consumers was discussed in Section III, drawing upon the work of
Sagoff (1988) Generally, it was shown that market-based systems of resource allocation and management
are ideal for responding to the demands of individual consumers; however, the goals of citizens are
generally more shaped by concerns of distributional and intergenerational equity, and by concerns for non-
market values.
294 Formulas for revenue allocation arc discussed throughout Section IV.
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Two other arguments are frequently raised to challenge the localization proposals.
First is the idea that the states do not have a constitutional right to independently assume
ownership or management responsibility over the public lands, a conclusion supported by
the failed historical efforts of states, counties, and other interests to gain control over these
lands Of course, this right could be gained by state and local governments, but it would
require sweeping new legislation at the federal level-something that has not been
forthcoming since the era of federal land retention began firmly established in the 1930 s.
The second, and more pragmatic, argument is that the changes in land management policy
generally sought by the critics of federal control would not necessarily be forthcoming from
state or local governmental management (Nelson, 1995). Proponents of localization
generally see these reforms as encouraging greater land uses, especially those of an
economic nature, rather than the "locking away" of these resources through federal
environmental programs. However, it is hard to imagine that state and local governments
would be willing to continue the subsidies that encourage many current public land uses,
such as grazing, timber harvesting, mining, and recreation.29 Existing policies in these
areas encourage intensive land uses and facilitate the transfer of federal moneys into state
and local coffers, results that are potentially vulnerable under localization schemes.
.Snecific Proposals and Areas of Experimentation
As discussed earlier, proposals for public lands privatization and localization are
certainly not new, most often being articulated in the modem era as part of the Wise Use
Movement Despite modern calls for federal divestment, however, very few acres of public
land have recently left federal ownership. The sale of public lands through the decade from
1974-1983 was almost nonexistent; less land was sold in that time than in any single year
from 1950 to 1968 (Nelson, 1995). Transfer of related federal resources, such as water
projects, to nonfederal entities has also progressed slowly.296 Nonetheless federal
divestment of public land resources remains a major component of the public lands debate.
Most of the current proposals for privatization and localization remain hypothetical
academic exercises, frequently featuring a strange synthesis of theory and dogma; however,
focused legislative proposals are beginning to materialize in several areas.
Among the many privatization proposals articulated in recent years is that ofRobert
K. Davis, who advocates breaking up the public lands to focus decision-making among
295 After all, grazing fees on state managed lands, for example, are generally higher than those for federal
**The Bureau of Reclamation has recently developed a "tide transfer framework" to structure negotiations
for the transfer of federal water projects to nonfederal entities, typically water districts or municipalities. Of
the 592 water districts served by 191 Reclamation projects, approximately 50 districts and municipalities
have expressed an interest in title transfer, primarily focusing on eight projects: Clear Creek, Contra Losta,
Lower Yellowstone, Canadian River, McGee Creek, Palmetto Bend, Nampa Meridian, and Freemont
Madison Several other projects have been, or are being, considered for transfer through separate legislauve
processes including completed transfers of four projects: Rio Grande (below Elephant Butte), Vermejo
Project Boulder City Pipeline, and San Diego Aqueduct. Other projects being considered for transfer
through legislative processes include Republican River, Burley (Idaho), Carlsbad, Oroville Tonasket, and
Collbran (Garner 1997). These efforts have been encouraged by the privatization focus of the National
Performance Review program. While title transfer of Reclamation projects remains quite rare, transfer oi
O&M (operation and maintenance) functions to water districts lias been common for many decades.
smaller, more distinctly homogeneous groups (Davis, 1994).297 This innovation is seen as
promoting local experimentation and flexibility, qualities lacking in a federal government
driven by a "large, sophisticated, professionalized, and to a considerable extent self-serving
industry dedicated to accumulating and defending subsidies and benefits" (Davis, 1994:13-
14). Davis advocates a system ofwell-defined property rights that recognize local land
users as the most logical focus of land management. A considerably less drastic program of
reform is advocated by Robert H. Nelson (Nelson, in Public Lands Hearing, 1996).
Nelson suggests that control over some of the existing public lands and activities be
allocated to state, local, and private interests, based on which sector is most directly
involved with a particular area or use. Only those resources that constitute significant
national interests should remain under federal control, and those management functions
should be more logically organized within the bureaucracy. While the approach has an
obvious logic, it is difficult to imagine what process could be utilized to determine which
areas of these multidimensional resources would be best allocated to each of these sectors,
and how this resulting pattern of fragmented jurisdiction would achieve significant
improvements in administrative efficiency.299 On the other hand, an incremental and
selective pattern of federal public lands divestiture is perhaps the most practical strategy for
those parties seeking an end to federal primacy in public lands management. While not
quite serving as ends on a continuum, the proposals ofDavis and Nelson do illustrate the
wide range within which most divestment reforms are located.
Of more immediately political significance is the proposal being fashioned by
Senator Craig, Idaho-R. A major focus of Craig's bill300 is to streamline the statutory
morass guiding federal public lands policy by integrating and simplifying the Federal Land
and Policy Management Act and the National Forest Management Act, and by transferring
implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act and the Endangered Species Act
to the Forest Service and BLM, away from the Fish and Wildlife Service and the National
Marine Fisheries Service. The proposal further suggests a continuance of the multiple-use,
sustained-yield philosophy as implemented by professional resource managers. While Craig
envisions an enhanced role for the Forest Service, the proposal also calls for transferring
some public lands to the states, and transferring some day-to-day management functions of
Forest Service lands to the states under specified circumstances. Specifically, these
transfers of authority would occur only after the Chief of the Forest Service determines that
a state can properly manage the National Forest in question, and after Congress ratifies the
291 Davis is a professor at the Institute ofBehavioral Science, University of Colorado, Boulder.
298 Nelson is a Professor of Environmental Policy, School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland; and is a
Senior Fellow at the Competitive Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C.
299 One potential strategy is described by Jeffery (1996), based in part on the land inventories conducted by
the Forest Service under the National Forest Management Act. Specifically, Jeffery's plan calls for the
establishment of interdisciplinary teams to generate and review all relevant data for a given area, including
the location of natural resource features, values and uses. This data would then be subjected to public
review and comment, leading to recommendations to the relevant governmental entities about the
appropriateness of federal divestments. Once potential land transfers have been identified, public interests
could potentially be protected in the divestment process through the use of tools such as restncUve
covenants, repurchase options, eminent domain or zoning actions, and perhaps even some form of leasing




appropriate contract between Forest Service and the state agency. It seems extremely
unlikely that these conditions could ever be satisfied (Margolis, 1997b). Ofgreater
significance are the elements ofthe proposal that appear to weaken the influence of pro-
environment agencies, statutes, and appeals processes in the decision-making activities of
the Forest Service and BLM, agencies with strong ties to the extractive industries. In this
way, the proposal apparently seeks to strengthen the ties between private natural resource
industries and federal resource managers, a defacto federal divestment.
Another recent bill seeking to more explicitly encourage timber industry control of
federal forest lands involve the O&C lands in Oregon, managed by the BLM (Blumm and
Loworn, 1997). The proposed Oregon Resource Conservation Act calls for the formal
legal transfer of these lands to the State of Oregon, primarily to promote the "economic
stability of local communities."301 Proponents of the scheme claim it would increase
management efficiency, reduce federal expenditures, address issues of fragmented land
ownership, and most importantly, would facilitate increased harvests benefiting local timber
economies. Critics counter that the transfer would eviscerate or dilute many federal
environmental regulations and programs, especially those pertaining to endangered species.
Pressure to abandon the terms of the Northwest Forest Plan, for example, would be
particularly high, given that the timber harvesting restrictions ofthe plan would likely
prevent the state from managing these lands at a profit—in fact, an annual deficit of $61
million is predicted.
In several other localities within the Pacific Northwest, the role of local parties in
federal policy-making is being augmented through the rapid proliferation of dozens of
collaborative groups organized to promote improved management of forest and watershed
resources. These groups generally seek improved resource management through the
informal shifting of decision-making authority away from centralized federal agencies to
local groups of governmental and non-governmental resource managers, stakeholders, and
other concerned parties (Wondolleck and Yaffee, 1994; Kenney, 1997). The most extreme
and controversial example of this form of localization is found in the Quincy Library Group,
a collective of resource managers, environmentalists, timber industry representatives,
business people, and other citizens concerned with the management ofthe Plumas National
Forest near Quincy, California. The group organized when the competing concerns of
environmental protection and timber industry continuance appeared to be irreconcilable
through existing processes of forest planning and litigation. Operating outside of formal
forest planning processes, the group determined that if appropriate lands (e.g., riparian
areas) were set aside from development, if clearcutting were eliminated, if fire hazard
reduction programs were implemented, and if related management standards and guidelines
were adopted, significant logging in the Plumas National Forest could continue for the next
100 years (Jackson, 1995). In 1997, the group crafted this plan into legislation considered
by Congress, simultaneously drawing praise and raising eyebrows concerning the merits of
delegating federal public lands management decisions on a piecemeal basis to largely
independent local groups.302
301 The Oregon Resource Conservation Act of 1996 (SB 1662). Quote from section 5(a)(l).
30: Quincy Library Group Forest Recovery and Economic Stability Act of 1997 (SB 1028; HR 858).
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VI: CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: PARTICIPATING IN
THE VALUATION DEBATE
The value of the federal public lands is both vast and incalculable. While it is
frequently possible to quantify public and private revenues associated with specific public
land resources, activities, and programs, this information rarely paints a complete picture of
resource valuation. Of particular concern is the observation that many qualities of the
public lands are valued in ways that are not explicitly economic, thus impeding efforts to
quantify all resource values with a singular, monetary valuation criterion. Additionally,
many types ofvalues with an economic component defy easy measurement. This can be
particularly troublesome for resource goods and services that are not directly associated
with human consumption or use, and for those which are not amenable to market
transactions due to their public good orientation, their intergenerational nature, or to related
qualities promoting market failures. The proliferation of natural resource subsidies can
further hinder the use ofeconomic statistics which, despite these shortcomings, still provide
an essential empirical measure of value that is impossible to escape or ignore. For these
reasons, the authors of this report have chosen to nest the review of economic statistics
within discussions ofthe history, ideology, politics, and law of resource management,
leading to a highly socioeconomic construct of value. This is the appropriate perspective
discussed in the Introduction—an imprecise, but necessary, approach for accurately valuing
the federal public lands.
A major stimulus behind this research was the concern that some parties, particularly
public land activists, often do not have sufficient information or understanding to participate
in policy debates involving public land values. This report partially fills that void in several
ways. For starters, the information in this report can be used to describe and evaluate the
manner in which the existing legal and administrative arrangements define and allocate
particular resource values. This is highly useful background information: an understanding
of the status quo, after all, is an essential prerequisite to assessing the merits of any
proposed reform. This review may indicate a pattern of resource valuation and
management based on assumptions that are historically antiquated, methodologically
flawed, or otherwise inconsistent with prevailing societal norms of equity and efficiency,
leading to a philosophical justification for action. This information, when considered along
with a more explicit review of the particular resource value allocation of concern—
specifically values of an economic nature (e.g., revenue streams)—can then be utilized to
perform a political analysis, identifying opportunities and constraints for coalition-building,
compromise, and ultimately, problem-solving. Additional opportunities may also be
illuminated by reviewing the management traditions and innovations pertaining to other
types ofresources and resource values. Only after this full spectrum of information is
gathered and synthesized can the public land activist be expected to participate in a
meaningful and effective way in the public policy process.
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Evaluating the Reform Proposals
Merits of Marketization. Privatization, and Localization
While it is difficult to comment on the merits ofmodem reform proposals on
anything other than a case-by-case basis, it is possible to generalize about the broader issues
that shape the policy environment and how these issues should influence the overall
direction offuture reforms. The very fact that the reform of federal public lands
management remains a hotly contested issue among scholars, stakeholders, and political
leaders suggests that this kind of inquiry is useful and legitimate.
There are at least three "givens" that should be understood by all participants
contributing to this debate. First, the federal public lands involve a tremendous variety of
multifunctional and valuable resources, and the control of these resources will consequently
always be a subject of considerable controversy and competition. This is inevitable, and
should not be viewed as evidence of a dysfunctional policy environment. Second, these
fundamental controversies about the goals and objectives of resource management are the
primary root cause for many of the problems inappropriately attributed to the resource
management bureaucracy. Conflicting and overlapping agency missions, for example, are
generally best understood as being products of fundamental policy disagreements, rather
than as administrative deficiencies that can be corrected through bureaucratic reforms
pursued in isolation of these larger policy questions. And third, federal resource
managers—just like nonfederal agencies and private resource users—should be expected to
continue those behaviors that provide them with the greatest benefits. Long-term agency
success is typically best maintained by jealously guarding turf (defined both in terms of
substantive areas and geography), by continuously seeking larger budgets and expanded
decision-making authorities, by protecting those existing policies and operating norms that
have contributed to the agency's evolution and growth, and by concentrating on those
management programs that cultivate and reward supportive constituencies (Clarke and
McCool, 1985).
These observations suggest that it is the incremental and ongoing reform efforts that
have the greatest potential for making meaningful contributions to public lands
management, a conclusion supported by a review of history. Additionally, it can also be
concluded that it is of little practical benefit to attribute only to the federal resource
agencies qualities which are also seen in state and local agencies, and in somewhat similar
ways, in private companies and individuals. This is one of many considerations that has a
place within the extremely salient debate about the merits of public or private control, which
is closely linked to the decision about whether policy should be primarily driven by equity or
efficiency concerns. Ultimately, this must be recognized is a false choice, as the ideal
regime is probably one in which policy is determined through political processes primarily
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driven by concerns of equity and fairness,303 while implementation is, to the extent possible,
driven by private sector mechanisms offering efficiency, competition, and flexibility.3 4
This promise is primarily offered by those proposals categorized as marketization;
nonetheless, privatization and localization can play a role in this larger strategy. Some
public land resources—and to a greater degree, goods and services flowing from these
resources—are sufficiently isolated and marketable to facilitate various forms of
privatization.305 In many other cases, it may be appropriate to pursue localization of
decision-making functions, which then could be implemented through marketization
strategies managed by state or local, rather than federal, agencies. In most cases, however,
transboundary impacts and other interrelationships among resources and uses encourage a
continued reliance on federal primacy, improved to the extent possible through incremental
reforms and aggressively featuring marketization tools in policy implementation. This is
likely to provide the best, and most politically viable, future for the federal public lands.
Proponents of greater marketization in public lands management have identified
dozens of situations and opportunities where these tools deserve greater application. For
example, the modification of pricing and fee structures associated with public land uses is
one area that clearly deserves the intense scrutiny it is currently receiving. However, largely
lost in the debate over grazing fees and below-cost timber sales are the subsidies associated
with many other emerging uses and values of the public lands—most notably, recreation/
Those uses of the public lands which are clearly market-oriented should at least approach
self-sufficiency through user fees, which does not necessarily preclude the subsidization of
some users deemed to posses an equity-based rationale for special treatment. Those values
lacking well-defined markets, such as endangered species preservation, should be funded
303 While the narrow agendas of influential interest groups undoubtedly limit the ability of political
processes to consider broad issues of equity and fairness, the American political system offers more
potential for considering such issues than does a market-driven system, which would be responsive only to
market values and active consumers.
304 As Osborne and Gaebler (1992), the intellectual fathers of reinventing government, have observed,
effective governmental bodies are those that aggressively define problems and goals, and then establish
cooperative relationships with the private sector (including free markets) to pursue determined objectives.
The role of the public sector is to "steer" (i.e., to coordinate policy development); the role of the private
sector is to "row" (i.e., provide goods and services).
305 Ongoing efforts to privatize the functions of the federal Power Marketing Administrations are one
example. Driver (1997) provides a thoughtful review of some of the important issues associated with the
impacts of electric power industry restructuring and the future of federal hydropower.
306 The National Park system is an interesting case study (Leal and Fretwell, 1997). Initially, National
Parks paid their own way through auto and concession fees; revenue stayed in parks and managers saw a
clear link between serving visitors and having funds to manage facilities. Over time, however, the ties
between revenues and expenditures became severed, both being independently funneled through federal
coffers under congressional control. Now, as recreation levels reach an all-time high, a $4.5 billion backlog
of construction improvements has amassed, and many critics point to recreation as the most subsidized of
all public land uses (Anderson, 1994). Marketization proponents suggest that the appropriate solution—
especially given the existence of a competing private recreation industry—is to raise user fees to support
recreation activities, and to coordinate the revenues and expenditures on a park-by-park basis. Some
progress in this area is being made (Leal and Fretwell, 1997). For example, many components of the
National Park Service participating in the Recreational Fee Demonstration Project (adopted January 1,
1997} have been able to dramatically increase revenues from modified entrance and user fee structures.
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from general appropriations, or potentially from "impact fees" associated with market-based
activities that contribute to these biodiversity management challenges. Endorsing the
tools of marketization should in no way be construed as imposing a self-sufficiency
requirement on those uses and values which are explicitly non-market, or are only partially
marketable. Failure to do so would burden marketization reforms with many ofthe
deficiencies ofunwarranted privatization.
The tools and philosophies of marketization should also be utilized to review
existing revenue sharing formulas, which can provide inappropriately strong local incentives
to encourage those uses which provide local revenue-sharing, while unduly discouraging
other activities that lack revenue-sharing. The goal of providing appropriate incentives is
also central to regulatory programs designed to use market-based tools to encourage
efficient goal achievement, such as the "bubble policies" used in air pollution control that
are increasingly being considered in nonpoint water pollution control. These, and
countless other reforms of this nature, promise to best improve the quality of management
programs in a way that recognizes the diversity ofvalues and uses of public land resources,
while maintaining the tradition of public ownership and control.
What About Subsidies?
The language ofthese public land debates is increasingly being centered around the
concept ofsubsidies, a term used liberally, and often inconsistently, to normally describe
one oftwo non-exclusive situations: first, any arrangement in which beneficiaries of a
resource value do not pay the full costs of providing that value, with these deficits being
made-up by society through tax payments or other societal costs; and second, any
arrangement in which a public benefit is transferred to private hands for a level of
compensation that is below what would have been obtained through a more explicit market-
driven transaction309 Prominent public lands examples of the first category include below-
307 The "impact fee" concept provides a legitimate justification for using revenues from one activity to
finance another TTie public lands provide many examples, however, of revenue-sharing relationships that
do not feature an obvious rationale. For example, federal hydropower revenues from Bureau of Reclamation
projects are typically utilized, in part, to finance irrigation water systems and deliveries (GAO, 1996). By
using hydropower revenues to subsidize the irrigation component of a water project, Congress is essentially
articulating a belief that irrigation is a use which has a non-market component that deserves a public
subsidy—a potentially defensible position, but one that is largely hidden from public scrutiny by existing
rules of revenue allocation. In order for benefits and limitations of marketization proposals to be fully
explored, these special accounting conventions must be exposed to public scrutiny.
** The concept of a bubble is to define the amount of pollution allowed in a given region (or bubble), and
then to allow market forces to allocate among pollution-causing industries the right to contribute to that
maximum ceiling of pollution. In such a system, only the most efficient and profitable companies will
generate pollution, with less efficient or notoriously dirty emitters being driven from the marketplace. The
right to pollute within a pollution bubble is expensive, thereby encouraging technological and process
innovations that reduce emissions (Hockenstein et al., 1997).
309 Other subsidy situations can exist in the natural resources realm. For example, federal agricultural price
supports are generally considered a subsidy in that the public, through tax payments, provides a higher level
of compensation to farmers than would be available to them through unfettered market transactions.
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cost" timber sales and federal reclamation projects, while examples ofthe second category
include "preference" hydropower rates and hardrock mining patenting procedures (Munson,
1994).310 Several specific sources of natural resource subsidies are described in Table A30
(House Report, 1994:11). The General Accounting Office conservatively suggests that
federal subsidies for mining, grazing, logging, and recreation industries on federal lands and
waterways exceeds $1 billion annually, a figure that is likely quite conservative (Losos et
al., 1995).
All types of subsidies are increasingly controversial in this era ofbudgetary
constraints, especially when many natural resources benefits ofthe public lands can, in
theory, be provided at a net profit to the public. Among the parties making this
conceptually simple observation is the General Accounting Office (GAO, 1992:13), who
has recommended that the federal government should:
... (1) seek a better return for the sale or use of the mineral, renewable, and
other natural resources on its lands; (2) cover programs' costs to the extent
reasonable and make some programs revenue producers rather than
contributors to the national debts, as they are now; and (3) provide a
revenue base that can be used to better manage and improve federal lands so
that they will remain a viable public resource in the future.311
This is certainly not a novel idea; in fact, it is largely consistent with language found in the
Federal Land Policy Management Act (FLPMA) of 1976 in which "Congress declares that
it is the policy ofthe United States that... the United States shall receive fair market value
of the use ofthe public lands and their resources unless otherwise prohibited by statute.'"12
What is frequently missing from the subsidy debates, however, is the recognition
that subsidies are not always unwarranted. Subsidies are used in virtually all policy arenas
to stimulate desired behaviors, promote useful innovations, to compensate for past abuses,
to provide opportunities, and to correct for market failures. A century ago, federal
subsidies to railroads and later irrigation districts, for example, were instrumental in
achieving important national goals ofwestern settlement; similarly, in the modern era,
scientific and technological subsidies, such as tax breaks for renewable energy technologies,
may likely play an important role in achieving modem objectives of resource
sustainability.313 These observations have prompted Wilkinson (1992:19) to caution that
310 The term "preference power" is used to describe certain classes ofelectricity users who are empowered to
purchase federally-generated power at a rate below that paid by other users. Preference power is typically
provided to rural and/or agricultural users, reflecting a historic national objective of rural electrification.
311 The GAO (1992) estimates that additional federal revenues of $4.5 billion annually could be achieved by
eliminating major natural resource subsidies.
312 43 U.S.C. § 170l(a).
313 For example, as part of the debate surrounding the enactment of the Hardrock Mining Act of 1872,
Congressman Aaron Sargent was quoted as making the following argument: "We are inducing miners to
purchase their claims, so that large amounts of money are brought into the Treasury of the United States,
causing the miners to settle themselves permanently... and in every way to improve their own condition
and to build the communities and States where they reside" (Quoted in House Report, 1994: 111; emphasis
added).
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"the real objection .. . ought not to be to subsidies generally, but to irrational or
unexamined subsidies." This is the appropriate perspective from which to approach the
subsidy debate, even though that in accepting this premise, the analyst must acknowledge
that the determination ofwhat is "rational" is destined to be an inexact science best
approached through a political exercise. Policy-makers burdened with these responsibilities
should seek out and utilize economic valuation statistics as part of these efforts, but
ultimately, determining what is a rational subsidy will require balancing resource values of
both an economic and non-economic nature. This is probably best accomplished through a
non-quantitative approach that considers factors such as the appropriateness ofthe
incentives provided, the economic and social commitments implied, the investments made,
and the objectives found in the underlying policies.
With these formidable caveats in mind, a thoughtful and comprehensive examination
of natural resource subsidies should be encouraged as part of the ongoing assessment and
review of public land values and policies. Even if non-market values are afforded
appropriate consideration in these examinations—something not consistently seen in many
ongoing subsidy debates—it is still highly likely that many, if not most, existing subsidy
arrangements will be found to be at least partially inappropriate. This observation is
particularly relevant to the West, as the "New West" is considerably different than the
territorial region upon which many subsidy regimes were originally targeted (Wilkinson,
1992). Many parties are convinced that we are destined as a nation to pay twice for these
natural resource subsidies: once to subsidize the development of resource extraction
economies, and twice to mitigate the resulting environmental and socioeconomic impacts
associated with the transformation to more sustainable uses ofthe public lands and
waterways (Losos et al., 1995). In many public land communities, this process is already
well underway. This should not be a cause for discouragement, however, as shifting public
objectives will inevitably require the abandonment of some past investments and the
increment ofsome new costs. This is inevitable byproduct of maturation. The challenge
now, as always, will be to do this gracefully and compassionately, in a manner which is
guided by wisdom more so than dogma, and that recognizes that we not only will be here
for a long time, but we have been here for a long time. Inherent in both perspectives are
values that defy easy explanation and elude quantification, but that merit our continued
respect and attention.
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VII. APPENDIX: STATISTICAL TABLES
The following pages contain thirty tables of empirical data summarizing various
facets of public land attributes, usage, and values. Each of these tables was referenced
earlier in the text, in most cases in Section IV. Most tables are a synthesis or summary of
information originally published elsewhere in a slightly different format. Modifications have
been made, as necessary, to improve the clarity and presentation of the data. The reader is
strongly encouraged to consult the original data sources for a greater explanation ofthe
figures provided, and to develop independent opinions as to the credibility of the estimates.
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Table Al. Mineral Production in the United States, 1990 and 1994.



































































Thousand metric tons 1,590
Metric tons 294
Million metric tons 57.0
Thousand metric tons 497
Thousand metric tons 139
Kilograms U810
Metric tons 2,121


























Adapted from- Census (1996:Table 1146). Most measurements are derived from mine
shipments, mine sales, or marketable production. Unless otherwise indicated for trace
elements, units are for recoverable content.
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Table A2. Mining Claims Recorded by the BLM, 1976 through FY 1996.
Administrative Total Claims a. New Claims VffX" E^onST






































































Adapted from: BLM (1996a:100, Table 3-19). The "Eastern States" designation includes
all states bordering, or east of, the Mississippi River.
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Table A3. Federal and Indian Leases for Oil, Gas, and Mining, FY 1997




































Sub-Total 325 1,146 M71
Summary: Oil, Gas, and Mining Leases
Federal onshore 20,135 44,771 64,906
Federal offshore 2,009 5,685 7,694
Indian 3,772 140 3,912
Total 25,916 50,596 76,512
Adapted from: MMS (1998:29, Table 17).
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Table A4. Disposition of Materials Tracked by the BLM Through Exclusive Sales,











































































































































































































































Adapted from: BLM (1996a:93-98, Table 3-17). Based on aggregated statistics for sand,
stone, gravel, pumice, clay, calcium, gemstone, and soil.
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Adapted from: NdMS (1998:11, Table 8).
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Table A6. Disbursement of Leasing Revenues Collected by the MMS and BLM, FY 1982 to FY 1997.



































































































































































Adapted from: MMS (1998:9, Table 7).
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Table A7. Disbursement of Leasing Revenues Collected by the MMS and BLM to
States, FY 1997.




































































































































TOTAL 116,132 569,422 685,554
Adapted from: MMS (1998:3-5, Tables 3 and 5). States receiving less than $500 in











Table A8. Grazing on Lands Management by the Forest Service, FY 1996.
Cattle Horses and Burros Sheep and Goats TOTALS
Number of




1,260,265 7,921,868 9,867 56,056 958,929 837,800 2,229,061 8,815,724
1,157,939 6,803,617 9,342 51,638 859,195 689,829 2,026,476 7,545,084
2,479 6,835 521 6,412 2,350 120 5,350 13,367
505 266 103 5,985 424 6,593 696










7,521 9,361 57,372 314,178
26,373
4,271
Adapted from: Forest Service (1997:117, Table 31).
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Table A9. Grazing on Lands Managed by the BLM, FY 1996.
Section 3 Lands Section 15 Lands
AUMs Number of Permits AUMs
Administrative



















































Totals 11,900 11,608,366 6,895 1,477,969
Adapted from: BLM (1996a:64-65, Table 3-7 and 3-8). Note that this data is by
administrative state, rather than by geographic state. While the two regions are typically
quite similar, notable exceptions exist. For example, California BLM administers some
lands within Nevada, thus the California administrative state contains some lands that are
actually within Nevada.
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Table A10. Condition of Selected BLM Rangelands, 1989.



































































































































Adapted from: NWF and NRDC (1989:5-6, Tables 1 and 2).
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Adapted from: BLM (1996a:34, Table 2-2).
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Table A12. Grazing Revenues on the Federal Public Lands, FY 1996.






























































Adapted from: BLM (1996a:lO6, Table 3-23) and Forest Service (1997:150, Table 58).
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Table A13. Formula for the Calculation of Federal Grazing Fees.
(FVI + BCPI-PPI)
Calculated Fee (CF) = $1.23 *
100
FVI = Forage Value Index. This is an index of private grazing land lease
rates (PGLLR) for eleven states.
BCPI = Beef Cattle Price Index. This is an index ofU. S. Department of
Agriculture prices ofbeef cattle over 500 pounds.
PPI = Prices Paid Index. This is an index of prices that livestock producers
must pay for selected production input items.
Taken from the Public Range Improvement Act of 1978 (43 U.S. C. § 1905). The use of
this formula was extended indefinitely by order ofPresident Reagan in 1986 (Executive
Order No. 12,548, 3 C.F.R. 188) (Olinger, 1998).
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Table A14. National Timber Harvest and Inventory Statistics by Ownership
Category.
Projections
































































































































































































































Adapted from Haynes et al. (1995:44, Table 34). The category of"other removals" can
include a variety of factors other than timber harvests that result in extracted timber,
including non-commercial thinnings, fire, disease, and conversion of forestlands to other
uses or classifications.
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Adapted from Haynes et al. (1995:18, Table 9). The category of "other removals" can
include a variety of factors other than timber harvests that result in extracted timber,
including non-commercial thinnings, fire, disease, and conversion of forestlands to other
uses or classifications.
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Adapted from Haynes et al. (1995:20, Table 10). The category of "other removals" can
include a variety of factors other than timber harvests that result in extracted timber,
including non-commercial thinnings, fire, disease, and conversion of forestlands to other
uses or classifications.
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Adapted from: Forest Service (1997:112 and 125, Tables 26 and 37). Over two-thirds of
all Forest Service receipts are from timber activities.
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Adapted from: BLM (1996a:66, Table 3-9). The category of"non-timber forest
products" includes items such as Christmas trees, mushrooms, cactus, seeds, nuts, bark,
and related materials. The O&C lands are in the western Oregon administrative region.
Some numbers do not add correctly due to rounding.
»■*,
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Table A19. Stumpage Prices in the United States in Constant (1982) Dollars.
Projections







Pacific Northwest (w/o Alaska)
Douglas fir subregion
Ponderosa Pine subregion
Pacific Southwest (w/o Hawaii)




































































Adapted from: Haynes et al. (1995:36, Table 26).
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Table A20. Historical Summary of Water Use in the United States as a Function of
Population, 1950 to 1980.
Estimated water use in billion gallons per day






























Surface Water (fresh and saline)
Groundwater (fresh and saline)
Total Freshwater Consumption

























Adapted from: Solley et al. (1988:124, Table 10-4). Some numbers do not add correctly
due to rounding and due to different assumptions and data sources. All values are
estimates for the 50 states with the following modifications: the 1950 data does not
include water use estimates for Alaska and Hawaii; the 1970 data also includes Puerto
Rico; the 1980 data also include Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. Consumptive use






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A22. Projected Differences in Hydropower Rates and Resulting Revenue
Streams Between the WAPA (Western Area Power Administration) Rate Structure
and Market Rates.
WAPA Sub-Region
Pick-Sloan / Upper Great Plains
WAPA's Rates
Market Rates
All Rates are Projected in mills/kWh
= :
year: 2000 2005 2010 2015
14.5 15.5 18.0 19.7
31.2 34.4 38.0 42.0
Net Present Value ofDifference












Net Present Value ofDifference
Over a 20 Year Period (1998-2018) $ 1.278 billion
Salt Lake City Area / Integrated Projects
20.2 20.9 22.1 23.3
31-2 34-5 381 42'°
Net Present Value ofDifference
Over a 20 Year Period (1998-2018) $ 0.952 billion
Loveland/Rocky Mountain
WAPA's Rates 24.5 27.5 30.0 31.7
Market Rates 28.6 31.6 34.9 38.5
Net Present Value ofDifference
Over a 20 Year Period (1998-2018) $ 0.086 billion
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Table A22 continued





Net Present Value of Difference
Over a 20 Year Period (1998-2018)
REGIONAL TOTAL
Net Present Value ofDifference












Adapted from: Driver (1997:14, Table 4). Values are for long-term, firm power.
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Table A23. Summary of Economic Value Estimates for Water by Use and Location
in Constant (1994) Dollars.



























































































Adapted from: Frederick et al. (1996:9, Tables 3.1 and 3.2). Please consult the source
material for a full discussion of methodological assumptions.
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Table A24. Summary of Economic Value Estimates (in Constant 1994 Dollars) for
Water in Recreation and Fish and Wildlife Habitat Uses.
Dollars per acre-foot Estimates
Water Use Used
Classification Average Median Minimum Maximum (n)
By Type ofUse
Fishing 34 5 0 2,642 158
Wildlife Refuges 24 6 1 404 44
Fishing &
Whitewater 1,042 1,505 6 1,615 3
Whitewater 9 9 5 12 4
Shoreline Recreation 19 19 17 21 2
By Region
New England 4 0 12 6
Mid-Atlantic 6 3 9 7
S.Atlantic-Gulf 3 17 9
Great Lakes 9 1 42 8
Ohio 3 0 8 14
Tennessee 2 14 4
Upper MI 4 0 12 10
Lower MI 0 0 0 5
Souris-Red-Rainy 3 3 3 1
Missouri 14 0 95 29
AK-Red-White 21 0 187 12
Texas-Gulf 8 3 15 5
Rio Grande 313 6 1,615 12
Upper CO 51 5 70 8
Lower CO 597 62 2,642 5
Great Basin 60 0 461 9
Pacific NW 1 0 3 13
California 27 0 404 48
unspecified 19 12 32 6
Adapted from: Frederick et al. (1996:22, Tables 4.2 and 4.3). Please consult the source
material for a full discussion of methodological assumptions.
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Table A2S. Recreational Visits in the National Forest System, FY 1996.



















































































































































Adapted from: Forest Service (1997:72-73, Table 11). A visitor day is 12 hours of
visitation. Visits is a measure of entries into the system for a recreational purpose. Visitor
days and visits are not directly related in that only the visitor day calculation includes a
time component. Colorado data is for 1995; Oregon and Washington data is for 1994.
Totals may not add correctly due to rounding.
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Table A26. Recreational Visits to National Park Service Lands, FY 1995.













































































































Adapted from: NPS (1995:3, Tables 2 and 3). States not listed do not have
National Park Service recreational facilities.
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Adapted from: BLM (1996a: 123, Table 4-1).
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Table A28. Status and Population Trends (as of 1994) of Listed Species Based on




























Adapted from: FWS (1994:12, Table 1). Approximately 1 percent (7 species) listed
between 1968 and 1993 have been ofBcially recognized as extinct and consequently
delisted.
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Adapted from: FWS (1994:29, Table 3).
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Table 30. Some Sources of Federal Natural Resource Subsidies, by Activity.
Mineral Extraction Other Activities
Subsidy Mechanism Hardrock Leasable Salable Irrigation Hydropower Grazing Recreation Timber
Free use of resources and direct
payments to operators X
Royalty forgiveness schemes and
artifically low royalty rates
X
Sale or lease of property, resources,
or services at below market prices X X
Favorable treatment for operators
under the tax code X
X X
Prices that yield insufficient
revenue to cover program costs X
Site-specific benefits for
certain operators ?






















Adapted from: House Report (1994:11).
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